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The 1955-1975 period was one in which substantial economic growth occurred 
in Western Europe; growth which was aided considerably by relatively cheap 
energy in the period to 1975* Throughout the period, the methodology of 
energy demand forecasting developed with improvements in the data base, 
sector analyses and more explicit forecasts linked to country and world 
economic forecasts. However, the experiments with mechanistic methods 
of forecasting proved disappointing.
A detailed study made of the precision of the many forecasts published 
provides guidelines for assessing the reliability of current forecasts.
This experience however is best used to supplement the knowledge of the 
uncertainties inherent in current forecasts and should not be used in a 
purely mechanistic way. Prom a study of the relationships existing between 
macroeconomic variables and energy consumption, the problems in using these 
relationships for energy forecasting are highlighted.
Energy price formation is shown to be a function of the world energy 
environment in spite of European governments' ambitions to closely control 
energy prices as an integral part of their energy policies. In this 
connection, the importance of the Rotterdam oil products market and its 
influence on individual countries1 energy prices was‘' studied‘.in depth.
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AFRA Average fre ight rate assessment.
v Made by a panel of London Tanker Brokers
Barge Prices \ Prices fo r 5000 tonne lots or less.
b/d barrels per day
Cargo Prices Prices for more than 5000 tonne lots.
CEGB 71 le Central E lec tric ity  Generating Board of the UK
CIF Cost including fre ight
CODU Crude oil d istilla tion unit.
Days Stock Stock of energy products in days supply, usually w ith
reference to consumption rate in last whole year.
FO Fuel oil.
FOB Free on board (fre ight charges not included)
GNP Gross national product.
GO Gas oil
GP General purpose tanker; 16500 to 24999 tons s.d.w.
GPW Gross product worth.
HFO Heavy fuel oil.
High Factor See Low Factor
IEA International Energy Agency.
IP Index of industrial production.
LDF Light d istilla te  feedstock; see naphtha.
LR1 Large range 1 tanker; 45000 to 79999 tons s.d.w.
LR2 Large range 2 tanker; 80000 to 159999 tons s.d.w.
Low Factor The low factor quotes the energy actually produced by
nuclear (or hydro) power. To replace the e le c tric ity  
provided by a nuclear power station from  a station 
fuelled by fossil fuels would require an input of 
approximately three times the amount of fossil fuel. 
This replacement value of nuclear power is termed the 
high factor.
Mogas Motor gasoline (Petrol in the UK)
MR Medium range tanker; 25000 to 44999 tons s.d.w.
Naphtha A petroleum d istilla te  in the boiling range 15°C to
185°C.
NCB The National Coal Board of the UK.
NWE North West Europe,
o.e. Oil equivalent
i
OECD Organisation fo r Economic Cooperation and
/ Development.
PDI Personal disposable income.
PG Persian Gulf.
PIW Petroleum Intelligence Weekly.
PMS Premium motor sp irit.
Q Quarter of the year.
RMS Regular motor spirit.
S Sulphur.
s.d.w. Summer dead weight.
Slate The pattern or m ixture of crude oils
SOEC Statistical O ffice of the European Communities at
Luxemburg.
ton The long ton = 1.016 tonne
tonne The m etric tonne = 1000 kg
. VLCC Very large crude carrier; 160000 to 320000 tons s.d.w.
W Worldscale rate -for tankers.
WE Western Europe.
INTRODUCTION
The objectives of this thesis are:
- to analyse the methods of energy forecasting as applied in Western Europe in 
the twenty years ending 1975 and to test the forecasts for the ir precision;
to trace and analyse the development o f energy prices in Europe in the same 
period;
j
-  and in the ligh t o f the above, comment in an analytical way on European 
energy policy.
For this purpose, — -
Part I provides the background, describing b rie fly  economic growth, the 
energy scene, and the development of the energy industries in Europe;
Part II deals w ith  the methodology of forecasting, and
Part III w ith the precision of the forecasts.
Part IV discusses relationships between some macroeconomic variables and 
energy consumption, w ith special attention to the petrochemical sector;
Part V is about the formation of energy prices, w ith a discussion o f the 
Rotterdam (oil products) market which occupies a special place in European 
trade.
Part VI pulls together the messages of the studies on forecasting and prices 
insofar as they as relevant to energy policy and discusses certain aspects o f the 
la tte r in some detail. Finally,
Part VII contains a summary of the six main chapters and some concluding 
thoughts.
The supporting material is appended.
-  1 -
PART 1
The Economy and Energy Supplies
The development of the Western European economy 1955-1975
For the hundred years prior to 1955, economic growth in Europe* had 
averaged about two per cent per annum. In the period from the firs t 
world war to 1950 the major countries all had real GNP growth rates of 
substantially less than two per cent, w ith France being below one per 
cent. American aid and its e ffic ien t distribution, helped by the 
formation of OEEC in 1948, sparked o ff a rapid recovery of economic 
ac tiv ity  which led to record economic growth from  1955 to 1973. 
Although there were minor setbacks such as those in line w ith  the 
American recessions of 1957/58, 1960/61 and 1970, European economic 
growth was about 4-| per cent per annum from  1955 to 1973. ' - - r
Western Europe’s share in to ta l OECD output (GNP) rose from  35% in 
1955 to 39% in 1970 and as may be seen from  Table 1.1, the European 
economy was a major part of the OECD Economy throughout the period.
Table 1.1 - Gross Domestic Product, Per Cent o f Total OECD
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975
Western Europe 35 38 38 39 39
North America 61 57 56 52 50
Japan 4 , 5 6 10 11
Source: OECD Economic Indicators
During the 1960s the growth of the economy was lower in North America 
than in Europe but the rate in Japan was higher.
♦where not otherwise stated, ’’economic growth" means growth in real 
GNP. Growth rates quoted are annual average compound rates. 'Europe' 
means Western Europe throughout.
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Table 1 .2  - Comparison of Western Europe, USA and Japan 1955-1973
Energy consumption 
(m illion  m etric 
tonnes oil " 
equivalent)
/ 1933 1973 1955 1973 1955 1973 1955 1973
Western Europe 316 378 304 691 960 1830 484 1261
U .S .A . 165 210 475 966 2880 4600 857 1828
Japan 89 108 31 184 350 1700 44 356
Source: OECD Economic Indicators and Appendix 2
In all the European countries, governments pursued policies of fu ll 
employment and trade expansion.
International co-operation also fostered economic growth and 
international organisations, such as the OECD, promoted economic 
planning. For example, in 1963 the OECD announced* a target of a 30 
per cent increase in the real GNP o f its member countries during the 
decade.
The d r if t  o f workers from low productiv ity agriculture into higher 
productiv ity industries was about one per cent a year in the early part of 
the period fa lling to a s till substantial half a per cent a year in the late 
1960s. This population sh ift, coupled w ith  economies of scale, better use 
of capital and new technologies, Were factors contributing to economic 
growth. Although there were peaks in the period (1933, 1960, 1964, 1969 
and 1973), the intervening troughs were re la tive ly shallow and did not 
basically inh ib it capital investment or shake confidence. In many 
industries, growth forecasts were so encouraging that developmental 
planning v irtua lly  ignored the minor setbacks. Indicative planning at 
governmental level in many countries may also have been helpful fo r 
steady and continuous expansion.
*U.N. World Economic Survey 1963.
Population 
(m ilii oris)
GNP
(billion
GNP 
(per capit
j[9 7 T T 7
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Labour productivity in industry increased substantially. UN sta tis tics ,* 
w ith 1963 = 100, showed that in Europe productivity increased from 78 in 
1955 to 138 in 1971. (Labour productivity, the index of industrial output 
divided by the index of industrial employment, is an important measure 
of productivity in industry but is not the only measure).**
The industrial expansion in Europe took fu ll advantage of the increasing 
liberalisation of international trade and, in spite of the occasional 
financial crises and devaluations such as those experienced by France and 
the U.K., Europe became increasingly in surplus on current account. The 
strength of the German economy and the inflow  of U.S. funds into Europe 
were items of major importance. Europe’s exports, along w ith  favourable 
terms of trade, allowed for the imports of adequate raw materials 
including energy (and food, where needed) and i t  was only from  late 1973 
onwards that the balance of payments problem loomed large to the 
extent that i t  seemed i t  could hinder expansion and u ltim ate ly impact on 
the standard of living.
1.2 European energy developments
The. surge in European economic growth lasting two decades was d irectly  
responsible fo r the almost three fold increase in energy demand. By 
1950 the sharp post war recovery in the economy had taken energy 
consumption past the best pre-war levels; i t  was followed by steady 
growth to 1973 apart from minor hesitations in 1953, 1958 and 1959. But 
the pattern of the European energy supplies changed substantially, from  
a coal-based into an oil-based economy and shifted from  domestic to 
imported supplies.
*Index Numbers of Labour Productivity in Industry UN Statistica l 
Yearbooks 1972 and 1975, UN, New York.
**F o r a discussion of the factors influencing economic growth, see ’’The 
Growth of Output 1960-1980". OECD, Paris, 1970.
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Table 1 .3 Western Europe! Prim ary Energy Consumption
Per Cent of Total
1955 1965 1973 1975
Solid Fuels 71 42 22 21
Oil 21 47 60 56
Natural Gas • 1 2 10 13
Hydro 7 9 7 8
Nuclear 0 0 1 2
Total Energy 
(M illion  tonnes 
oil equivalent)
542
Source:
834 
Appendix 2
1257 1188
The diminishing role of coal was despite the attempts of the Schuman 
Plan to provide e ffective coordination of the coal industry from  1953 
onwards in the six countries forming the European Coal and Steel 
Community* and the various measures in all producing countries 
protecting the coal industries.
The formation of the Common Market in 1957, when oil was making such 
an impact, did l it t le  to influence the energy picture. Although crude oil 
was imported duty free under the Treaty of Rome, refined products were 
not, and the rig id  French control over all significant aspects of the ir 
energy industry continued regardless. Nor were the various atomic 
energy organisations formed in the 1950s really significant in the 
European energy scene. This was partly because of the very small 
market share of nuclear power, which rose only to one per cent by 1973, 
(see Table 1.3) and partly because of po litica l problems.
Throughout the period the price of primary energy w ith in  Europe was 
almost wholly controlled by the price at which energy could be imported. 
Security of supply was not publicly seen to be a problem prior to 1973, in 
view of the m ultip le and abundant sources of crude oil arid the tanker 
capacity available. The oil stocks level of about three months normal 
consumption held in Europe proved more than adequate.
*  An outline of the international institutions influencing European 
economic and energy developments is given in Appendix 3.
Each European country did of course have the problem of setting 
domestic prices. This they often did w ith raising revenue in mind (e.g. 
motor sp irit) or following other objectives. Indigenous coal production 
was subsidised and atomic energy was heavily subsidised w ith government 
funds.
The form ation of the Community of Nine in 1973 did l it t le  to influence 
European energy in the period to 1975. The individual nations continued 
as before but the traumatic experience of the autumn of 1973 gave 
M. Simonet, as chairman of the EEC Energy Committee, the opportunity 
to put forward proposals fo r a new energy strategy in the 1980s, although 
the objectives were entirely voluntary in nature*. The objectives were 
merely policies dictated by the basic economic facts of the situation. 
Balance of payments problems led to every encouragement being given 
by individual governments to conserve energy whilst there were 
reductions in economic growth expectations and increased incentives fo r 
indigenous energy production. In particular, solid fuels consumption, 
which had declined from 90 per cent of energy consumption in the 
immediate post war period to 22 per cent in 1973, was expected to have 
a market share of 20 per cent in the early 1980s, as opposed to the 13 per 
cent expected in pre-crises forecasts. Natural gas consumption was to 
be boosted wherever possible and France and Germany in particu lar 
planned fo r substantial increases in nuclear power.- In all, the objective 
was, by means of conservation and substitution, to reduce EEC 
dependence on oil from 60 per cent of to ta l energy in 1973 to 40 per cent 
in 1985.*
A chronology of important events related to the development of Western 
Europe’s energy consumption and energy supplies is given in Appendix 4.
In a sense one might say that West European governments' energy 
policies must have been successful during the post-war years up to 1973. 
Strong economic growth was the prime objective; that growth would not 
have been possible without adequate energy supplies.
*"Europe" 22 March 1974 NO. 1483, P.7.
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fo llow ing Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez canal, the Arab-Israeli 
con flic t and the disastrous jo in t British-French "police action" in 
November 1956 brought the security of European oil supplies problem 
into sharp focus. In 1958 there was concern about energy supplies but 
from 1959 onwards supplies were ample. Rapidly rising production in 
North A frica  from 1960 and in Nigeria from 1962 led to p le n tifu l oil 
supplies.
The 1967 Suez crisis following the Six Day Arab-Israeli war saw Europe 
in an even more vulnerable position because oil was a much more 
important component of the energy balance than i t  had been in 1956. 
However the flow  of crude oil was not reduced, the shipping surplus being 
utilised bring oil around the Cape.
The most serious crisis to Europe was precipitated by the fourth Arab- 
Israeli con flic t of the autumn of 1973; the Yom Kippur War. The sudden 
fourfo ld increase in the price of crude oil had immediate economic 
implications heralding the end of the cheap energy era. Arab 
determination to use oil as a m ilita ry  and po litica l weapon gave a sharp 
jo lt  to Europe's energy policy makers. Governments took steps to 
encourage conservation and rely to a lesser extent on imported oil. The 
rapid expansion in world oil demand was halted.
The energy industries in Europe
The doubling of energy usage required the significant expansion of 
domestic energy production in Europe (with the exception of coal) as well 
as of the processing and distribution network. In this section we survey 
some of the salient developments. One feature of a ll o f them was, in 
line w ith  general developments, the rise in the ir labour productiv ity.
W ithin the various sectors of the energy industry there were considerable 
differences in the changes in productiv ity. For example, labour 
productiv ity increased in the petroleum and natural gas industry in 
Western Europe from 38 in 1955 to 319 in 1971 and to 375 in 1973 whilst 
in the coal industry labour productiv ity increased from  83 in 1955 to 124 
in 1971 but fe ll to 122 in 1973 and to 117 in 1974.*
♦Index Numbers of Labour Productivity in Industry. UN S tatistica l 
Yearbooks 1972 and 1975; UN, New York.
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design development was of course based on the industry’s rapid 
expansion. A refinery bu ilt before or just a fte r the Second World war 
m ight well have had a pay ro ll of 1,000 fo r a throughput o f 5 m illion tons 
p.a. A re finery commissioned in the 1970s would have had a payroll o f 
about 100 fo r the same throughput. Quality control s ta ff, fo r example 
would have been reduced from 60 to 6.
We s ta rt this survey of the energy industries w ith hydropower, a most 
desirable source being renewable and non-polluting. Hydropower 
production equalled about 56 m illion tons of coal in 1955 and was almost 
trebled by 1975. In 1961 i t  accounted fo r about 40 per cent o f European 
e le c tric ity  production, fa lling to about 30 per cent in 1970, in view of the 
rapid development of thermal power stations. However, in the period 
1961-1970 hydro production contributed sixteen times the quantity of 
e le c tric ity  that nuclear contributed.
• : x  *fhe f irs t public nuclear power station in Europe, at Calder Hall, 
came on stream in 1956; in the next two decades nuclear power received 
a great deal o f publicity in relation to its importance. Commercial 
development on a larger scale of nuclear power followed only in the early 
1960s. In 1968 four countries, France, Ita ly , Germany and the U.K. 
produced nuclear e lec tric ity  and the to ta l amounted to about ha lf o f one 
per cent of Western Europe's energy consumption. In the non-communist 
world only Japan end the U.S.A. also had nuclear power but not in 
significant amounts; the U.K. output exceeded the to ta l o f the other 
five  countries. In 1973 the nuclear power contribution in Western Europe 
was about one per cent (see Table 1.3).*
The percentages quoted are calculated using the "high fac to r". On the 
"low fac to r" the contribution in 1980 would be 2 per cent o f Europe’s 
forecast demand. The low facto r method quotes the energy actual 
produced by nuclear (or hydro) power. To replace the e le c tr ic ity  
provided by a nuclear power station from a station fuelled by fossil fuels 
would require an input of approximately three times the amount o f fossil 
fuel. This replacement value of nuclear power is termed the high facto r.
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N 'In the 1950s the nuclear industry had such confidence in the future of 
nuclear power 'th a t it  was forecast that from the mid 1960s nuclear 
power would ;be taking all the increase in base load e le c tric ity . 
Technical and economic problems were admitted but considered 
transient. The most ambitious forecasts considered that nuclear would 
account fo r more than three per cent of energy consumption in 1974, a 
figure which proved to De three times too optim istic.
To sum up, nuclear power was not at a ll important to Europe in the years 
to 1975 as a provider o f power and the UK failed to take advantage o f its 
early technological lead.
Natural gas was l it t le  used in Western Europe before 1950; consumption 
in 1950 was s till only about one m illion ton o.e. supplied mainly from  the 
Austrian, French and Italian fields. In 1955 consumption had reached 4 
m illion tons o.e. more than half of which was supplied from the Ita lian 
fields. ENI was active in Ita ly, exploring and developing, but gas was not 
considered to be a major energy source in the future.
In the f irs t half o f the 1960s supplies from the-Ro Valley and the Lacq 
fie ld  in France accounted fo r two thirds of Western Europe's production.
n
But the massive finds at Gronjgen in Holland and la te r in the North Sea 
changed the outlook completely fo r natural gas in Europe. Consumption 
rose to more than 50 m illion tons o.e. in 1969 and to 108 m illion tons o.e. 
in 1972, when i t  amounted to about 10 per cent o f energy consumed, and 
to 153 m illion tons o.e,. in 1975.
Before the October 1973 crisis thoughts were that natural gas would 
supply about 15 per cent of Western Europe's energy demand in 1980. 
A fte r the crisis, as a result of conservation and some increased supply, 
plans were being considered in which natural gas would supply 20 to 25 
per cent o f energy demand in the early 1980s*. Supplies would be met 
largely by indigenous production supplemented by imports.
*Energy Prospects to 1985, Vols I and II OECD, Paris, 1975.
Demand fo r natiiral gas hlis been and w ill be lim ited only by supplies, 
because the qualities o f gas (low sulphur con tro llab ility  etc.) make it  a 
particu larly  desirable fuel.
The growth of natural gas is also illustrated by its re lative importance 
compared w ith coke oven gas and gas works gas. In 1961 natural gas was 
s t il l only 30% of to ta l gas in Western Europe but this had increased to 
70% by 1970. In 1970 gas works gas was only 10% of to ta l gas and w ill be 
of even less importance in future. The quantity of gas (methane and 
ethane) supplied from oil refineries was never more than a few per cent 
o f gas consumption and most was used as refinery fuel.
Considering the long time scales usually associated w ith major changes in 
the primary energy balance, the change in the position of natural gas in 
Western Europe took place rapidly.
Solid fuels accounted fo r about 90 per cent o f Western Europe's energy 
-needs in the period just a fte r the second world war, about 60% in 1960 
and 30% in 1970. The decline in the importance of coal was mostly due 
to the re la tive cheapness, availability and convenience of o il un til 
October 1973. The coal industry lost many markets but did remain 
predominant in the e lec tric ity  generating sector. For example, even in 
1971 in the nine EEC countries solid fuels accounted fo r 43 per cent of 
fuel used fo r e lec tric ity  generation and oil fo r 28 per cent.
I f  market forces alone had been allowed to operate in the 1950s and 
1960s West European coal production would have been confined to 
re la tive ly few localities serving large customers such as e le c tr ic ity  
generation and steel manufacture. However, market forces were not 
allowed to operate and subsidies as well as other protective measures 
kept the West European coal industry going on a substantial though 
reducing scale. The largest producers of coal industry invariably are in 
the U.K. and Germany, whilst among smaller producers the Dutch 
stopped, the French and Belgians greatly reduced mining coal.
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The U.K. policy, of keeping'Targe numbers of high cost production pits in 
operation was at the expense of economic effic iency and it  was pointed 
out that it  would benefit the U.K. i f  less protection was given to the 
U.K. coal industry*. In the decade that Lord Robens was the chairman of 
the NCB, he did much to rationalise the industry but some of his e ffo rts 
were frustrated by unnecessary support of nuclear energy to the 
detrim ent of the coal industry**.
The German case was not dissimilar, eventually leading to large, state- 
managed consolidating operations and the concentration of the large 
number of mines into 'Ruhrkohle1 and three other regional corporations.
The postwar European coal industry was struggling w ith  high costs 
re la tive  to  other fuels; i t  needed protection not only against oil but 
against U.S. coal. In most of the period to October 1973 adequate 
capacity existed in the U.S. to supply Europe w ith substantial quantities 
o f coal but imports of U.S. coal fluctuated considerably from  year to 
' year, being high in the years that energy was re la tive ly short in Europe, 
such as e.g. in 1947 and 1957.
In 1960 the cost of producing U.S. coal was about $5 ton as opposed to 
$14 ton in the EEC and $11 in the U .K .***  This meant that even w ith  
U.S. ra il and ocean fre ight costs, U.S. coal was highly com petitive at 
European sea board situations.
Although some of the West European countries had a l i t t le  o il production, 
long established in some instances, in 1955 to ta l production was only 
about 10 m illion tons which amounted to 10 per cent o f o il consumption. 
By 1964 production had reached 20 m illion tons and stayed at tha t level 
until 1975 when North Sea production started to make an impact.
*Colin Robinson "The Energy Crisis and British Coal" Hobart Paper No. 59
I.E.A. 1974.
**Lo rd  Robens. "Ten Year Stint". Cassel 1972
***Petro leum  Press Service, April 1964, P135.
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Future prospects fo r production were improved enormously as the British 
and Norwegian North Sea areas were developed, but throughout the 
period 1955 to 11975, indigenous production averaged to no more than 
about 5 per cent of consumption. Thus the European oil industry was 
necessarily much concerned with the purchase of foreign oil and its 
transportation.
From 115 m illion tons in 1955, West European oil consumption rose each 
year to 748 m illion tons in 1973. This period o f dramatic expansion 
ended in 1974 w ith the substantial increase in oil prices and the 
accompanying economic recession. The rise in prices gave an incentive 
fo r conservation in energy and fo r substitution of o il by other fuels. Fuel 
oil accounted fo r about 40 per cent of the oil market and consequently 
there was considerable scope fo r substitution by coal and nuclear power 
in the industrial and e lec tric ity  generation markets. Middle d istilla tes 
and ligh t d istillates accounted fo r the other 60 per cent in roughly equal 
shares and w ith in the ligh t distillates, motor gasolines were about 20 per 
cent and chemical feedstocks about 10 per cent. This product sp lit also 
gives a good indication of the sectors of the economy which consumed oil 
in the mid 1970s.
- 12 -
H istorica l development of energy forecasting
The forecasts considered were not selected by choosing those published 
by any particu lar organisations, they were simply those most frequently 
used in the energy industry and which were published in the more 
accessible sources. The sources proved to be mostly the OECD and its 
predecesor the OEEC, the EEC, the UN and the major oil companies.
Although the forecasting systems employed by major oil companies bu ilt 
up a picture of the world environment in 1955 and had the same objective 
in 1975, certa in of the procedures employed developed considerably in 
the 20 years. The major improvement was in the much greater degree of 
coherence contained in the forecasts eg the agreement between 
economic and energy sector forecasts improved. A fu rther and not 
unimportant development, was that as the major companies came under 
greater po litica l pressure in the 1970s, there was a greater transparency 
in the forecasts.
In the early 1950s, economic projections (for example that the GNP of 
Western Europe would grow at 2\%  p.a. fo r the next ten or twenty years) 
were supported by re la tive ly l it t le  economic analysis. W ithin Europe, the 
OECD, the UN-ECE, the EEC and the individual governments much 
expanded the ir economic services in the period. The considerable work 
which took place in the US provided stim uli fo r the development of 
economic analysis in Europe. Europe nevertheless lagged in the 
production of detailed economic forecasts and especially in the 
production of control data*.
The economic basb of oil company world economic forecasts in the 
period to 1973 typically was comprised o f simple aggregates of the 
consensus view in the USA, the MITI view of Japan and consensus view of 
the individual countries’ forecasts in Europe.
*For example, in January 1976, both the US and Japan published the main 
statistics for their petrochemical sectors’ a c tiv ity  in the year 1975. 
Simiiar data were not expected for Western Europe or even the EEC. 
until 1977.
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I t  was not until 1973 that f irs t the restraints caused by energy supplies, 
followed by the need co take a central view of world energy supplies, 
changed the approach.
In the 1950s and 1960s long term forecasts of GNP were based on 
projections of the population, o f productivity and shifts of the working 
population among sectors. However, the realisation in 1973 that i t  was 
possible to project levels of economic ac tiv ity  which might not be 
supported by the expected levels of energy supplies, and perhaps supplies 
of other commodities, brought a realisation that commodity supply 
forecasts would be of prime importance in setting economic growth 
levels.
For individual countries and fo r Western Europe as a whole, primary 
energy (PE) requirements were estimated from the GNP forecasts using 
GNP/PE ratios near to observed historical values.
In most major countries some energy sector analyses and forecasts were 
available to back up the macro economic approach. But through most of 
the period Western European sector data suffered by being re la tive ly 
incomplete; i t  was not until a fte r 1970 that satisfactory energy sector 
forecasts fo r Western Europe became routine.
O il companies obviously have less obligation to use po litica lly  biased 
forecasts of solid fuel and nuclear energy supplies but on the whole l i t t le  
benefit (ie not significantly better precision) was derived from  taking an 
independent view. Neither did the oil companies’ expertise lead to the 
provision of significantly better natural gas forecasts than those made 
outside the oil industry. (See Part III.)
As w ith natural gas supplies, the major oil companies were no more 
successful than other parties in forecasting supplies of indigenous o il in 
Western Europe. Outside Europe, the major oil companies were v irtua lly  
alone in their knowledge of production potential in the main producing 
areas because, until the producing governments participated or 
nationalised in the early 1970s, the majors exercised complete control 
over development schedules. From 1900 to 1970 the most im portant 
aspect of o il production potential was the possibility o f a large excess of 
installed capacity.
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Forecasts of oil reserves have been the subject of much emotion and 
have always: been po litica lly sensitive. The most widely quoted and 
acknowledged best estimates of reserves are those published by the Oil 
and Gas Journal. These were updated annually and were done on the 
advice of the oil company having the biggest interest in the particular 
area. Reserves estimates are the basis for assessing production potential 
but i t  is not necessarily the largest reserves which are developed firs t, 
since ownership, location and other aspects may influence decisions.
The planning cycle used by the major oil companies included production 
of world oil trade matrices in April of each year fo r the previous year. 
These were obtained by collation of statistics provided by the major 
industrialised countries supplemented by specialist knowledge of the oil 
trade and of course the crude oil liftings  data. The matrices were 
published in the BP Statistical Review of the World Oil Industry in May 
of each year. Finally, the link between production and consumption 
required attention - transportation. The method fo r measuring the 
carrying capacity of the world oil tanker flee t in standard T-2 units dates 
back to the 1940s when the T-2 o il tanker, of 16500 tons dwt and 14.5 
knots, was the popular large crude oil carrier.Throughout the period to 
1975, oil companies used the ir own particular methods of measuring the 
capacity of the world flee t and provided governments w ith data on the 
ava ilab ility  of tankers, measured the requirements and forecast oil 
movements. The data provided apparently reassured governments of 
security of oil supplies. In the event, the two major po litica l crises, the 
Suez Crises of 1956 and 1967, did not lead to unacceptable strains on the 
world tankship flee t.
The event that prompted publication of forecasts, tha t had h itherto  been 
regarded as commercial secrets, was the great tankship slump that 
emerged in 1974. This was caused partly the economic slump of 1974/5 
and the fa ll in the oil trade but was mostly due to the vast overbuilding 
of tankers.
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It  is useful to consider examples of some sector forecasts and also 
consider the sector forecasts o f individual o il products demand.
The OEEC Oil Committee in 1956 published an analysis of the 
consumption of seven oil products in fifteen  sectors or sub-sectors in 
1955*. The same report provided sector forecasts to 1960 of oil products 
consumption. The next significant OEEC report (Robinson) in I960**, 
provided sector energy consumption forecasts to 1965 and 1975. These 
forecasts are compared w ith actuals below.
Table 2.1 - The Robinson Committee Forecasts and Actuals
(1955 = 100)
1965 1975
1955 Forecast Actual Forecast Actual
GNP 100 136 165 183 243
IP 100 147 170 208 240 (1974 = 252)
Total P E *** 100 130 151 172 211 (1973 = 221)
***P rim ary  Energy, high facto r fo r nuclear and hydropower.
The actual energy consumption level in 1975, was underestimated by 18 
per cent. ~
Petroleum product forecasts by sector as published by the OEEC in 1956, 
also illustra te  the substantial under-forecasting of certain sectors.
Table 2.2 - Oil Product Forecasts (OEEC 1956) m illion tonnes
1960 1975
Forecast Actual Forecast Actual
Road Transport, Mogas 28 30 50 90
Road & Rail Transport,
Gas/Diesel Oils 11 11 25 48
Ocean Bunkers,
Gas/Diesel Oils 3 3 3 5
Fuel Oils 13 13 27 ■, 30
*O il, The Outlook fo r Europe, OEEC, Paris, September 1956
**Towards a New Energy Pattern in Europe (Robinson) OEEC, Paris, 1960.
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The substantial under-forbeast o f mogas consumption was mainly due to 
the conservative economic forecast im p lic itly  under-estimating the car 
• populations and consumers' expenditure on private motoring.
A feature of Robinson's energy sector forecasts was the absence of the 
petrochemical sector. The chemical sector in 1975 consumed about 80 
m illion tonnes oil equivalent energy of which half was naphtha. Aviation 
fuels expanded to 15 m illion tonnes, becoming a more im portant sector 
than ra il transport which was a sector considered by Robinson whilst air 
transport had not been considered separately.
The forecasts provided by the e le c tric ity  supply industry were published 
regularly by OECD. The long lead time fo r construction o f new stations 
meant that there was a considerable "counting" element in the capacity 
forecasts. E lec tric ity  would be supplied in future years from  stations 
already existing when the forecasts were made and from  stations fo r 
which firm  plans had been made including the choice of fuel. In a period 
. when e le c tric ity  consumption was expanding steadily to utilise the 
installed capacity, the consumption forecasts were reliable. The super 
optim istic, nuclear forecasts fortunately were always so much in the 
fu tu re jthey  l it t le  influenced developmental planning. The E le c tric ity  
Committee even in 1955, backed their analyses of consumption and 
forecasts by considerable sector detail.
2.2 Methodology of energy demand forecasting
During the period 1955-1975, forecasting methodology developed con­
siderably. The main difference between the methodology in 1955 and 
that employed in 1975 was the much greater degree o f explicitness 
coupled w ith a much more comprehensive and coherent approach. This 
statement is true not only fo r energy demand forecasting, but also fo r 
economic forecasting and energy supply forecasting.
National planning, ie government decision taking as opposed to the 
market mechanism for allocation of resources, was attempted in several 
countries w ith varying degrees o f success. Although i t  is unlikely tha t 
national planning influenced the methodology by which industrialised 
forecasts were prepared, i t  may well have influenced the ir outcomes.
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Economic forecasting methods developed from 1955 to 1975 and indeed 
the methodology apparently became more sophisticated. (Without 
improving the precision of forecasting - see Part 3.)
In economic forecasts, moreso than in energy forecasts, the
psychological factor is of considerable importance and is considered here 
w ith reference to forecasts made in France and Sweden.
In France the success o f indicative planning, w ith  the forecasts or 
targets set in the plans on the whole achieved or exceeded, may, at least 
have been partly due to the high degree of c red ib ility  associated with the 
French economic forecasts. The psychological aspect o f forecasting is 
important both for the lim itations i t  imposes on the construction of 
forecasts and in the way i t  influences the eventual outcome.
In Sweden a review of economic forecasts made over the period 1965- 
1975* was published in 1976. Over the eleven year period the forecasts 
of real GNP change made each year were at a consistently steady level, 
typ ica lly 4%. The outcome was usually less than 3% and on occasion 
greater than 4% with the average outcome about 3%. The mean of 
(forecast - actual) was 0.8%. In defence of the forecasting record, i t  was 
pointed out that i t  was perhaps not po litica lly  possible to forecast boom 
or slump conditions and expect the outcome to be unaffected by the 
forecast. I f  a slump was forecast, why not take action to avoid it?
Forecasting accelerating or even high in fla tion  rates in the early 1970s,
even i f  they were perceived, was something that a ll governmental and 
supragovernmental organisations were reluctant to do on the grounds 
that generating such expectations would make the outcome worse. 
Factors such as these high in fla tion  rates experienced in the 1970s served 
to diminish the value of published forecasts from some o f the main 
o ffic ia l sources. O ffic ia l forecasts of in fla tion  rates other than the 
minimum feasible rates would doubtless be termed irresponsible.
*"Economic Forecasting- mistakes and lessons."
O. Lindgren and M. Petrelius,
Skandinaviska Enskiida Banker, January, 1976, P31.
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For much of the 1955-19f5 period world energy supplies so comfortably 
exceeded potential demand fo r energy, that potential demand forecasts 
could be taken as forecasts of likely consumption. The reason was of 
course that until 1972 the supply o f oil, the main energy source and also 
the balancing energy, was projected at levels exceeding the potential 
demand by a satisfactory margin. It was not until 1972 that the world 
potential demand forecast fo r oil exceeded the potential supply forecast. 
This cross-over of the supply and demand projections in the late 1970s 
really pointed out that adjustment of the price was necessary to restore 
equilibrium between supply and demand.
On a regional basis and on an economic sector basis, forecasts o f energy 
supplies and energy consumption were fu lly  integrated in some instances. 
For example, supplies of hydro-e lectric ity and consumption of energy by 
aluminium smelters; supplies of natural gas by pipeline and its 
consumption in the chemical, industrial and domestic sectors and the 
supply o f coking-coal to steel works are instances of integral supply and 
demand forecasts. In these cases, there was no need fo r any significant 
change in the forecasting procedures through the 1955-1975 period.
But w ith forecasting energy supply at the world level, there was 
considerable progress made by the oil companies. In 1955 forecasts of 
world oil supplies were made as were demand forecasts fo r tankers, but 
the approaches were not as detailed as those used in the 1970s. In the 
early 1970s quite detailed world energy balances were undertaken w ith 
detailed and very explic it forecasts of crude oil production potential, oil 
movements and the tanker flee t requirements.
As fa r as the methodology was concerned, until the second Suez Crisis 
(1967), forecasting of world oil supplies and movements was on a single 
point basis ie only one central scenario v/as considered. The closure of 
the Suez Canal in 1967 had the obvious e ffec t of introducing Suez- 
open/Suez-closed variants into forecasts and increasingly forecasts of 
world oil supplies and movements employed scenarios. The high fre ight 
rates of 1970/1971 provided additional stimulus to the oil companies to 
produce short term (quarterly) world oil supply and tanker forecasts.
c
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Energy supply forecasts were more objective than economic or energy 
demand forecasts and this has been an important distinction. With three 
o f the primary energy sources, natural gas, hydro-power and nuclear 
power, once fac ilitie s  were installed they were like ly to be used as long 
as they were functioning because the associated in itia l capital costs were 
large whilst running costs were small. Also the long lead times fo r 
installation o f new fac ilities meant that forecasts, to at least five years 
ahead, were like ly  correctly to anticipate future availability . Much solid 
fuel production was linked to base load e lec tric ity  production fac ilities  
thus providing a stable demand. Concern w ith countries' balance of 
payments and security o f supplies guaranteed that oil production 
fac ilities  in the industrial countries would be fu lly  utilized. Hence 
forecasts of fu ture production levels based on existing and planned 
expansions o f proven reserves were also objective.
The subjective elements of supply forecasts were the solid fuel 
production levels in areas w ith a potential solid fuel surplus and sim ilarly 
the oil production levels from the main oil exporting countries, mainly 
the Middle East countries. In these areas where the reserves were 
proven, additional production capacity could be installed to order but the 
level o f production required from these balancing areas would be subject 
to the same degree of uncertainty as that associated w ith economic 
forecasts. Thus those elements of energy supply forecasts tha t were 
associated w ith  economic uncertainties were just as subjective.
The methodology of energy demand forecasting relies heavily on the 
methodology o f economic forecasting and energy supply forecasting. In 
the 1955-1975 period, energy demand forecasts have largely been 
judgemental assessments based im p lic ity  or exp lic itly  on the economic 
and energy supply forecasts.
In the 1950s, energy demand forecasts fo r the next five years were made 
as naive projections of the most recent consumption data. Such 
projections are contained in BP Statistical Reviews o f the World O il 
Industry of the period and these forecasts im p lic itly  assumed continued 
economic growth, a steady increase in oil's share of the energy market 
and no lim ita tions on oil supply. The more exp lic it forecasts of the 1950s 
deduced or assumed the ra tio  between energy and economic ac tiv ity  (the 
PE/GNP ratio). This ratio was then used to calculate future levels o f 
c energy demand from projections of economic ac tiv ity .
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One of the best reviews oTe^ergy demand forecasting was that mode by 
a US Congress’Committee chaired by W.N. Aspinall*. The Committee 
reviewed 25 energy demand forecasts made over the period 1960 to 1971. 
The conclusions were not fla tte ring  to forecasters and the outcome of 
events in the following two years justified  their conclusions.
"In the conclusion, an appraisal of the forecasts reviewed here finds that 
they are o f lim ited usefulness. Most of the studies are fundamentally 
defic ient fo r their fa ilure to deal w ith an exact energy concept, their 
analyses are usually only loosely structured to address some vague notion 
o f energy demand, and l it t le  attention is given to a correct 
interpretation of the forecasts. The crucial issues o f price and supply 
lim ita tions are usually all but ignored. Perhaps most im portant o f all, 
many studies seem to suggest that their forecasts can be used by policy ­
makers as target levels fo r future energy consumption. They do so, 
however, w ithout justify ing their implied GNP growth rate objectives and 
w ithout considering the re lative costs and benefits of providing various 
levels o f energy consumption in the future.
Despite the deficiencies of the studies covered here, they represent the 
best energy studies currently available."
A detailed analysis of the out-turn of a UK energy forecast made in 1965 
fo r 1970 has been provided by G.F. Ray**. One of the detailed findings 
which is of general interest was the comment on the usefulness of the 
"energy coeffic ient" o f PE/GDP ratio . Ray pointed out that both energy 
and GNP grew by 12% over the 1965-70 period so the coe ffic ien t was 
around unity. But the year to year pattern was erra tic , ranging from  0.1 
to 2.0.
*"Energy "Demand" Studies, an Analysis and Appraisal Committee on 
In terio r and Insular A ffa irs " (Chairman, W.N. Aspinall), 92nd Congress. 
US Government Printing O ffice, September 1972.
**"Medium Term Forecasts Reassessed, Part III Energy", G.F. Ray, 
National Institu te Economic Review No. 4, 1972, p61.
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The conclusion drawn was that the PE/GNP ratio  was "an extremely 
unreliable tool for forecasting".
2.3 Time series methods
The purpose of this section is to review the status of time series analysis 
and projection in the area of energy forecastinq, and to comment on the 
experience gained by the promoters of time series projections in the 
1933-1975 period*.
A major oil company may need to handle several thousand time series in 
one country alone. These would include the major economic series, the 
energy series on a national and regional basis, details of its own sales on 
national and regional bases, and u ltim ate ly supplies to distribution 
depots. In many instances these data w ill be available on cards or tape 
fo r purposes other than forecasting. Forecasts of nearly a ll the series 
are required on a monthly basis and they may also need to be updated 
monthly. There is therefore some incentive to use a mathematical or 
sta tis tica l method of forecasting on the usual grounds of saving tim e and 
money and simultaneously introducing a greater degree of "ob jec tiv ity " 
into the forecasts.
It  may therefore come as a surprise, to those not d irectly concerned v/ith 
forecasting but who read the statistica l lite ra ture , to learn that the 
sophisticated methods of tim e series analysis and projection so prominent 
. in the lite ra ture  have never been in routine use. The economic and 
energy models also have been lit t le  used in the construction of the 
forecasts which are used fo r operational and developments planning. 
This is the finding of the survey of many forecasts, done specifically fo r 
the purpose of this thesis.
*A  tim e series is a set of ordered observations in tim e. As considered 
here, they are equidistant in time at monthly intervals. A tim e series 
analysis evaluates how the series varies w ith time by obtaining 
parameters such as trend (secular trend) and the seasonal pattern. A 
tim e series projection utilises parameters established in the analysis to 
obtain future values ie projections or forecasts. A model or equation 
established from a study of the historic data series can be used to project 
values for any time interval into the future. Just how far forward it  is 
sensible to project is a m atter of judgement. The term exponential 
smoothing in the context of time series analysis or projection means that 
re la tive ly more weight is placed on the most recent data.
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The President when addressing the Royal S tatistica l Society in 1968* 
devoted part of his talk to the irrelevance of much present day 
s ta tis tica l litera ture . On the subject of (unwanted) extension of 
s ta tis tica l theory and publishing papers he had the follow ing to say. "The 
process is self generating. A publishes paper which is irrelevant, or 
based on unrealistic premises. This stimulates B and C' to further 
thoughts on the same lines. And in a few years a body of lite ra ture  is 
bu ilt up". Unfortunately this is what much of the s ta tis tica l lite ra ture  on 
tim e series appears to be to some of those engaged in energy forecasting. 
The sta tistica l time series methods of projection have not proved useful 
and i t  seems unlikely that they w ill ever be used for forecasting. This 
may appear to be a sweeping statement and le t us consider the evidence 
fo r making it .
Wagle et a l* *  compared four sta tistica l (mechanistic) tim e series 
methods using monthly data and twenty petroleum product series over a 
six year period. The results showed that H o lt’s m ethod*** was the most 
satisfactory and concluded that there was some m erit in using 
exponential smoothing methods as part of a computer-based forecasting 
system. There was insuffic ient evidence to conclude tha t mechanistic 
forecasts were better than those prepared taking trend and business 
environment into account and in Esso Petroleum, where Wagle worked, 
the traditional method of forecasting continued.
*"Theory and Practice in Statistics"
F. Yates, J. Royal - Statist. Soc. Series A, 1968, Page 463
**"A  Program for Short-term Sales Forecasting"
B. Wagle, J.Q.G.H. Rappoport, V.A. Downes 
The Statistician 18, Page 141, 1968
***"Forecasting Seasonals and Trends by Exponentially Weighted Moving 
Averages"
C.C. Holt, Carnegie Institute to Technology, 1957
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account w ill always be used by a company in preference to mechanistic 
forecasts i f  the two forecasts are in disagreement. We shall return to 
this point la ter when discussing the degree of subjective judgement used 
in forecasting.
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One well known method of time series analysis and forecasting is that 
introduced by Box and Jenkins. One of the early applications by the 
authors was fo r forecasting air passenger tra ff ic  in the U .K .**. This 
method was a development of those by H olt and Brown*** which
i followed considerable work into forecasting methods by IC I**** . 
R e id *****  working at the LSE examined 113 series and concluded, " it  
seems clear that i f  one were to recommend a single technique fo r short 
term  forecasting, then the Box-Jenkins has the overall advantage". This 
feeling was probably widespread and the method was tried fo r many 
forecasting applications.
*"Time' Series Forecasting and Control". G.E.P. Box and G.M. Jenkins, 
Holden Day Inc, San Francisco, 1970 
"Time Series Forecasting"
Part I: "Models fo r Forecasting Non Stationery Time Series".
G.M. Jenkins
Paper given at "Conference on Forecasting" University o f Lancaster, 
A pril 17/18th, 1972.
**"Some Recent Advances in Forecasting and Control"
G.E.P. Box and G.M. Jenkins, Applied Statistics 17_, Page 91, 1968
***"S ta tis tica l Forecasting and Inventory Control"
R.G. Brown, McGraw-Hill, 1939
****"M athem atica l Trend Curves, An Aid to Forecasting"
ICI Monograph No. 1, O liver and Boyd, 1964 
"Short-Term Forecasting"
ICI Monograph No. 2, Oliver and Boyd, 1964
* * * * * !IA Comparison o f Forecasting Techniques on Economic Time Series"
D.J. Reid
Paper given at "Forecasting and Action" Joint Conference of Society fo r 
Long Range Planning and the Forecasting Study Group of the OR Society, 
21st A pril 1971
' S 'Let us therefore consider'some detailed examples from work undertaken 
by British Petroleum", including time series analysis.
One of the firs t attempts in BP to use series projection was w ith the UK 
aviation fuel consumption series using data to mid 1968.
In itia l experience w ith the work was unsatisfactory due to an unexpected 
slow down of growth in the summer of 1969 in a series which had been 
growing, and was forecast to grow, at about 10% p.a.
Table 2.3 - UK Aviation Fuel Consumption Data
thousand tons
Avgas and 
Jet 
Gasoline
Jet Kerosine
Total
Aviation
Fuel
July 1968 48.2 308.3 356.5
August 1968 63.2 274.7 337.9
July 1969 47.5 301.8 348.3
August 1969 23.4 302.2 325.6
The above figures also show a point which is important in all tim e series 
projections. That is, that an aggregated series is like ly  to be less erratic  
than one of the components of that series and so more amenable to a 
mathematical univariate method of projection. A more obvious example 
occurs in the e lec tric ity  industry. A country or region which generates 
using both thermal and hydro generation w ill normally use the hydro to 
the maximum available which w ill be a function of ra in fa ll and balance 
on thermal. The series of hydro output w ill therefore be correlated w ith  
the weather and therefore not be a suitable series fo r projection.
A second example from the BP work is quoted to show that even when 
dealing w ith highly aggregated series, the error component in the series 
may be such that projected values have very large associated probability 
lim its .
Projected values for 15 months ahead are shown in the fo llow ing table 
together w ith 95% probability lim its .
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Table 2.4 -  TOTAL INLAND MARKET FOR OIL, GERMANY 1970/71• lUt-SAW£-*T 1 w
thousand tonnes
Date
95% Probability L im its 
of Forecast Forecast Actual
' Lower Upper
1970
October 7799 11059 9287 9308
November 8167 11737 9790 8909
December 9203 13926 11062 10367
1971
January 8522 12378 10271 9895
February 8119 .11853 9810 9759
March 8618 12643 10437 10740
A pril 8327 12281 10113 9309
May 7560 11206 9204 8423
June 7880 11737 9617 9665
July 8104 12129 9914 . 8591
August 7511 11295 9211 8771
September 8127 12281 9990 8414
October 8312 12995 10393 9220
November 8709 13745 10941 10588
December 9804 15587 12362 10714
In all cases the outcome proved to be well w ith in the 95% lim its  but the 
trend was being substantially over-forecast in the second half o f 1971. 
The forecast fo r a ll 1971 was 122,263,000 tonnes (+12%) whilst the 
outcome was 113,909,000 tonnes (+5%). The average growth forecast 
from environmental considerations made in May 1970 fo r 1971 was +6%, 
a be tte r one than that of the above model.
This example brings out a point of general interest. The growth rate of 
consumption in 1970 over 1969 was +11% and any time series projection 
method using exponential weighting w ill project high growth rates un til 
data are included which contradict this trend. Sim ilarly when points of 
inflexion or downturns are encountered, the forecast trend w ill be f la t or 
contain negative growth rates; there is no mechanism which w ill pro ject 
through a point of inflexion or downturns back onto a positive growth 
trend. This la tte r statement is repeating the very obvious to those who 
are involved w ith forecasting but it  is a point that is not appreciated by 
many of the users of forecasts.
- 26
One of the strengths of a sta tistica l time series projection method is that 
the associated probability lim its  for a forecast may be readily generated. 
However, they may look unreasonably wide to a user. The 95% 
probability lim its  for the December 1971 forecast were -20% to +25%; 
whilst the actual proved to be 15% lower than the forecast. (See table 
2.4.) These lim its  may be considered wide fo r normal "surprise free” 
business planning. The lower probability l im it would correspond to an 
economic depression whilst levels higher than optim istic forecasts might 
not be sustainable because of capacity lim ita tions.
The choice of probability lim its  presents d ifficu lties . In many instances 
95% probability lim its  may be considered too severe fo r most business 
planning and 70% probability lim its  (+ one standard deviation) are usually 
representative of the levels of uncertainty routinely considered. Whilst 
changing the probability level may improve the cred ib ility  of the 
forecast in the eyes of a user, i t  does not solve the problem. Probability 
lim its  can be influenced by a) the type of series selected b) the choice of 
model c) the length of the series and d) the pretreatm ent of the raw 
data; this last point we shall consider separately.
Very wide confidence lim its  in connection w ith a Box-Jenkins projection 
were discussed in a paper by Chatfijeld and Prothero*. Sales data fo r a 
company projected six months ahead give a value of 1387 and 95% 
probability lim its  of 488 to 2286. The authors were not satisfied w ith the 
lim its  because they fe lt  they indicated that any sales level was possible. 
(The outcome proved to be 855).
The President of the Royal Economic Society had the follow ing to  say on 
wide ranges in his address in 1969**. "The forecaster, instead of 
predicting a specific outcome, wisely takes refuge in quoting a range of 
figures, but sets upper and lower lim its  so fa r apart tha t the policy 
maker to whom the forecast is presented is no wiser than he was before".
*"Box - Jenkins Seasonal Forecasting: Problems in a Case-Study"
C. Chatfield and D.L. Prothero 
J.R. Statist. Soc. Series A 136, Page 295, 1973
**"Economic Forecasting"
Sir Alec Cairncross, Econ J., December 1969, Page 797
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In the discussion on the paper of Chatsworth and Prothero much 
attention was given to choice of model and the authors were critic ised 
fo r selecting a model fitte d  to a logarithm ic transformation of the data 
when i t  was claimed that the model should have been fitte d  to 
untransformed data. Harrison* stated that "The main point is that the 
Box-Jenkins technique has been used out of context."
However, i t  is possible to obtain models quite d iffe rent in form  that give 
equally good fits  to a series o f data. For example, the author found when 
working w ith U.S. aviation fuel data that two models were obtained 
which although each fitte d  equally well (same correlation coefficients), 
nave projected growth rates in which the trend differed by 2% p.a. But 
as the discussion on the Chatsworth paper indicated, i f  forecasts 
d iffe ring by 2% p.a. were the only cause fo r concern, the problem may 
not be significant. Whether or not to transform the data and i f  so, which 
transformation to use, w ill always be a contentious issue. But even this 
issue is secondary to the decision as to whether or not a series is suitable 
fo r a Box-Jenkins type projection.
An I.S.C.O.L. publication** answers the question "How can we 
forecast?" in the following manner. "U n til recently there have been a 
number of d iffe ren t forecasting techniques available, many of which 
have been proved to be not only theoretica lly unsound, but also 
unreliable, and thus ineffective, in practice. However a universally 
applicable methodology has been developed to meet the needs o f a ll 
those actively concerned w ith time series forecasting. This 
methodology, which is now internationally acclaimed, is known as Box- 
Jenkins Times Series Analysis and Forecasting". C learly these closely 
concerned w ith  the development of the Box-Jenkins method have one 
view whilst not everyone agrees w ith it.
*J. Harisson, discussion on Chatfield's paper, Page 319
**"Box-Jenkins Time Series Analysis and Forecasting" a Management 
Guide. I.S.C.O.L. University o f Lancaster
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great aeai ot suDjecuvity in time series analysis and projection and the 
more one becomes involved w ith sta tistica l projectors, the more the 
subjectiv ity becomes apparent. There is no. doubt that many are 
attracted to statistica l methods of time series analysis and projection 
w ith anticipation that the "objective" sta tistica l approach w ill be an 
improvement on the "subjective" forecasts methods in general use. In 
rea lity  the situation is that the sta tistica l methods of time series 
analysis are very objective and indeed indispensable fo r items such as 
seasonal ratios and anomalous weather corrections. But to use a 
sta tis tica l time series projection as a forecast is 100% subjective* whilst 
judgemental (environmental) forecasting methods contain large objective 
elements introduced by factors such as available capacity and supply 
lim ita tions.
I f  we lis t sequentially the decisions that one needs to take in the process 
of preparing a statistical time series projection, the degree of subjective 
judgement becomes more apparent.
a. Is i t  worthwhile using a sta tistica l approach?
b. Is i t  best to use weekly, monthly, quarterly or winter/summer data?
c. How much historic data should be scrutinised?
d. What pretreatment o f the data is necessary fo r items such as 
holidays, anomalous weather, strikes? Should the number of degrees 
of freedom be reduced as a result of this "cleaning-up" process?
e. What method of analysis and what depth of analysis should be used to 
form ideas about trends, cycles, seasonals and the error component? 
Should a m ulti-variate  approach be used to examine the environment 
o f the series and i f  so, which othervariab le  should be considered? 
The la tte r e ffect does not always get the consideration i t  deserves 
although i t  is widely appreciated that the projection o f univariate 
tim e series is valid only i f  the environment does not change. For 
example, w ith  individual energy series there should not be a drastic 
change in the primary energy balance.
*The user makes a decision to use a mechanistic procedure of a particu lar 
type as opposed to using any other forecasting procedure.
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should be used? V-
g. Which of-the available statistica l time series methods should be used?
h. Having chosen the method, i f  there is a choice of model, which type 
o f model?
i. How far ahead should projections be made, 10 periods? 50 periods?
j. With consideration to the length of the historic series, the methods 
used to adjust the data, what use should be made of probabilities to 
qualify the point estimate forecast?
k. What c rite ria  should be employed fo r revising or re jecting forecasts?
I t  is possible to read papers on the same subject and from  some gain the 
impression that a forecast is completely subjective. Many papers 
discussing econometric forecasts or models give the reader the 
impression that the subject is completely objective; on the other hand 
papers w ith  titles  such as "Forecasting and Guessing"* suggest less 
ob jectiv ity  is involved. In 1973 a survey was carried out on the
development of systematic forecasting procedures in British Industry**. 
The authors stated, "We would argue that, w ith a systematic approach, 
objective methods play a major role in reducing the uncertainty which 
surrounds the future and in lim iting  the amount of subjective estimation 
and judgement, but they can never entirely replace them". One of the 
conclusions from the study was, "No company was found to undertake a 
to ta lly  objective forecasting approach; by contrast some 12% of the 
firm s did employ a wholly subjective approach". Later in the paper the 
authors classify econometric models and mathematical trend projections 
as "objective" and im p lic itly  forecasts that do not make direct use of the 
defined mathematical or sta tistica l procedures are classified as 
"subjective".
*"Fore'casting and Guessing" M.J.C. Surrey.
The Business Economist 3 No. 2, Page 19, 1971
**"The Development of Systematic Forecasting Procedures in British 
Industry" L.T. Simister and J. Turner J. of Business Policy 3 No. 2, Page 
A3, 1973
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mere nas propaoiy oeeq- an increasing awareness that "objective” 
methods are not 100% so and that methods classified as "subjective” or 
"judgement" do, contain substantial elements of ob jectiv ity . Furthermore 
i t  is apparent that the degree of subjectivity can vary w ith d iffe ren t 
classes of forecasts and w ith the time ahead fo r which the forecast is 
made. To quantify some of the aspects the w rite r obtained tne opinions 
o f seventeen people who were active in the forecasting area in British 
Petroleum. The subjective part of a forecast was defined as that part of 
i t  which may be considerably or entirely influenced by the individual 
forecaster a fte r a detailed consideration of the subject. The following 
results were obtained from an analysis of the completed questionnaires*.
Table 2.5 Degree of Subjectivity in Making Forecasts
Number of Years Ahead 
GNP
Primary Energy 
Motor Gasolines 
Rate of Infla tion
There was a wide spread about the averages quoted above and also a 
strong correlation between the considered precision of the forecast and 
the degree of objectivenessj viz the smaller the error associated w ith 
the forecast the greater was the assessment of the degree o f ob jectiv ity .
1 3 6 9 15
35% 40% 45% 60% 70%
25% 35% 45% 60% 70%
10% 15% 25% 45% 55%
35% 55% 65% 80% 85%
*The questionnaire was a table sim ilar to table 2.5 in which the 
subjectiv ity ratings were inserted as single point estimates.
o
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As a final example of the variation in the degree of subjectivity present 
in forecasting le t us consider cycles. Some writers dismiss the concept 
f i r  example Sirkin*, and cycles are described by some as unpredictable 
random variations in activ ity . Fels and Hinshaw** have pointed out the 
d iff ic u lty  in even recognising turning points. And yet others take the 
view that cycles do exist and can be forecast. Pearce*** shows an 
impressive diagram of alkali consumption as an indication of the ac tiv ity  
in the U.K. economy with peaks at 1969, 1974 and 1979 and troughs in
' 1967, 1972 and 1976.
I t  is however unusual to see cycles identified in time series analysis and 
used in projections. Although analysis of such economic data and the 
construction of leading indicators involves mathematical and sta tis tica l 
procedures fo r deseasonalising and other adjustments, projections are 
made by quantifying factors such as general economic expectations and 
business confidence.
From the foregoing discussion and the examples quoted i t  may be seen 
that s ta tis tica l time series projections have lim ited  value in energy and 
o il forecasting. Although sta tis tica l methods have been given extensive 
tria ls , fo r instance by Wagle et al in Esso and O’Carroll, Wilson et al in 
BP who examined 360 series, not in one instance has the s ta tis tica l 
projection replaced the environmental or judgemental forecast. In the 
future, i f  many oil demand series are like ly to  f la t or show negative 
growth rates, there should be no question of s ta tis tica l methods replacing 
the environmental methods. Forecasts w ill therefore continue by 
environmental methods where energy forecasts are integral parts of 
economic forecasts and w ill continue to be influenced by the underlying 
po litica l assumptions.
* MBusiness Cycles aren’t  what they used to be, and never were”
G. Sirkin, Lloyds Bank Review No. 104, Page 20, 1972
**"Forecasting and Recognizing Business Cycle Turning Points"
R. Fels and C.E. Hinshaw NBER, Columbia U.P. 1968
***"Computerised Forecasting in West Europe"
S.F. Pearce, IMRA J. July 1973, Page 11
c
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To end, i t  seems apt to quote from the conclusions of three papers. " I t  is 
a great mistake to believe that there are a few forecasting techniques 
which, once learned, w ill allow you to forecast anything and everything", 
Robinson*. " It is therefore dangerous to project trend curves too fa r into 
the future and they must be regularly updated using the latest available 
data. In addition the results should always be corroborated where 
possible by detailed market studies and by other forecasting methods and 
a constant watch maintained fo r new developments which may change 
the trend" Pearce, IC I**. "What I am try ing to say is that there is no 
substitute yet fo r the carefully-considered business judgement of the 
human brain, and we cannot pass the buck to the computer". Bridges, 
Shell***.
*"Some Notes on Forecasting" C. Robinson 
The Business Economist - Page 19, Autumn 1969
**"Computerised Forecasting in West Europe"
S.F. Pearce, IMRA J. July 1973, Page 11
***"C orporate  Planning in the Royal Dutch Shell Group"
H. Bridges, The Business Quarterly, Summer 1970, Page 33
0
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PART 3 
The Precision of Forecasts
3.1 The status o f forecasts
Some forecasts are considered to be good and may enjoy a high degree of 
cred ib ility . Other forecasts may not influence opinion and are not highly 
regarded. y\
Forecasts may be judged partly on the issuing authority and partly on the 
"track-record" of previous forecasts. This la tte r is obtained by 
Comparing forecasts w ith the actual outcomes. The "track-record" 
expressed numerically is the precision. For a forecast to be accurate, 
implies that the outcome agreed perfectly w ith the forecast. Precision 
data indicate how well forecasts agree w ith outcomes.
There are d iffe ren t kinds of forecasts and the precision of forecasts may 
be expressed in a variety of ways. F irst we shall consider types of 
forecasts, then how the precision may be expressed and fina lly  consider 
detailed examples in the energy industry.
Before establishing the precision of a forecast it  is necessary to be 
exp lic it about the nature of the forecast. A single point or central 
forecast may be what the forecaster believes to be the most like ly  
outcome. The forecaster may be explic it about uncertainty and quote a 
range believing that the outcome w ill fa ll w ith in, or not too fa r away 
from, the range quoted. But i t  is rarely tha t one sees a forecast 
qualified by a probability distribution. To forecast the probability 
distribution about a best single point forecast is as hazardous as making 
the forecast. There is a general reluctance on the part of forecasters to 
admit to the fu ll uncertainty associated w ith forecasts.
Projections on the other hand may not be forecasts but could be intended 
as "what i f "  tria ls. Like a forecast, a projection may be a single point or 
a range of projections may be postulated. For example, piojections may 
be made and the consequences examined of an economy expanding 
between 2 and 4% p.a. Projections of zero expansion or 6% p.a. growth, 
might not be considered feasible outcomes. A projection could be 
termed a forecast i f  i t  is considered to represent the most like ly 
outcome,
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In economic forecasting, target growth rates may be set which are not 
forecasts of the most like ly outcome nor are they naive projections. A 
target may be defined as that position which is assessed to be the most 
desirable of the possible outcomes, forecasts in some National Plans are 
targets.
Lastly i t  is usually understood that forecasts, projections and targets are 
made under conditions described in forecasting jargon as standard-world, 
surprise-free conditions. Thus energy forecasts made before 1972 would 
not have anticipated the rapid rise in prices which occurred in the 
1973/1974 period. Neither would they have been valid w ith major 
po litica l disturbances.
Energy forecasts do not usually anticipate supplies of some fuels until 
specific reserves are proven and possibly production schedules outlined. 
Thus there was a period when UK natural gas demand was not forecast 
but a continuation of manufactured gas was. O il demand forecasts made 
in the early 1960s fo r UK demand in the early 1970s, contained about 10 
m illion tons naphtha for gas manufacture. When assessing the precision 
of these forecasts, is i t  correct to debit this quantity because the 
particular sector demand had all but vanished? Similar questions arise 
w ith many sectors when assessing the precision of forecasts and 
consequently deriving precision data, which should be a purely objective 
exercise, can become quite subjective.
In Western Europe there were some unanticipated structura l changes in 
the economy, and the earlier forecasts did not have adequate represent­
ation of sectors such as petrochemicals, o il refin ing, aviation and ocean 
bunkers. In the following treatm ent of precision, all forecasts (most 
like ly outcomes), projections and targets have been treated alike and no 
corrections were made when certain sectors were not adequately 
represented.
3.2 Measuring precision
There are three aspects which require elaboration; what is meant by the 
precision of forecasts, the various methods of measuring precision, and 
bias in forecasts.
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I t  is f irs t necessary to define what is meant by precision. In this context 
precision is a technical term based on statistica l measurements. The 
term  'accuracy1, which is sometimes used instead of precision, is not 
appropriate because i t  does not admit to the existence of error. I t  is 
' possible to obtain an accurate, i.e. exact count, of the number of a irc ra ft 
owned by an airline or of vessels by a shipping company but only a 
precise estimate of the quantity of fuel consumed in a given time period. 
Precise is used because we obtain what is in e ffec t a best estimate of 
fuel consumption, not an exact or accurate measure. Consumption, 
estimated at fo r example 5000 units, was most like ly to be w ith in  the 
range 5000 - 50 units.
To be more explic it, we can state that there is only a one in twenty
chance or a 95 percent probability, that consumption was outside the
range 5000 ^50 units. The sta tistica l expression of such a range fo r the
+ +stated probability is 5000 -  2-2 standard deviations.
The standard deviation in the example quoted is therefore 25 units. 
When the standard deviation is known, we can w rite  down the precision 
for any required probability lim its .
g. 70 percent probability lim its  - 25 units 1SD)
95 percent probability lim its  - 50 units 2SD)
99.7 percent probability lim its  - 75 units 3SD)
A lternative ly, given the range, we can w rite  down the associated 
probability,
e.g. There is a one in three chance that consumption w ill exceed a 
forecast quantity.
Statements such as the above, may be made fo r any probabilities by 
reference to standard sta tistica l tables.
In practice the standard deviation is established by comparing forecasts 
w ith actuals or if  such experience is not available, a guess may be made 
based on a knowledge of the data and conditions used to make the 
forecast. This la tte r procedure is in e ffec t making a probabilistic 
forecast and being exp lic it about the range of uncertainty associated 
* w ith  the forecast.
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Whilst any method of establishing the precision w ill depend on estimating 
the standard deviation, the standard deviation itse lf may be calculated in a 
number of d iffe ren t units. The error associated w ith a forecast may be 
expressed.
I ' ■ '■'■■■ ■ .
In absolute terms, (quantity terms fo r energy or oil);
On a percentage basis;
i On an incremental basis, (the precision of the forecast increment from the 
base year);
On a time basis; this is expressing the uncertainty associated w ith a 
forecast in terms of time rather than quantities. For example the level 
forecast five  years hence should be attained not sooner than three years 
hence nor la te r than seven years hence.
There is no reason why the precision of energy forecasts should be constant. 
Indeed there is every reason to expect that the level of precision w ill change 
between primary energy sources and between oil products; from  one country 
to another depending on the size of market; from one time period to 
another depending on the steadiness of the growth of consumption and on the 
degree of control; when there is competition between energy sources errors 
should be greater than when there is no competition; when the outcome of 
forecasts may be influenced by weather since forecasts are made on a 
normal weather basis and lastly forecasts in the medium term  should be 
more precise than long term forecasts.
Growth rates can be substantially d iffe rent on a temperature corrected basis 
and i t  is sensible to compare year on year growth rates only on a 
temperature corrected basis fo r heating fuels.
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uenmaric, uas u ii,  annual urowrn r^ates
Actual Data Temperature Corrected
1960-61 14.8 21.2
1961-62 27.6 \  20.4
1962-63 18.0 '  13.7
1963-64 15.1 23.6
1964-65 19.3 14.4
1965-66 16.0 15.7
1966-67 4.5 9.3
1967-68 6.7 6.5
1968-69 17.1 11.9
Bias can occur in forecasts. During the 1955-1973 period, the economic, 
energy and oil forecasts nearly always were underestimates, whilst the 
nuclear power forecasts were usually fa r too optim istic. The situation was 
therefore encountered that the bias was of the same order of magnitude as 
the forecast increment and furthermore was persistent. When analysing the 
error variance of such data two elements may be identified; the bias and the 
standard error corrected fo r bias.
Using data over the period 1960 to 1970, the error associated w ith  world oil 
demand foiecasts was found to be:
Percent deviation from actual consumption = 1-3 (number of years
ahead)*
The equation • was a good f i t  to the data considered w ith  a correlation 
coeffic ien t o f 0.99. Thus during the period a forecast made five  years ahead 
underestimated actual consumption by 14 per cent. (Deviation o f forecast = 
1 - 3 x 5 = -14 per cent).
During the 1960s, many oil and o il product forecasts were revised upwards 
each year partly as a result o f higher growth rates being forecast and also 
because higher consumption levels pushing up the base year(s) levels. 
However, w ith the energy price increases, from  J 972 onwards many 
forecasts were revised downwards. Thus whilst the oil demand forecasts in 
the period to 1971 were underestimates, the forecasts from 1974 onwards 
(made previously to 1972) were overestimates. C learly biasses established 
fo r one time period are not necessarily applicable to another.
*G .I. Jenkins - Petroleum Review, June 1972, P212.
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Published forecasts 1955-1975
3.3.1 General
In 1955 there was comparatively less e ffo rt put into forecasting than 
there was in 1975. Certainly the flow  of information improved
/
considerably through the period and many more people were employed 
in the forecasting and planning activ ities. But forecasting was 
certa in ly not in a prim itive  state in 1955. Sector data of energy 
consumption were available and forecasts of energy supplies and 
economic a c tiv ity  were made in addition to energy demand forecasts. 
For example, a comprehensive and balanced view of energy forecasts 
w ith in  a single country (the U.K.), was provided by the Ridley 
Committee as long ago as 1952*.
Within each of the European countries the various energy industries 
provided forecasts of their own countries' future consumption levels 
and possibly sources of supplies of fuels. But in the 1950s the views 
were essentially parochial. I t  was not until 1970 that the U.K. NCB, 
fo r example, set up a formal forecasting group; previously forecasts 
of anything other than U.K. coal production were provided on an ad 
hoc basis. In countries where atomic energy industries had been 
established, there was no reluctance to provide forecasts of the 
expected growing importance of nuclear power w ith in the e le c tric ity  
generation sector. But where the e lec tric ity  generation authority 
was independent of the atomic energy authority, there was most 
like ly to be a diversity of opinion and additonal forecasts provided.
*Report of the Committee on National Policy fo r the use o f Fuel and 
Power Resources.
Cmd 8647. HMSO 1952.
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In addition to those providing national forecasts, there existed in 1955 
three international bodies interested in European economic, energy 
and oil forecasting. These were the European Coal and Steel 
Community (E.C.S.C.), the Organisation fo r European Economic Co­
operation (O.E.E.C.) and the Economic Commission fo r Europe 
(E.C.E.).* These three bodies were sources of in fluentia l economic, 
energy and oil forecasts.
The Treaty of Rome, setting up the EEC-6 (Common Market) and 
Euratom, was signed in 1957, E.F.T.A, was.formed in 1959 and the 
EEC-9 in 1973. U n til 1966, the E.C.S.C. High Authority  was 
responsible fo r the coal sector, the Euratom Commission fo r nuclear 
energy and the EEC Commission fo r oil and gas. The merger o f the 
three Communities’ individual executives in 1966 brought fu rther 
benefits in rationalisation and in fa c ilita ting  co-ordination of 
policies. A ll these organisations either published forecasts and or 
fac ilita ted  exchange of information to aid forecasting, thus supple­
menting the forecasts published at frequent intervals by the various 
sectors of the energy industries in all the European countries.
When examining forecasts, i t  should be remembered that the 
consultative process between those responsible fo r preparing energy 
forecasts ensured a great deal o f consistency between forecasts 
although the differences between the forecasts provided by the 
various energy industries were important.
*The O.E.E.C. was set up in 1948 and included all Western European 
countries except Spain. I t  was essentially an intergovernmental 
organisation with an important economic committee and an oil 
committee. The United Nations E.C.E., based in Geneva, was 
organised in three divisions; an Economic Division, a Transport 
Division and an Industry Division which contained a Coal Section. 
The E.C.S.C., set up in 1951, was a supranational rather than an 
international body founded by the Council o f Europe and which 
included an Energy Committee.
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The United Nations, the O.E.E.C. and later the O.E.C.D. have been 
much .more concerned w ith  the economy as a whole than w ith  the 
energy sector. Many more economic forecasts were available in the 
1970s than there were in the 1950s but there was no basic change in 
the ir quality. Certainly throughout the period, sector detail, 
econometric and m athem atical/statistical techniques all improved. 
The progress made in economics during the period did much to 
improve the understanding of the working of the economy and factors 
which were like ly to be im p lic it at the start of the period, were 
perhaps exp lic it in the 1970s although the po litica l element possibly 
increased in importance in the 1970s.
Throughout the period, the U.N. published economic analyses and 
forecasts covering ^the Communist and non-Communist worlds. 
Taking this global view of the economy undoubtedly had m erit as 
opposed to the narrower views taken by individual countries. Even in 
1975, some economic forecasting was s till done on a national basis 
w ithout being exp lic it about the state of the world economy.
A comprehensive survey of the economy of Western Europe in 1955 
was published by the U.N. in the "Economic Survey of Europe in 
1956". Although there was optimism fo r the prospects of freer trade 
in Western Europe, the relative slowdown of the post World War II 
economic recovery in 1955 and 1956, together w ith the po litica l 
uncertainty caused by the 1956 Suez Crisis, led to somewhat cautious 
attitudes on future growth. Indeed forecasts made in the 1950s were 
cautious and expectations were well illustrated by the tendency to 
consider only a lower variant in addition to the "best" single point 
forecast. I t  was re la tive ly unusual to find forecasts fo r long tim e 
periods in 1955, but one, which received widespread circula tion, 
forecast real GNP growth in Western Europe to be 1.75 to 
3.25% p.a. in the period 1955-1980*.
*"The Economic World Balance"
T. Kristensen and Associates. North Holland Publishing Co. 1960 
P.250
xF. Friedensburg (President of German Institu te  fo r Economic 
Research Berlin) Paper 45 12/6, Sixth World Power Conference 
Melbourne 1962.
xx"Brita in 1984". P.53
R. Brech, Unilever. Longman, Todd and Co. London, 1964
xxxWorld Economic Survey 1969-1970. P. 1979 
U.N., New York, 1971
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This was in an environment of real GNP growth in North America of 
3.0 to 3.4% p.a. and for the World of 2.75 to 4.0% p.a. I t  is worth 
recalling that although Kristensen intended his economic projection 
to be taken as a forecast, many long term projections of economic 
growth were properly described as target levels. When such target 
levels were comfortably exceeded, i t  may not be technically correct 
to state that economic growth was under-forecast. Economic policies 
may have been geared to producing economic growth at least to the 
target level stated.
On a national basis, economic forecasts for the short and long term  _ 
appeared at regular intervals and were usually in fluentia l. The 
economic growth forecasts or targets formulated w ith national plans, 
such as the five year plans, received international attention. Two
Xexamples of longer term forecasts included that of Friedensburg who 
forecast real GNP in West Germany from 1959 to 1975 of 5% p.a. and 
a Unilever forecast of economic growth in the U.K. in the period 1950 
to  1984 of 3% p.a.xx
Surveys of GNP growth rates, as indicated in national plans, were 
published by the U.N.j fo r example, see the 1969-1970 World
_ XXXEconomic Survey. The O.E.C.D. has also provided frequent 
economic forecasts fo r member countries which were not always in 
line w ith the national plan forecasts.
The General (Annual) Reports of the European Commission, published 
since 1958, dealt in considerable detail w ith all aspects of economic 
affa irs. Additionally the Commission published a quarterly bulle tin  
"The Economic Situation in the Community" which included surveys 
and short term forecasts.
Throughout the period, the very many published forecasts of the U.S. 
economy have influenced European economies through trade became 
more widely appreciated.
X
Se.(L- P m .
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O.E.C.D. were\'regular producers o f energy forecasts. These 
forecasts were largely bu ilt on the economic forecasts provided by 
experts of the same organisations and, as indicated in the section on 
methodology, these forecasts were published only a fte r discussions 
w ith  leading energy companies and probably circulation on working 
papers fo r comment.
The strongest features of the forecasts provided by the U.N. and the 
O.E.C.D. were the supranational views taken of economic and energy 
growth w ith their lack of bias towards any single sector o f the energy 
industry.
O f considerable importance to those engaged in energy forecasting 
were two publications which appeared fo r the f irs t tim e in the early 
1950s, one published by the U.N. and the other by British Petroleum. 
The firs t o f the U.N. "Series J" Energy Statistics appeared in 
September 1952 w ith  worldwide energy data fo r the years 1929, 1937 
and 1950. This f irs t number also included data on non-commercial 
energy sources fo r 1949; these fuels are not usually prominent in 
energy statistics. Series J has appeared regularly since 1952 and is 
one o f the most authoritative sources o f energy sta tis tics. British 
Petroleum has published its detailed "BP S ta tis tica l Review of the 
World O il Industry" each year since the 1952 edition which appeared 
early in 1953 and has become widely used since.
The inter-relationship between the economy, energy and tim e has 
been discussed in the section on methodology. Long term  economic 
forecasts are usually based on population forecasts together w ith  
assumptions about the number entering the work force and about 
labour productivity. However, a forecast of world energy demand to 
the year 2050 AD, which was published in 1954* and widely 
distributed, employed a methodology which e ffec tive ly  by-passed 
assumptions of economic growth and the relationship between 
economic growth and energy, consumption.
*"Energy in the Future"
P.C. Putnam, Macmillan 1954, P.114
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O.E.C.D. were regular producers of energy forecasts. These 
forecasts were largely bu ilt on the economic forecasts provided by 
experts o f the same organisations and, as indicated in the section on 
methodology, these forecasts were published only a fte r discussions 
w ith  leading energy companies and probably circulation cn working 
papers fo r comment.
The strongest features of the forecasts provided by the U.N. and the 
O.E.C.D. were the supranational views taken o f economic and energy 
growth w ith their lack of bias towards any single sector o f the energy 
industry.
O f considerable importance to those engaged in energy forecasting 
were two publications which appeared fo r the f irs t tim e in the early 
1950s, one published by the U.N. and the other by British Petroleum.
‘The firs t o f the U.N. "Series J" Energy Statistics appeared in 
September 1952 w ith  worldwide energy data fo r the years 1929, 1937 
and 1950. This f irs t number also included data on non-commercial 
energy sources fo r 1949; these fuels are not usually prominent in 
energy statistics. Series J has appeared regularly since 1952 and is 
one of the most authoritative sources of energy sta tis tics. British 
Petroleum has published its detailed "BP S tatistica l Review of the 
World Oil Industry" each year since the 1952 edition which appeared 
early in 1953 and has become widely used since.
The inter-relationship between the economy, energy and tim e has 
been discussed in the section on methodology. Long term  economic 
forecasts are usually based on population forecasts together w ith  
assumptions about the number entering the work force and about 
labour productiv ity. However, a forecast of world energy demand to 
the year 2050 AD, which was published in 1954* and widely 
distributed, employed a methodology which e ffec tive ly  by-passed 
assumptions of economic growth and the relationship between 
economic growth and energy consumption.
*"Energy in the Future"
P.C. Putnam, Macmillan 1954, P.114
energy consumption naa oeen sustainea ana esumatea ana me wanu 
average output of energy per capita w ill be not less than the present 
rate of 3 per cent, and may reach 4 per cent or more, at least fo r 
part of the tim e". Energy forecasts were then calculated from 
population forecasts and forecasts of the e ffic iency o f energy usage. 
Putnam produced a forecast which stood up well to the early 1970s by 
being more optim istic than his contemporaries. However, Putnam's 
forecast covered the period 1954 to 20501 (It was noticed w ith many 
forecasts that long term forecasts seemed to be unreasonably 
influenced by short term expectations).
Forecasts o f o il demand were the most im portant forecasts of the 
individual energy sources because oil was the main and balancing 
supplier o f energy and because much energy policy was dictated by 
views on the future of o il. I t  was not only in the period a fte r January 
•1st 1974 that oil was important fo r balance of payments reasons. 
When the price of oil was considerably less than $11 barrel, o il 
imports were an important item in the national accounts of many 
countries. Security o f supply considerations were never allowed to 
fade into the background w ith the 1956 and 1967 Suez Crises and the 
Arab Boycott of 1973/74. More w ill be said la te r o f o il supplies, 
fre igh t and o il product prices but fo r the above stated reasons alone, 
i t  w ill be apparent why oil forecasts were of considerable interest to 
European governments and why they were v ita l in form ulating energy 
policy.
3.3.2 O il companies
Forecasts produced by the major o il companies fo r Western Europe in 
the period 1955-1975 have been important fo r a number of additional 
reasons as well. Throughout the period, o il was the marginal energy 
source and for most European countries i t  was also the most 
im portant energy source. Whereas many energy demand forecasts 
were produced by authorities or governments considering the ir 
economies in isolation, the major o il companies were certa in ly not 
parochial in their a ttitude towards forecasting. A strength of the 
seven majors was in the ir forecasting of energy supplies, pa rticu la rly  
o il and gas supplies, because of the ir extensive exploration ac tiv ities. 
In the la tte r part o f the period the majors were also interested in the 
international coal trade.
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requirements was almost exclusively in the hands of the international 
•x-
o il companies .
O il companies have provided governments and supranational bodies 
w ith  statistics and forecasts in a variety of d iffe ren t ways. On a 
national basis, it  has been customary fo r representatives o f the oil 
industry to hold regular meetings at which they exchange views and 
provide medium term forecasts fo r government use. Typically 
forecasters would exchange views on the economic outlook and non­
o il energy energy supplies before the meeting and then decide on the 
most like ly  oil demand forecast. In the UK fo r example, the 
Petroleum Industry Advisory Council (PIAC) has a forecasting panel 
which produced medium term oil demand forecasts. Other countries 
also have o ffic ia l or informal meetings between oil companies, 
sometimes w ith the other energy industries, to agree most like ly  
forecasts. The detailed procedure, o f course, varies from  one country 
to another according to the way the energy industry is organised.
These national forecasts were aggregated by the major o il companies 
to provide their "in-house" European forecasts which in turn formed 
part o f the world oil demand forecast. Typically "m edium -term " 
forecasts would be fo r five or six years ahead together w ith  a single 
year about nine or ten years ahead. These forecasts were published 
by the oil companies nearly every year, mainly in the form  o f papers 
to organised energy industry meetings. As may be seen from  the lis t 
o f o il company forecasts, there was no concealment o f o il company 
views. From the comparison of BP published and hitherto unpublished 
BP Planning Department forecasts, i t  w ill be seen la te r (table 3.29) 
tha t the "confidential" or "in-house" numbers have been those which 
were published.
*An interesting insight into governments1 attitudes m ight be taken 
from  an incident the w rite r experienced in 1974. When a government 
o ffic ia l was invited to participate in a group working on a standard 
method for quantifying international o il movements and the ir tanker 
requirements, the reply given was that since the o il companies 
provided excellent information and statistics there was rea lly no 
government requirement fo r active participation.
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3,4 The outcome o f forecasts
3.4.1 General
In this section firs t economic, secondly to ta l energy forecasts, and 
th ird ly  those for the various fuel types w ill be compared w ith  the 
actual outturns.
The economic forecasts in Table 3.2 have not been selected as a 
representative sample of economic forecasts made during the 
period; they are mostly those which were exp lic itly  quoted in the 
selected energy studies. In the 1930s the longer term  forecasts of 
GNP tended to be near to the outcome or were under estimates. In 
the early 1960s underforecasting was general. The forecasts made 
in 1974 of more than 3% p.a. GNP growth in Western Europe in the 
1971 to 1980 period, appeared to be quite optim istic in ligh t of the 
poor growth rates from 1974 onwards.
Assessing economic forecasts (GNPs) by simply comparing the 
forecast w ith  the outcome is a ll tha t is necessary here. The 
problems associated w ith making reliable GNP forecasts did not 
diminish through the period and unfortunately, energy demand 
forecasts are almost completely dependent on economic, a c tiv ity  
forecasts in the absence of energy supply constraints. In future, i f  
energy supplies are potentially above the possible demand levels, 
then there is scope for underforecasting the level of economic 
activ ity . However, i t  is also possible to envisage situations in 
which energy supplies w ill place a lim it on the possible level of 
economic activ ity .
For future guidance i t  therefore appears that a forecast GNP 
growth rate of 3% p.a., for any country area or tim e period, could 
equally well turn out to be 2% p.a. or 4% p.a. and there is l it t le  
useful guidance provided by a study of the outcomes of h istorica l 
economic forecasts fo r quantifying the range of uncertainty.
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Total energy forecasts made in the 1930s were generally 
considerable underestimates as one would expect because of the 
underestimates of economic growth; other factors were re la tive ly 
unimportant. The Paley Report (Forecast 1) underestimated energy 
consumption by a factor of two over the 20 year period whilst other 
forecasts, such as forecast 3 of Table 3.3, considered energy 
growth rates the lower lim its  of which turned out to be a factor of 
three in error. Putnam however (Forecast 2) who did not exp lic itly  
consider economic growth, provided a forecast of energy growth of 
3 to 4 per cent per annum which was of the correct order o f 
magnitude over the period to 1973. An exception to the general 
pattern was a forecast of UK energy consumption made in 1936 
(Forecast 9) which over-forecast UK energy consumption. The 
economic performance of the UK, of course, fe ll short of 
expectations.
When the GNP forecast used to provide an energy forecast is 
proved to be in error, then the energy consumption forecast w ill be 
in error i f  the methodology fo r obtaining the energy consumption 
level from the economic activ ity  level was correct. This was the 
case in the 1950s and 1960s. Even when ranges were quoted, such 
as in Forecast 6 fo r the OEEC area, the top end of the range 
proved to be unrealistically low. Forecast energy consumpion fo r 
the OEEC area in 1975 was 890 to 960 m illion tonnes o.e whilst the 
actual was 1090 m illion tonnes o.e. I t  is not necessarily helpful to 
place a range on a forecast i f  i t  is unqualified in probability terms 
or not supported by an objective assessment of precision data.
In the 1960s there was an improvement in precision which 
accompanied the more optim istic expectations of economic growth 
which proved to be realistic. Ita ly  proved to be an exception, 
achieving higher GNP growth rates than forecast and consequently 
higher energy consumption rates than forecast.
The early 1970s saw a considerable upward revision of forecast 
levels of energy demand but from 1974 onwards, energy demand 
forecasts tended to be revised downwards due to energy supply 
lim ita tions becoming apparent.
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meet Unexpected demand, demand w ill be curtailed by one 
mechanism or another and the consequences of inadequate energy 
demand forecasts w ill be more serious for energy policy makers.
SQlid fuel forecasts made in the 1950s and early 1960s 
generally over-estimated solid fuel consumption, particu larly fo r 
the early 1970s, due to two reasons. The forecasters did not 
foresee the cheap and plentifu l supply of oil making coal so 
uncompetitive, this was a good example of forecasters disregarding 
price when making demand forecasts. Nor did forecasters foresee 
the problems such as poor productivity, which the European coal 
industry would encounter.
From Table 3.4 i t  w ill be seen that, fo r short periods ahead, solid 
fuel forecasts usually had a good precision. Forecasts made fo r 
five years ahead or less in the period to 1970 agreed w ith  the 
actuals to w ithin about 10 per cent. A fte r 1970 the shorter term  
forecasts were too optim istic as had been the longer range ones 
previously. Good precision should be expected in the short term  
solid fuel was not a balancing energy source and there should be a 
good assessment of sector usage included in the solid fuel demand 
forecasts.
The natural gas consumption forecasts listed in Table 3.5 were 
invariably based on supply forecasts. In a country, such as France, 
which found lit t le  gas beyond that which was known at the time the 
forecast was made, the forecasts proved precise. For other 
countries, such as the UK, which discovered large amounts of gas 
during the forecast period, the forecast was like ly  to be very 
imprecise. No speculative elements were included in the forecasts 
based on known possible sedimentary basins.
In 1965 i t  was forecast that natural gas consumption in 1975 would 
be 6 m illion tonnes; actual consumption was 33 m illion tonnes. In 
France a 1966 forecast fo r 1975 was for consumption of 16 m illion  
tonnes; the outcome was 17 m illion tonnes. The dilemma posed by 
natural gas supplies w ill always be important in energy forecasting. 
It  is perhaps irresponsible to forecast supplies un til the fields are 
known and the reserves proven. But to expect no additional gas 
supplies beyond those proved is not necessarily the most like ly  
outcome taken i f  few would believe a forecast embodying it .
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Hydropower forecasts are both supply and consumption forecasts and are 
made on the assumption that water supplies w ill be at long term average 
levels. They should be the most precise; of any energy forecasts. 
Installation of new schemes take about a decade and i t  is possible to 
make an assessment of the ultimate hydropower potential in any area. 
To this extent the forecasts are generally highly objective.
An example of a careful appraisal of hydropower resources made in 1955 
fo r 1975 was that made by the Hartley Commission which was proved to 
be exact, (See Forecast 6 in Table 3.6). The forecasts which proved to be 
slightly optim istic were not substantiated by detailed analyses. The
optim istic level of 50 m illion tonnes by 1975 postulated in 1956
(Forecast 9) was obtained by applying an arb itrary growth rate and not by 
a detailed assessment of potential.
The nuclear power forecasts listed in Table 3.7 are generally optim istic  
but are super-optim istic when prepared by those associated w ith  the 
nuclear power industry itse lf. Forecasts of UK nuclear power production 
in 1975 made in the mid-1950s were optim istic by a fac to r of four. But 
the Robinson Committee in 1960 forecast what proved to be a rea lis tic  
range fo r Western Europe in 1975, (Forecast 15). The uncertainty seen 
by the Robinson was reflected in the wide range quoted, 20 to 60 m illion  
tonnes o.e. The actual was 24 m illion tonnes o.e.; this was near the 
lower l im it quoted but other forecasts did not always provide rea lis tic  
lower lim its .
One of the most optim istic forecasts listed (Forecast 41) was an 
objective for the then newly set up Euratom which indicated target 
levels which would have solved Europe's (and the World's) energy 
problems. Forecasts or targets such as this have l i t t le  influence on 
energy policy.
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In the 1955 to 1973 period, oil supplies were available to satisfy all 
the demand that was placed on oil to levels considerably above 
those forecast. Thus there was no question of oil consumption 
being lim ited by a physical shortage of oil even though oil demand 
was underforecast.
The pattern of underforecasting not only for European oil demand 
but fo r world oil demand was quite consistent*. Furthermore 
energy policy during the period took into account the p lentifu l 
ava ilability  of cheap oil supplies and oil demand (potential 
consumption) forecasts were not regarded as lim its  in any way. 
Policy was to maximise economic growth and make as fu ll a use as 
possible of the cheap o il. —
The forecasts listed in Table 3.8 made in the period up to 1973 
re fle c t the then accepted views of the energy industry on oil 
demand. I t  is not constructive to attem pt to identify  any degree of 
superiority in any one forecast or group of forecasts. The crux of 
the m atter, referred to previously, was that all these forecasts 
were dependent on an adequate supply of (cheap) oil being 
available. Had these cheap oil supplies continued to be available, 
post 1973 all the oil demand forecasts might well have turned out 
to be quite precise.
Tables 3.2 to 3.8 include many forecasts to 1980 and to 1985. 
These forecasts, w ithout exception, show that the strong growth 
rates forecast fo r the early 1970s were expected to continue well 
beyond. Factors which could radically change the growth pattern 
were not considered to carry su ffic ient weight to influence the 
forecasts.
*See Part 3.2 (P age 35 )
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.Forecast. 
(Ref. No.)
Country/Area Year of Forecast
To Year 
or Period
Growth Rates $ p.  s.
Forecast
*
Actual
1 Western Europe 1952 1950-1975 2.5 4.25
6 O.E.E.C. 1955 1960 3.5 4.75
1975 3.0 4.25
9 O.E.E.C. 1956 1975 3.5 4.25
U.K. 1956 1975 3.0 2.5
West Germany 1956 1975 4.5 4.5
France 1956 1975 3.5 5.
Italy 1956 1975 5.5 4.75
12 EEC-6 1957 1955-1965 4.3 6.0
1965-1975 3.1 4.0
13 EEC-6 ' 1957 1955-1965 4.3 6.0
1965-1975 3.1 4.0
15 O.E.E.C. 1960 1955-1965 3.0 5.0
1965-1975 3.0 3.5
18 Western Europe 1960 1955-1980 1*75 to 3.25 4.25**
20 O.E.E.C. . 1957 • 1972 3.6 4.75
21 EEC-6 1962 1962 4.5 6.0
22 West Germany 1962 1975 ’ 4.75 3.75
30 - France 1962 1975 4 to 6 5.25
35 U.K. 1964 1960-1984 3.0 —
36 O.E.C.D. 1964 1960-1970 4.2 4.5
38 U.K. 1965 1970 3.5 2.0
42 EEC-6 1966 1976 4.6 4.0
45 Western Europe 1966 1980 4.5 — .
46 EEC-6 1967 1965-1970 4.3 4.5
U.K. 1967 1965-1970 3.8 2.0
60 France 1971 1975 6.0 3.25
73 Western Europe 1973 2000 4.5 —
79 EEC-9 1974 1971-1980 5.2 —
Other W• Europe 1974 1971-1980 5.1 —
EEC-9 1974 1980-1985 4.8 —
Other W. Europe 1974 1980-1985 5.2
"I'See Appendix 3 - 5 1  -
* to nearest 0.25^
** to 1975
million tonne3 oil equivalent
Forecast 
(Ref.No.)
Country/Area Year of Forecast
To Year 
or Period Forecast Actual
1 Western Europe 1952 1975 640 1188
2 World 1954 2050 3 to 4fo p.a. —
3 Western Europe 1954 long term 1.25fo p.a. tcf4ft p.a.
4 O.E.E.C. 1954 1958
1963
1968
1 1 to 2.5/6 p.a.
1 (same range for 
J each period)
1i56 p.a. 
3*5^  p.a. 
456 p.a.
6 O.E.E.C. 1955 1960 
1975
547 to 573 
733 to 867
617
1090
7 O.E.E.C. 1955 1960
1975
542 to 573 
785 to 961
617 
1090 -
9 O.E.E.C.
U.K.
West Germany
France
Italy
1956 1975
1975
1975
1975
1975
835 (2.656 p.a.) 
260 (2.256 p.a.) 
2.7% p.a.
2.056 p.a.
4.756 p.a.
1090 ( 3 h
205 
2~tP p.a.
p.s. 
7/6 p.a.
12 EEC-6 1957 1955-1965
1965-1975
3*5/6 p.a. 
2.656 p.a.
5ft p.a.
13 EEC-6 1957 1955-1965
1965-1975
3.656 p.a. 
2.756 p.a.
r--fp/o p.a.
i
15 O.E.E.C. 1960 1965
1975
675
900
795
1090
16 O.E.E.C. 1960 1965
1975
690 to 720 
890 to 960
795
1090
. 18 Western Europe 1960 1980 834 to 1200 —
20 O.E.E.C. 1957 1972 3.556 p.a. * 1 -iQtTft p.a.
22 West Germany 1962 1975 214 242
23 Western Europe 1962 1971 950 1116
28 Western Europe 1962 1970 785 1116
29 U.K. 1962 1970 207 228
30 France 1962 1965
1975
112
167 to 198
118 
169
31 Italy 1962 1965
1975
55
83
81
138
32 EEC-6 1963 1970 
1975
465
565
632
668
+See Appendix 5
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35 U.K. 1964 1984
/
250 ; —
37 U.K. 1965 1975 247 to 273 205
1
38 1 U.K. 1965 1970 225 228
40 Western Europe 1966 1980 1000 —
42 EEC-6 1966 1970
1980
495
755
632
43 ; France 1966 1970
1975
131 to 136 
157 to 167
160
169
44 Western Europe 1966 1970
1980
960
1440
1116
47 EEC-6 1968 1970
1980
490
765
632
5 6 Western Europe 1971 1975 1090 1188
59 EEC-6 1971 1975
1980
833
1112
668
60 France 1971 1975
1980
1985
187
240
300
169
62 EEC-6 1972 1985 1210 —
63 Western Europe 1972 1980 1550 —
64 Western Europe 1972 '1975 1090 1188
65 EEC-6 1972 1985 1265 —
66 EEC-6 1972 1985 ' 1335 —
67 EEC-6 1973 1980 940 —
68 Western Europe 1973 1968-1980 
1969-1980 
1971-1975
3.5$ p.a. 
4.6$ p.a. 
4.7$ p.a.
—
69 Western Europe 1973 1975
1975
1980
1980
1985
1985
11307 +
1165 J 
1500 0 + 
1535 J 
18357 + 
1900 J
1188
'1188
70 Western Europe 1973 1980 1757
+ Range forecast
- 53 -
71 West Germany 1973 1980 342
72 EEC-9 1973 1985
2000
1600
3200
73 Western Europe 1973 2000 3300 5 4.5^  p.a.
74 EEC-9 1974 1985 1500
75 Western Europe 1974 1980
1980
1985
1985
1500*]. + 
1270 > 
1900] 
1570)
76 Western Europe 1974 1985
1985
2200] 
2000 J
77 EEC-9 1974 1985 
1985
18007 ' 
1575 I
78 . EEC-9 1974 1985 1500
79 EEC-9 1974 1980
1980
1985
1985
1337] . 
1278/
1686 7 
1607 5
79 Western Europe 1974 1980
1980
1985
1985
1632] +
1562 i 
• 2121] + 
2023 J
80 EEC-9 1974 1985 1575
81 EEC-9 1975 1985 1475
82 Western Europe 1975 1980
1985
1605
1930
83 Italy 1975 1980 
. 1985
175 to 186 
220 to 263
+ Range forecast
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SOLID FUEL FORECASTS
(CONSUMPTION) million tonnes coal equivalent
Forecast 
(Ref.Noo),
Country/Area Year of Forecast
To Year 
or Period Forecast Actual
1
1 Western Europe 1952 1975 500 248
4 O.E.E.C. 1954 1958 511 541
1965 524 554
1968 558 500
■ 6 I O.E.E.C. 1955 1960 575 558
1975 605 327
9 O.E.E.C. 1956 1975 585 327
15 O.E.E.C. 1960 1965 495 to 585 538
1975 500 to 615 327
25 Western Europe 1962 1971 525 438
27 West Germany 1962 1975 172 105
28 Western Europe 1962 1970 520 470
29 U.K. 1962 1970 187 160
50 France 1962 1965 82 71
51 Italy 1962 1965 15 13
1975 15 18
52 . EEC-6 1965 1970 178 to 191 242
1975 174 to 185 179
55 U.K. 1964 1984 140 —
57 U.K. 1965 1975 180 to 200 105
58 U.K. 1965 1970 175 160
42 EEC-6 1966 1970 258 to 271 242 -
45 France 1966 1970 65 to 65 59
1975 56 to 58 38
47 EEC-6 1968 1970 217 242
1980 192 to 205 *
56 Western Europe 1971 1975 577 248
59 EEC-6 1971 1975 195 179
1980 194
60 France 1971 1975 40 38
1980 50 —
1985 25
+See Appendix 5
- 55 -
62 EEC-6 ; 1972 1985 137 —
63 Western Europe 1972 1980 
1980 .
225 to 345 
195 to 240
■ —
64 Western Europe 1972 1975 377 248
65 EEC-6 1972 1985 210 —
66 EEC-6 1972 1985 180 —
67 EEC-6 1973 1980 185 —
69 Western Europe 1973 1975
1975
1980
1980
1985
1985
370 7
300 J
2807 
250 J 
4201 + 
400 J
248
248
70 Western Europe 1973 1980 360
71 West Germany 1973 1980 96 to 108
74 EEC-9 1974 1985 337
75 Western Europe 1974 1980
1980
1985
1985
2807 
310 3
,510V350 J
76 Western Europe 1974 1985
1985
300 7 +
450 J
77 EEC-9 • 1974 1985
1985
2627 
375 J
78 EEC-9 1974 1985 375
79 EEC-9 1974 1980
.1980
1985
1985
3641+ 
376 J 
373 7+ 
382 J
79 Western Europe 1974 1980
1980
1985
1985
421 } + 434 3
441 ] + 448 5
80 EEC-9 1974 1985 375
81 EEC-9 1975 1985 375
82 Western Europe 1975 1980
1985
275
250
83 * Italy 1975 1980 
1985 .
23
23
-
~  ~  + Range forecast
NATURAL GAS FORECASTS
million tonnes oil equivalent
Forecast*
(Ref.Nc.)
—  ------ -
Country/Area Year of Forecast
To Year 
or Period Forecast Actual
•4 O.E.E.C, 1954 1958 8 7
1963 14 15
1968 14 40
6 O.E.E.C. 1955 1960 7 11
1975 14 151
9 ! O.E.E.C. 1956 1975 7 151
12 EEC-6 1957 1960 7 10
1968 10 37
1970 12 61
1975 14 113
15 O.E.E.C. 1960 1965 20 19
1975 40 to 80 151
23 Western Europe 1962 1971 38 100
27 West Germany 1962 1975 4 33
28 Western Europe 1962 1970 29 76
29 U.K. 1962 1970 0 11
30 France 1962 1965 6 5
31 . Italy 1962 1965 6 7
1975 6 21
32 EEC-6 1963 1970 29 to 30 61
1975 43 to 55 113
37 U.K. 1965 1975 6 33.
38 U.K. 1965 1970 1 11
42 EEC-6 1966 1970 35 61
1980 86 to 117 —
43 France 1966 1970 10 10
1975 16 17
47 EEC-6 1968 1970 39 61
1980 92 to 115 —
56 Western Europe 1971 1975 120 154
59 EEC-6 1971 1975 91 113
1980 119 —
60 F^rance 1971 1975 17 17
1980 24 —  ■
1985 30
+See Appendix 5 - - 57 -
62 EEC-6 [ 1972 1985 187
63 Western Europe 1972 1980 
1980
170
420
64 Western Europe 1972 1975 120 154
65 EEC-6 1972 1985
1985
210] + 
250 J
66 EEC-6 1972 1985 200
67 EEC-6 1973 1980 150
69 Western Europe 1973 1975
1975
1980
1980
1985
1985
110] + 
277 J 
177] + 
417 J 
257? 
584 J
154
70 Western Europe 1973 1980 231
71 West Germany 1973 1980 55
74 EEC-9 1974 1985 375
75 Western Europe 1974 1980
1980
1985
1985
177] + 
384 i 
2571 + 
527 J +
76 Western Europe 1974 1985
1985
3107 +
500 /
77 EEC-9 1974 1985
1985
265] + 
375)
78 EEC-9 1974 1985 375
79 EEC-9 1974 1980
1980
1985
1985
262] + 
299 J 
336] + 
375 )
79 Western Europe 1974 1980
1980
1985
1985
290] + 
329 5 
385]+ 
435 J
80 EEC-9 1974 1985 380
81 EEC-9 1975 1985 290 to 340
82 Western Europe 1975 1980
1985
250
350
83 Italy 1975 1980 
1985
33
41
- J
_ 58 - + Ranfie forecast
million tonnes oil equivalent 
(low factor)
Country/Area Year of Forecast
To Year 
or Period Forecast Actual
1 Western Europe 1952 1975 54 52
4 O.E.E.C. 1954 1958 25 16
1965 24 22
1968 24 27
6 O.E.E.C. 1955 1960 20 19
1975 29 29
9 ' O.E.E.C. 1956 1975 50 29
12 EEC-6 1957 1960 8 9
1965 10 10
1970 11 11.5
1975 , 12 9.5
15 O.E.E.C. 1960 1965 21 24
25 Western Europe 1962 - 1971 55 50
27 West Germany 1962 1975' 6 2
28 Western Europe 1962 1970 28 50
51 Italy 1962 1965 5 4
1975 5 5
52 EEC-6 1965 1970 12 11.5
1975 14 9.5
54 Western Europe 1965 1975 51 52
57 U.K. 1965 1975 2 1
40 Western Europe 1966 1980 22 —
42 EEC-6 1966 1970 9 9
1980 9
45 France 1966 1970 5 5
1980 5
44 . Western Europe 1966 1970 56 50
1980 51
+ See Appendix 5
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60 France 1971 1975 4
1980 4
1985 4
70 j Western Europe 1975 1980 48 .
71 West Germany 1975 1980 2
74 EEC-9 1974 1985 13
75 Western Europe 1974 1985 51
77 EEC-9 197* 1985 15
1985 12
79 EEC-9 1974 1980 15
1985 16
79 Western Europe 1974 1980 45
1985 49
81 EEC-9 1975 1985 14
82 Western Europe 1975 1980 50
1985 60
85 Italy 1975 1980 4
1985 - 4
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NUCLEAR POWER FORECASTS
million tonnes oil equivalent 
(hifth factory
Forecast + 
lief. No..)..
Country/Area Year of Forecast
To Year 
or Period Forecast Actual
5 U.K. 1955 1975 27 7
6 O.E.E.C. 1955 1975 54 24
9 O.E.E.C. 1956 1975 50 24
10 U.K. 1956 1965 4 4
1975 40 7
12 EEC-6 1957 1965 16 1
1970 29 4
1975 58 11
15 O.E.E.C. 1960 1965 10 to 14 5
1975 20 to 60 24
25 Western Europe 1962 1971 19 13
27 West Germany 1962 1975 1 5
28 Western Europe 1962 1970 15 11
51 Italy 1962 1965 1 1
32 EEC-6 1965 1970 6 4
1975 16 to 27 11
34 O.E.E.C. 1965 1975 33 24
37 U.K. 1965 1975 60 7
41 Western Europe 1966 1980 100 : ---
41 EEC-6 1966 1970 6 4
1975 30 11
1980 70 — »
’ 1990 225 —
2000 600 —
42 EEC-6’ 1966 1970 8 4
1980 60 to 80 —
43 France 1966 1970 1 1
1975 2 4
44 Western Europe 1966 1970 15 11
1980 150 to 150 —
56 Western Europe 1971 1975 40 11
1980 135 —
1985 500
■f
See Appendix 5
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60 France 1971 1975 4 4
1980 13 -
i
1
1985 34 —
62 EEC-6 1972 1985 117 '
65 EEC-6 1972 1985 120
1985 140
70 Western Europe 1973 1980 125
71 West Germany 1973 1980 30
74 EEC-9 1974 1985 260
75 Western Europe 1974 1985 290
1985
77 EEC-9 1974 1985 160
1985 260
79 EEC-9 1974 1980 86
1985 202
79 Western Europe 1974 1980 119
1985 273
80 EEC-9 . 1974 1985 270
81 EEC-9 1975 1985 242
82 . Western Europe 1975 1980 105
1985 285
83 Italy 1975 1980 2
1985 29 to 36
- 62
million tonnes oil
Forecast* 
(Ref.No.)
Country/Area Year of Forecast
To Year 
or Period Forecast
Actual
/
6 O.E.E.C. 1955 1960 114 to '133 1Q3
1975 117 to 310 597
8 O.E.E.C. 1956 1965 200 365
1975 . 345 597
9 O.E.E.C. 1956 1960 200 193
1975 375 597
11 O.E.E.C. 1956 1960 153 193
1975 340 597
14 Western Europe 1958 1960 161 205
15 O.E.E.C. 1960 1965 195 to 235 365
1975 285 to 375 597
16. O.E.E.C. 1960 1965 200 to 240 365
1975 300 to 390 597
21 EEC-6 1962 1962 13^ 15?o
22 Western Europe 1962 1971 425 655 |
23 Western Europe 1962 1971 428 655 |
24 Western Europe 1962 1965 300 to 320 389
1970 400 to 420 626 |
1975 500 to 540 665 I
24 EEC-6 1962 ' 1965 176 to 178 228
1970 230 to 263 375
1975 296 to 345 395
25 EEC-6 1962 1965 163 2-28
26 O.E.E.C. 1962 1965 195 to 235 365
1975 300 to 390 597
27 West Germany 1962 1975 86 129
28 Western Europe • 1962 .1970 370 626
29 U.K. 1962 1970 62 102
30 France 1962 1965 39 54
31 Italy 1962 1965 28 52
1975 52 96
4-
See Appendix 5
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32 EEC-6 i 1963 1970 204 to 220 375
1975 259 to 293 395
33 Western Europe 1965 1973 475 749
35 U.K. 1964 1984 100 —  .
37 U.K. 1965 1975 95 to 105 92
38 U.K. 1965 1970 96 102
42 EEC-6 19 66 1970 243 to 260 375
43 France 1966 1970 65 to 66 94
1975 85 to 85 109
44 Western Europe 1966 1970 585 max 626
1980 950 max —
45 Western Europe 1966 1970 566 626
47 EEC-6 1968 1970 270 375
1980 450 to 475 —
48 Western Europe 1969 1980 944
49 Western Europe 1969 1980 1070
49 EEC-6 • 1969 1980 608
50 Western Europe 1969 1980 769
51 EEC-6 1970 1980 710
52 Western Europe 1970 1980 1095
53 Italy 1970 1980 180
54 EEC-6 1970 1980 552
55 Western Europe 1971 1980 765 to 1608
56 Western Europe 1971 1975 66 5 665
58 Sweden 1971 1975 27 to 28.5 26.5
1985 54.5 to 59 —
59 EEC-6 1971 1975 570 395
1980 779 - —
60 France 1971 1975 127* 109
1980 171* —
1985 207* —
61 EEC-6 1972 1985 770] +
1985 650 J
E^xcludes non energy oil products. ' + Range forecast
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62 EEC-6 1972 1985 755
T
65
i!
EEC-6 1972 1985
1985
770*1 +
680 J
66 EEC-6 1972 1985 870
67 EEC-6 1975 1980 588
70 Western Europe 1975 1980 1113
71 i West Germany 1975 1980 177 to 185
72 EEC-9 1975 1985 1000
74 EEC-9 1974 1985 600
75 Western Europe 1974 1980
1980
1985
1985
10001  ^
556 J + 
11501 
560 J +
76 Western Europe 1974 1985
1985
13501 ^
800 J
77 EEC-9 1974 1985
1985
1160 "I +
655. j
78 EEC-9 1974 1985 580
79 EEC-9 1974 1980
1980
1985
1985
7311 + ■
628 j
885 \
760 5 +
79 Western Europe 1974 1980
1980
1985
1985
900 X + 
781 J 
1121*1 + 
967 J
80 EEC-9 1974 1985 645
81 EEC-9 1975 1985 600 to 650
82 Western Europe 1975 1980
1985
925
985
85 Italy 1975 1980
1985
113 to 124 
123 to 159
+ Range forecast
3.4.2 Oil Companies
Each year, British Petroleum like many other energy companies, 
produces a forecast of the environment in which i t  operates. The 
process evolved in the 1960s and the forecasts made over the 
period 1966 to 1973 were prepared in a fa ir ly  stable form at. 
Forecasts were produced fo r each year up to six years ahead and 
also a forecast fo r nine years ahead. The form at changed 
somewhat from 1974 and w ill continue to change to meet changes 
in circumstances.
The forecasts collated in BP's annual long term forecast documents 
were all prepared by forecasters in the individual countries and 
were generally consistent w ith the contemporary views. As w ill be 
seen from the forecasts of Mobil O il in the follow ing section , the 
forecasts of oil demand in Western Europe prepared by BP and 
Mobil were sim ilar. The precision data derived and the 
commentary on the precision are not therefore applicable purely to 
BP forecasts but are of more general interest.
When considering the forecasts in detail, the follow ing aspects are 
discussed; the precision of the various oil products and to ta l oil, a 
comparison o f the precision data between the major countries, the 
precision in the 1966-1973 period, bias in the forecasts and the 
changes in the forecasts made following the late 1973/1974 price 
increases.
The forecasts discussed are those prepared fo r the BP long term 
forecasts (LTFs) in June of each year from 1966-1973. Precision 
data were prepared fo r the following sets of forecasts which in all 
instances were by year fo r at least five years ahead.
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L is t o f BP Forecasts Examined
Total Oil Demand
Motor Gasolines
Gas Oils
Fuel Oils
Lubricants
Bitumens
LPG
(Liquid Petroleum 
Gases)
LDF
(Light D istilla te  
Feedstocks)
Table
Austria A6.1
France , A6.2
Italy A6.3
Netherlands A6.4
Norway A6.5
Sweden A6.6
UK A6.7
West Germany A6.8
France A6.9
UK A6.10
West Germany A 6 . l l
France A6.12
UK A6.13
West Germany A6.14
France A6.15
UK A6.16
West Germany A6.17
France A6.18
UK A6.19
West Germany A6.10
France A6.21
UK A6.22
 T K « -
West Germany A6.23
Total Western A6.24
Europe
Total Western A6.25 
Europe
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Lubricants 
Bitumens 
Total Oil Demand
Additionally a short series of quarterly forecasts fo r OECD 
Europe* were examined these were prepared in the middle of each 
quarter and were by quarter fo r at least five  quarters ahead.
Table
OECD Europe A6.30
OECD Europe A6.31
OECD Europe A6.32
OECD Europe , A6.33
The method employed to calculate the standard deviation fo r the 
forecasts fo r each year was that derived by ICI workers* fo r 
estimating the standard deviation from the range which is 
appropriate fo r small samples. The ranges of the values covered by 
• the forecasts, together w ith estimates of. the standard deviations, 
are included in each table w ith the forecasts themselves and the 
actual consumption for each year to 1975. The m ajority of the 
forecasts were prepared in long tons and these original units were 
retained fo r the precision data.
It is appropriate to discuss the precision data in three categories; 
the actual precision data to 1973, the precision of the 1974 and 
1975 forecasts and the dispersion of the forecasts made fo r the 
years 1976 and after. *
In the period to 1973, the forecasts for to ta l oil demand show a 
sim ilar pattern from one country to another. The precision 
deteriorates in all cases for forecasts made several years ahead 
rather than fo r just one or two years ahead, but there are 
exceptions as may be seen from table 3.10.
^Statistical methods in research and production. O.L. Davies, 
P.L. Goldsmith, Editors 5th edition, O liver and Boyd, 1972, P449.
Motor Gasoline 
Gas Oil 
Fuel Oil
Total Oil Demand
• c .u iup e
TGtal Western A6.27
Europe
Total Western A6.20 
Europe
Total Western A6.29 
Europe
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TABLE 3.10
THE PRECISION OF OIL DEMAND FORECASTS IN EIGHT 
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES IN THE PERIOD 1966-1973
' / ' ' "  "  ’
(See Appendix A6.8 for example of data.
Units - m illion long tons
Consumption Standard Deviation of Forecasts
Country  — ---------------------- —•-----—----------—------—_
1965 1973 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
Austria 5.5 11.3 .4 .4 .3 .3 .3 .3 .3 .5
France 53.6 125.3 2.5 1.1 .9 1.5 3.9 5.6 7.0 8.9
Ita ly 52.2 102.0 .5 .2 .7 .5 1.3 2.2 3.8 4.9
Netherlands 25.5 40.6 1.2 1.8 1.7 1.3 1.9 2.3 2.8 3.4
Norway 5.2 8.5 0 .1 .1 .1 .3 .3 .3 .3
Sweden 18.8 28.9 1.1 .4 .5 1.1 1.7 1.4 1.2 1.3
UK 72.2 111.6 .3 .4 .5 1.3 2.7 3.4 3.8 4.0
West Germany 80.5 147.3 .2 1.4 1.1 1.8 5.1 6.5 8.8 8.9
It  is logical to expect that the longer ahead a forecast is made, the 
poorer w ill be the precision. V/hen examining such a series of 
forecasts, i f  the firs t year ahead forecast proved to be different, 
from the average trend, when the second and th ird  years 
approximated to the average, then the apparent precision fo r the 
forecast made one year ahead would be abnormally high.
The following data, Table 3.11, provide a measure of the 
contribution of some individual countries to the errors in the to ta l 
oil demand forecast for Total Western Europe in 1967 and 1970.
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FORECASTS OF OIL DEMAND MADE IN JUNE 1967 FOR THE YEARS SPECIFIED
1967
Forecast Error
1970
Forecast
m illion  long tons 
1973
Error Forecast Error
Austria 6.2 - 0.2 8.6 -0 .5 10.7 -0 .6
France 65.4 -0 .2 83.9 - 9.0 99.9 -25.4
Ita ly 64.0 + 0.3 83.3 - 2.6 102.4 + 0.4
Netherlands 27.4 + 0.2 33.4 - 3.2 36.3 -4 .3
Norway 5.9 0 7.4 - 0.6 8.5 0
Sweden 21.4 + 0.6 25.4 -4 .2 28.9 0
UK 82.6 -0 .6 95.6 - 5.2 109.6 - 2.0
West Germany 84.4 -0 .8 115.3 -11.1 130.9 -16.4
Total West Europe 455 -11 568 -49 670 -67
The numbers in Table 3.11 indicate that much of the error in the 
Total Western Europe forecasts fo r 1970 and 1973 was due to the 
contributions from the forecasts made fo r France and Germany and 
was due to the better than expected economic growth expectations 
in these two countries.
Overall the precision in in most countries was good; possibly as 
good as is required fo r most planning purposes. For example, i f  
refineries had been bu ilt to meet the 1967 oil demand forecasts fo r 
1973, they would have been on target. Only in France and Germany 
would the construction programs need to have been hastened.
The precision data derived from the Western Europe numbers, 
suitably scaled, probably provide better guidance fo r application to 
individual countries’ forecasts. This is because special factors 
influencing individual countries w ill not be prevalent in the macro 
forecasts. However, to supplement the h istoric precision data 
when considering the lim its  to be placed on forecasts, i t  is 
necessary to take an independent view of bias based on factors such 
as economic expectations and energy supply considerations.
c  • .
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to enable the performance of sim ilar forecasts to be assessed. For 
example, fo r a given year assume that the in itia l forecast was 
made for five years ahead and then the forecast was reviewed and 
perhaps revised at annual intervals. The standard deviation 
calculated for each year as the forecasts are revised provides a 
measure of the stab ility  of the forecasts and may be compared with 
the established precision data. I f  there are signs of lack of 
s tab ility  compared w ith the established crite ria , then i t  may be 
possible to identify those factors responsible fo r the lack of 
s tab ility . This is in essence applying control chart techniques for 
monitoring forecasts.
There is an important feature contained in the forecasts prepared 
in June 1973. Although in 1973 there already was concern 
expressed on the future availability of oil supplies and consequently 
a possibility of substantial energy price increases, the forecasts 
were not influenced by these factors in numerical terms. The 
revisions to forecasts were made following the energy price rise.
TABLE 3.12
FORECASTS OF TOTAL OIL DEMAND FOR 1977 MADE IN THE YEARS STATED
million long tons
Country Year Forecast Made 1971 1972 1973 1975 1977
Actual
Austria 15.0 14.9 15.0 10.5 10.8
France 162.6 160.7 163.5 117.0 112.8
Ita ly 150.9 150.2 142.6 93.4 94.4
Netherlands 52.9 48.1 50.8 33.7 37.0
Norway 10.8 11.3 11.0 8.1 8.7
Sweden 39.2 39.7 35.7 28.7 27.8
UK 143.7 136.6 128.9 87.0 90.8
West Germany 186.8 181.7 180.7 134.7 134.9
Total Western Europe 979 958 949 667 686
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The average reduction from the 1973 forecast to the 1975 forecast 
was over 40 per cent but as w ill be seen from  analyses of the 
individual petroleum products forecasts, this reduction was not 
evenly distributed. For all the countries quoted in table 3.12 and 
fo r Europe, the downward revisions made in 1975 fo r the 1977 
demand proved to be very precise.
The precision of motor gasoline forecasts should be better than the 
precision fo r gas oils and fuel oils because the possibilities of 
substitution are more lim ited  and the consumption pattern is 
lim ited to factors such as vehicle populations and disposable 
income which are not usually subject to unpredictable sudden 
changes. As w ith to ta l oil demand forecasts, when economic 
growth turns out to be better than anticipated, motor gasoline 
forecasts are like ly to be on the low side. Consequently forecasts 
made fo r UK motor gasolines consumption in the 1966-1973 period 
have had a better precision than those prepared fo r France and 
West Germany.
TABLE 3.13
M otor Gasolines Forecasts made in 1966 fo r 1972
m illion  long tons
Year 1972 1972
Country Forecast Actua l
France 12.4 14.3
UK 15.0 15.6
West Germany 16.1 18.3
Western Europe 78.4 83.8
To assess the adequacy of the forecasts, consider the forecasts 
made for periods of three years ahead fo r Total Western Europe. 
(Three years ahead is a reasonable period to build gasoline 
manufacturing plant).
The precision data fo r all the years are included in Table 3.14.
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TABLE 
3.14
Total Western Europe Motor Gasoline Forecasts 
fo r Three Years Ahead
m illion  long ton!
Forecast in 1966 fo r 1969 69.95 actual 66.50
Forecast in 1967 fo r 1970 71.11 actual 72.50
Forecast in 1968 fo r 1971 75.38 actual 78.05
Forecast in 1969 fo r 1972 81.34 actual 83.84
Forecast in 1970 for 1973 87.50 ' actual 89.34
Forecast in 1971 fo r 1974 92.87 actual 86.17
Forecast in 1972 fo r 1975 100.15 actual 88.70
The under forecasting to  1973 was a maximum of 2.5 m illion  tons; 
the sort of figure that could readily he accommodated w ith in  the 
fle x ib ility  o f the supply system.
The forecasts made fo r 1977 in the years 1971 to 1973 averaged 
about 112 m illion tons. In 1975 the 1977 forecast level was 90.87 
m illion tons, a reduction of more than 20 per cent.
As anticipated, the precision data of the gas oil forecasts were
generally worse than the precision data of the motor gasoline
forecasts. The gas oil used fo r space heating, industrial use and
diesel engines. Motor gasoline forecasts did not suffer by
Sf.9competition from other fuels to any synificant extent, the phase of 
the road transport market taken by LPG being small (less than 1 
per cent of Europes motor sp irit consumpion in 1975) whilst 
unanticipated switches between motor spirit and diesel fuel were 
not possible because of the stab ility  of the road vehicle population. 
In 1975, of 190 m illion tonnes domestic consumption of gas oil in 
Europe 36 m illion tonnes were used by road vehicles and 107 m illion  
tonnes by the residential sector mainly fo r space heating. In this 
la tte r sector there was competition between gas oil and other 
fuels, particularly w ith material gas. Consequently gas oil demand 
forecasts could be in error due to unforeseen penetration of this 
sector by natural gas. The heating component was and was also 
subject to variation from year to year depending the severity o f the 
winters. Forecasts of the diesel fuel component of gas oil should 
have been more reliable and the precision in line w ith the precision 
of motor gasoline forecasts so much of the error could be 
attributed to the heating oil. _ -?u -
TABLE 3.16
precision was poorest fo r West Germany and best fo r the UK.
Precision of Gas Oil Forecasts In France, UK
and West Germany 1966-1973
(The firs t forecasts were prepared in 1966 and then revised annually)
( See Appendix Aoc8 for example of data)
Units - m illion long tons
Country -
Consumption Standard Deviation of Forecasts -
1965 1973 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
France 16.4 43.1 .9 .2 1.0 1.6 2.4 3.2 3,8 3.3
UK 10.7 20.4 .1 .3 .8 1.2 1.7 2.0 2.3 2.5
West Germany 30.4 61.8 .2 .5 .9 3.1 4.8 5.6 6.2 7.3
The following forecasts, were prepared in 1966 fo r 1972 and are shown 
with the actual outcomes.
TABLE 3.17
Forecasts o f Gas Oil Demand fo r 1972 made in 1966
M illion long tons
France 1966 forecast fo r 1972 31.2; actual 39.7
UK 1966 forecast fo r 1972 13.6; actual 20.1
West Germany 1966 forecast fo r 1972 43.3; actual 58.3
The incremental error, in absolute terms, was sim ilar fo r France and 
the UK in 1972 being only half that observed with the German 
forecasts.
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The gas oil forecasts in the post-1973 period were revised down 
particu larly sharply. One of the prime factors was the planned 
increase use of natural gas at the expense of gas oil following the 
1973/1974 oil embargo and price increase. As w ill be seen from the 
actuals, the downward revisions proved realistic.
TABLE 3.18
Gas Oil Forecasts fo r 1977
m illion long tons
Country Year Forecast Made Actual
1971 1972 1973 1975 1977
France 58.9 55.4 56.3 38.0 37.1
UK 26.0 25.5 27.7 17.4 19.3
West Germany 76.0 74.4 74.4 57.3 57.9
In the period considered oil was the major energy source and the 
balancing fuel. On this basis i t  m ight have been expected that the 
precision of fuel oil forecasts would have been subject to 
substantial errors since shortfa ll in solid fuel supplies and the 
nuclear power program would have been made good by increased 
fuel oil usage.
However in the period to 1973, the forecasts in the UK and in West 
Germany were surprisingly good; i t  was only in France that the 
forecasts followed the expected pattern.
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Precision of Fuel O il Forecasts in France, UK 
and West Germany 1966-1973
(See Appendix A6c8 for example of data)
Units - m illion long tons
Country
Consumption Standard Deviation of Forecasts
1965 1973 1966 1967 1963 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
France 14.1 35.6 1.0 1.0 .8 1.1 2.3 3.2 - 4.0 5.1
UK 27.6 38.8 .4 1.5 2.1 2.3 3.0
West Germany 17.6 29.2 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.9 1.9
In quantity terms, the forecasts fo r 1972 are as follows
TABLE 3.20
Forecasts o f Fuel o il Demand in 1972
France 1966 forecast fo r 1972 23.4
UK 1966 forecast fo r 1972 38.4
West Germany 1966 forecast fo r 1972 25.6
m illion  long tons
actual 31.8 
actual 40.7 
actual 28.2
A further point is that it  might also have been expected that the 
influence of the dirigiste system of planning in France would have 
led to a better precision than that achieved in the UK and in West
Germany^ in ; fact^the French actual was 36% higher
whilst Germany was 10% and the UK only 6%.
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As w ith the gas oil forecasts, the fuel oil forecasts were also 
revised downwards following the 1973 oil embargo w ith proposed 
conservation and substitution having a major impact on the 
forecasts for example in the UK the forecast fuel oil consumption 
fo r 1977 was 40.1 m illion tons in 1971, the 1972 forecast was 82.7, 
the 1973 forecast was 39.9 and the 1975 forecast 25.0 and the 
outcome was 27.3 m illion tons.
A noteworthy point which concerns the revision of both the gas oil 
and fuel oil forecasts is concerned w ith  the conservation effects. 
In revising the forecasts, conservation factors were applied to all 
energy sources. Thus energy saved by conserving coal also enabled 
that quantity of coal saved to substitute fo r fuel o il. This 
substitution e ffec t depleted fuel oil consumption in addition to the 
depletion due to increased supplies of coal and perhaps other fuels.
The two non-energy petroleum products lubricants and bitumen are 
not capable of substitution to the extent that gas oil and fuel o il 
could be substituted and neither was i t  considered that demand fo r 
them was particularly price elastic. However downward revision of 
the forecasts fo r these two products occurred as fo r the main 
petroleum products.
In the UK over the 1969-1973 period, a ll the bitumen forecasts 
made agreed with the actual outcomes to w ithin about 10% of the 
actual but the downward revision of the 1977 forecast from  1973 to 
1975 was about 30%. The precision data established under 
conditions of a steadily expanding market did not therefore provide 
any guidance on the magnitude of the revisions made subsequent to 
the 1973 forecasts.
The precision data for 1966 to 1973 are shown in the follow ing 
tables.
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TABLE 3.21 V ,
Precision of Lubricants Forecasts in France, UK 
and West Germany 1966-1973 
(See Appendix A6.8 f o r  example o f  data) Units- m illion long tons
Consumption Standard Deviation of Forecasts
Country
1963 1973 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
France .665 1.071 .003 .021 .020 .031 .037 .040 .046 .049
UK 1.105 1.166 .004 .038 .033 .029 .047 .063 .085 .073
West Germany .861 1.201 .005 .053 .041 .058 .096 .098 .101 .114
The precision data fo r France appear slightly better than those fo r the UK especially 
when viewed against the substantial growth in the French Market -
TABLE 3.22
Precision o f Bitumen Forecasts in Frances UK 
and West Germany 1966-1973
( See Appendix A608 for example of data) Units - m illion long tons
Consumption Standard Deviation of Forecasts
uuunuy
1965 1973 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973'
France 2.342 3.342 .16 .20 .24 .26 .26
UK 1.828 2.419 .03 .08 .06 .05 .10
West Germany 4.247 4.583 ,18 .12 .22 .25 .32
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precision but there is l it t le  to choose between the precision of the 
forecasts fo r France and Germany.
Liquid Petroleum Gases (LPG) forecasts which had shown a good 
precision over the period 1966 to 1973 fo r Total Western Europe, 
were also revised sharply downwards in 1975.
The reduction in the forecast of LPG demand in 1977 made in 1975 
(27 per cent) was in line w ith  the reduced to ta l oil consumption 
which was reduced by 30 per cent from 1973 to 1975.
LPG is an a ttractive  clean fuel usually selling at a premium price 
of over other fuels but consumption has been dictated by supplies; 
Western Europe's supplies coming mainly from refinery sources. 
The cutback in the forecasts was mainly as a result of reduced 
expectation of supplies available from refineries. I t  is of interest 
to note that the forecasts made in 1974 and 1975 fo r 1980 and 1981 
did not apparently anticipate substantial supplies from North Sea 
sources.
. TABLE 3.23
Western Europe LPG Forecasts fo r the 1980s
m illion long tons
Forecast fo r 1980 made in 1971 , 26.65
Forecast fo r 1980 made in 1975 ,, 18.50
Forecast fo r 1981 made in 1972 , 26.88
Forecast fo r 1981 made in 1975 , 19.24
The LDF (light d istilla te  feedstock) forecasts cover an im portant 
sector of the economy which is heavily dependent on liquid 
petroleum feedstocks; gases and coal based hydrocarbons are of 
re lative ly minor importance. The forecasts include the LDF 
employed fo r manufacturing olefins (mainly ethylene and 
propylene), aromatic hydrocarbons and smaller quantities fo r 
ammonia and methanol. Also included are small quantities of LDF 
used for manufacture of gas; substitute coal gas or substitute 
* natural gas.
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The precision of the LDF forecast is therefore a close measure of 
the precision of forecasting the a c tiv ity  in the petrochemical 
sector.
The forecasts in the period to 1973 show a precision which is good 
assessed against the growth rates; the standard deviation of the 
forecasts being less than the annual growth in consumption. The 
forecasts were also free from bias compared w ith many other oil 
product forecasts. The forecasts prepared in 1966, 1967 and 1968 
were optim istic, in 1969 the forecasts were a l i t t le  low and in 
1970-72 quite close to the actuals.
The follow ing forecasts were made fo r periods of four years ahead. 
TABLE 3.24
LDF Forecast fo r  Western Europe
m illion  tons
1966 fo r 1970 40.66 actual 34.55
1967 fo r 1971 37.25 actual 38.23
1968 fo r 1972 43.17 actual 42.69
1969 fo r 1973 40.86 actual 45.30
In 1975 the consumption proved to be heavily over forecast w ith 
the forecasts ranging from '46 to 49 m illion tons whilst the actual 
was only 39 m illion tons.
The 1975 forecast revised sharply downwards the earlier ones made 
fo r the later 1970s and early 1980s; about 20 m illion tons being the 
reduction from the 1973 forecast and about 30 m illion  tons from 
the 1971 and 1972 forecasts. The re la tive ly good precision data 
derived from the late 1960 and early 1970 forecasts in the period to 
1973 did not prove a reliable guide to the precision of the forecasts 
fo r the late 1970s early 1980s or indeed fo r 1975.
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higher energy price level may be estimated by examining forecasts 
made a fte r the 1973 crude oil price increases. In 1974, 1975 and 
1976 prices of crude oils were re lative ly steady in real terms and 
the overall environment was re la tive ly "surprise-free".
The forecasts made in 1974 and in 1975 by quarter, up to the fourth 
quarter of 19/6 show a sim ilar pattern in the case of gas oil fuel oil 
and to ta l o il; downwards revision of the forecasts which did not 
prove entirely justified. I t  is surprising that the gas oil forecasts 
fo r 1976 made in the fourth quarter of 1974 proved to be more 
accurate than those made in 1975. However, such bias observed is 
of l it t le  use fo r assessing.
The motor gasoline forecasts made four quarters ahead were as 
follows.
TABLE 3/25
Motor Gasoline Forecasts for OECD Europe
million tonnes
Date Forecast Made Forecast Actual Error Per Cent Error
3Q74 fo r 3Q75 24.523 24.536 -0.013 -0.1
4Q74 fo r 4Q75 21.246 22.628 -1.282 -5.7
1Q75 fo r 1Q76 19.527 20.995 -1.468 -7.0
2Q75 fo r 2Q76 22.944 23.696 -0.752 -3.2
3Q75 fo r 3Q76 25.004 25.604 -0.600 -2.3
4Q75 fo r 4Q76 22.764 23.075 -0.311 -1.3
Absolute Average 3.3
In 1Q75 consumption recovered from a depressed level of 18.1 
m illion tonnes in 1Q74 to 18.8 m illion tonnes but then went sharply 
ahead to 21 m illion tonnes in 1Q76. The 1Q76 level o f 11.7% gain 
over 1Q75 was underforecast very substantially but a growth rate 
of 11.7% was surprising. When anomalous growth rates are 
encountered, forecasts are like ly to have a poor precision.
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The gas oil fuel oil and total oil forecasts made fo r four quarters 
ahead are as follows.
TABLE 3.26
Gas Oil Forecasts for OECD Europe
Date Forecast Made Forecast Actual
million tonnes 
Error Per Cent Error
3Q74 fo r 3Q75 39.2 41.0 -0.8 - 2.0
4Q74 fo r 4Q73 57.6 51.2 -6.4 +12.5
1Q73 fo r 1Q76 56.5 61.6 -5.6 - 9.1
2Q75 fo r 2Q76 42.5 42.0 +0.5 + 1.2
3Q73 fo r 3Q76 38.7 43.8 -5.1 -11.6
4Q75 fo r 4Q76 55.0 56.4 -1.4 - 2.5
Absolute Average 6.5
TABLE 3.27
Fuel Oil Forecasts for OECD Europe
million tonnes
Date Forecast Made Forecast Actual Error Per Cent Error
3Q74 fo r 3Q75 43.3 37.9 +5.4 +14.2
4Q74 fo r 4Q75 58.8 54.3 +4.5 +8.3
1Q75 fo r 1Q76 59.0 56.2 +2.8 + 5.0
2Q75 fo r 2Q76 45.1 45.7 -0.6 - 1.3
3Q75 fo r 3Q76 40.9 45.5 -4.6 -10.1
4Q75 fo r 4Q76 54.8 58.4 -3.6 -6.2
Absolute Average 7.5
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TABLE 3.28
T o ta l O il Forecasts fo r OECD Europe
m illio n  tonnes
Date Forecast Made Forecast Actual Error Error
3Q74 fo r 3Q75 134.4 125.7 + 8.7 +6.9
4Q74 fo r 4Q75 167.2 153.5 +13.7 +8.9
1Q75 fo r 1Q76 161.5 162.2 -0 .7 -0.4
2Q75 fo r 2Q76 136.7 134.7 + 2.0 +1.5
3Q75 fo r 3Q76 129.2 137.5 -8 .3 -6.0
4Q75 fo r 4Q76 157.3 164.4 - 7.1 -4.3
Absolute Average 4.7
For the gas oil fuel oil and associated to ta l oil forecasts, errors are 
introduced by poor precision v/ith the economic forecasts and by 
deviations in weather patterns from the normal. The weather 
e ffects include both temperature variations and also ra in fa ll 
variations which can influence the output of hydroelectric power. 
A shortage of water can lead to an extra demand on oil. Also 
water stocks being replenished faster than expected such as 
occurred in 1976/1977, can lead to less oil than forecast being used.
Errors of 10 per cent on quarterly forecasts made fo r four quarters 
ahead may be tolerated, an error of 10 per cent on a quarter’s 
forecast being equivalent to 9 days consumption. When normal 
product stocks are 90 days this error is not serious. But i f  product 
stocks are low, fo r example at the 70 days level, then consumption 
equal to an additional 9 days demand in a quarter may lead to a 
sharp increase in the price of that product in the marginal markets 
(see the chapter on pricing).
From the publications listed in Appendix 5, i t  is possible to extract 
forecasts of Western Europe's oil demand made in 1956, 1963, 
1965, 1967, 1969, 1973 and 1974. These are shown as follows in 
Table 3.29.
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TABLE 3.29
BP Published Forecasts 
Oil Demand for Total Western Europe
million long tons
Year Forecast Made For Year Forecast For Year Forecast
Quantity Quantity
1956 1965 155 1975 280
1963 1971 460 1980 740
1965 1971 480 1980 730
1967 1975 750 - -
1969 1975 795 1980 1050
1973 1975 843 1980 1110
1974 1976 741 1980 805
These forecasts are in fac t completely in line w ith  those quoted in 
Appendix 6, Table A6.29.
The forecasts in Table A6.29 are represented as a histogram in 
Figure 3.1 and diagramatically in Figure 3.2. From Figure 3.1 the 
way in which the forecasts changed through tim e fo r a single year 
(1975) may be seen. Each year from 1965 to 1971 w ith  the 
exception of 1968 (the. forecast prepared a fte r the second Suez 
Crisis) the forecasts were revised upwards. In 1972 and 1973 small 
reductions were effected with much larger reductions in 1974 and 
1975. The forecast prepared in early 1975 fo r that year proved in 
fac t to be too pessimistic.
The oil demand forecasts fo r years to 1980 show the persistent 
under forecasting in the 1970s w ith the forecasts from  1963 to 1973 
showing a sim ilar pattern. This pattern w ill be seen again in the 
forecasts prepared by Mobil Oil .
In 1970 Mobil Oil published the ir forecasts fo r the European 
Common Market, Japan and the Free World outside North America. 
For the Common Market the forecasts had been made each year 
from 1961 to 1969 fo r periods o f up to ten years ahead. The report 
of Mobil's analysis was as follows:
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i"It looks as i f  world oil demand may grow a good deal faster 
in the 1970s than the oil industry had anticipated earlier. 
Many companies, taking a "fresh, hard look", are now revising 
upward their previous forecasts. Mobil Oil is a case in point. 
I t  now figures free world oil demand outside of North 
America w ill soar a startling 55% in the next five years above 
last year’s level - and w ill more than double by I960. Mobil 
estimates a 7.5% average annual rate of growth over the next 
five years, "higher than any rate we have previously forecast 
fo r the 1970s". It expects free world demand (outside of 
North America), which totalled 20 m illion barrels daily in 
1969, to jump to 31 m illion b/d by 1975 and 43 m illion by 
1980. "Fantastic" growth is forecast fo r Japan where demand 
is slated to double from 3.2 m illion b/d in 1969 to 6.1 m illion 
in 1975, and to trip le  to 10 m illion b/d by 1980. Europe is 
expected to jump some 56% from 10.6 m illion b/d in 1969 to 
16.5 m illion by 1975, and more than double to 22.6 m illion  by 
1980.
Principal reasons fo r the upward revisions: nuclear power is
running into unforeseen costs and delays, coal production is fa lling  
o ff, demand fo r petroleum feedstock is burgeoning fo r the world 
petrochemical industry, and overall prosperity in the developed 
areas of the world (prim arily Europe, Japan and Australia) is 
continuing higher than had been anticipated." (Source: Petroleum 
Information Weekly February 9th, 1970}
Mobil later amplified this report w ith the forecasts presented in 
Figure 3.3. From Figure 3.3 w ill be immediately evident the 
consistent underforecasting of oil demand throughout the 1960s. 
As a result of this experience, Mobil prepared three a lternative 
forecasts fo r the 1970s based on an extrapolation of the trend (high 
line), a forecast following the methodology used in the 1960s (low 
line) and a forecast in which the low forecast was increased by 
applying the average bias observed between forecasts and actuals 
during the 1960s.
Mobil concluded, correctly to 1973 as i t  turned out, that upward 
revision of the forecasts was necessary to compensate fo r the bias 
(underforecasting) observed throughout the 1960s. +
+ Also referred to on P.38.
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The following are the forecasts for the three scenarios shown in 
Figure‘3.4 together w ith the actuals.
TABLE 3.30
Mobil oil Forecasts of Oil Consumption for the Free 
World Outside USA and Canada
million barrels day
1971 1972 1973 1974 197!
A . 1960s methodology 24 25 27 28 30
B. As "A " w ith correction 
fo r bias 25 26 28 30 32
C. Trend extrapolation 26 28 31 33 35
Actuals 25 27 29 28 27
Trend forecasts, of course, do not allow the possibility
downturns and subsequent recoveries such as tha t of the 1974/3 
period. I t  was justified to increase the consumption forecasts for 
the period to 1973 but subsequently the forecasts were not valid.
For an oil company to forecast world oil consumption better than 
its rivals allows i t  to ta ilo r its fac ilities , particu larly of oil tankers, 
better to the oil markets needs. This obviously can be very 
profitable and converse is equally true as shown by the experience 
of the Burmah Oil Company. For a section of group of nations, 
individually or collective ly, to incorrectly forecast world oil 
demand can also lead to severe financial problems. The very 
excessive over building of oil tankers le f t  the world's oil tanker 
flee t must double the number of VLCCs required in the past 1974 
period. This was a direct result of too rosy a view being taken of 
world oil consumption and was a major policy fa ilu re  fo r the OECD 
world. Western Europe's oil tanker policy is developed in Appendix 
8.
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3.4.2 Summing Up
* ^ e conclusions that can be drawn from this survey in the 1955-
1973 period are as follows. Some conclusions on to ta l energy
forecasting firs t.
( i) A ll enery forecasters, oil companies included, substantially 
underforecast demand fo r oil in the period to 1973.
( ii)  The oil company forecasts were bullish compared w ith energy 
and oil demand forecasts emanating from other sources. The 
fa ilure of the forecasters to anticipate the 1974 downturn led 
to substantial surpluses in the petroleum industry particu larly 
of refinery capacity and shipping.
(iii)  The main reason fo r the underestimation of energy and oil 
consumption in the period to 1973 was chronic under- 
forecasting of economic activ ity .
( iv) The steady reduction in price of crude oil in real terms 
throughout the period, coupled w ith technical progress in the 
petroleum industry, provided two decades of cheap energy 
supplies. Cheap energy undoubtedly contributed to the long 
economic boom which ended in 1973.
( v) Solid fuel forecasts were over-ambitious partly fo r po litica l 
reasons and, as expensive production fac ilitie s  were 
eliminated, oil filled  the gap.
( vi) Nuclear forecasts, too, were over-ambitious and again the 
shortfa ll in supply was filled  by o il.
(v ii) Hydropower forecasts on the whole were reliable.
(v iii) Supplies of natural gas were grossly underestimated, w ith  a 
consequence that the demand fo r gas was underestimated. 
This has become most apparent in the 1970s.
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( ix) To have successfully forecast oil demand through the period 
would have involved making forecasts of economic a c tiv ity  
which would have probably been unacceptably high at the 
time they were made. I t  is an unfortunate fac t that forecasts 
which d iffe r from generally accepted levels have practica lly 
z^ro cred ib ility .
In the 1955-1973 period, to ta l primary energy demand forecasting 
based on projections of economic ac tiv ity  and macro-economic 
relationships was in general use. Post-1973, the experience gained 
from evaluating the precision of forecasts during the 1955-1973 
period w ill be of lim ited usefulness. In future, potential demand 
forecasts w ill be much more dependent on, and integrated w ith, 
energy supply forecasts.
Therefore, the appraisal of the precision of natural gas, solid fuel, 
hydro and nuclear power forecasts does provide quantitative 
precision data which may be applied to future forecasts. Oil w ill 
s till be in the balancing role in future but whereas in the period to 
1973 future supplies of oil were regarded as unlim ited, henceforth 
they w ill not be so regarded.
( i) Total Energy Forecasts
F irst it  may be stated that the evidence produced fo r 
underforecasting in the 1955-1973 period probably had l i t t le  
relevance to post-1973 forecasts. Forecasts of oil demand 
produced for the years beyond 1975 now tend to suffer from  
reduced cred ib ility  because they are generally considered to 
be over-optim istic. C learly to enhance the numbers produced 
on account of the negative bias observed in the 1955-1973 
period is riot logical.
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prove to be unbiassed, what can we say about the 
dispersion? In the future, as in the past, the precision of 
energy forecasts w ill be dependent on the precision of 
economic forecasts. Assuming that these economic 
forecasts are not bounded w ith in narrow lim its  by energy 
supply considerations, there is no evidence to suggest that 
they w ill be more precise in future than they have been in 
the past. Thus an economic forecast of 2 \ per cent p.a. 
made for a single year or fo r a five year period or fo r a 
decade could easily turn out to be l  per cent p.a. or 3 j  per 
cent p.a. The error in a corresponding energy forecast 
would be expected to correlate well w ith the error in the 
economic forecast. The degree of "conservation" bu ilt into 
an energy forecast w ill influence the calculation of the 
energy requirement from the economic a c tiv ity  forecast. 
This additional complication of which there is l it t le  past 
experience, cannot improve the precision. On past 
experience, from  energy demand considerations alone, a 
forecast consumption level made fo r a year a decade ahead 
could easily be in error by 10 per cent. Demand forecasts 
substantiated by energy supply data integrated w ith 
economic ac tiv ity  forecasts may have a better precision.
When the forecasts made by the OECD fo r 1985 are 
considered (see Table 3.31), there is a case fo r considering 
that the energy precision data quoted in the last paragraph 
give unrealistically low lim its . There is scope fo r a 
forecast of energy demand made ten years ahead being in 
error by more than 10 per cent on the basis of the range 
quoted by the OECD. The forecasts provided by the OECD 
in 1976 had a range of less than 10 per cent whilst the 1974 
forecasts had a range of 4 per cent. But precision data 
should be objective and not modified according to the 
degree of euphoria or pessimism considered to be 
associated w ith particular forecasts and they should apply 
equally to the 1974 and to the 1976 OCED forecasts.
Solid F uel Forecasts
Solid fuel supply forecasts made for one year ahead or even 
for five year ahead are highly objective in that they are 
based on existing fac ilities  or fac ilities  which, are about to 
come into production. When considering the precision of a 
solid fuel forecast, i t  may be necessary to separate that 
portion of i t  which is based on speculative supply 
considerations and may not be supported by a credible 
sector consumption forecast.
The solid fuel forecasts quoted in Table 3.31 contain mainly 
speculative elements for quantities above the ’reference’ 
level of 864 m illion tonnes o.e. There is therefore only a 
small probability that levels of solid fuel production much 
higher than the reference level w ill be achieved. 
Production levels 10 per cent or more higher than the 
reference case would be possible by crash programs for 
rapid expansion of open cast production areas. But such 
programs are like ly  to be undertaken only i f  there are 
severe supply problems w ith other energy sources. To 
consume solid fuel production at levels s ignificantly higher 
than the reference case would require creation of fac ilitie s  
to consume the additional coal.
Downward potential from the reference level exists 
because of problems in connection w ith maintaining 
production from old fac ilities  and delays in commissioning 
new fac ilities. With government’s policies everywhere 
intent on keeping solid fuel production at as high a level as 
possible, the scope for a shortfa ll from the reference level 
should be less than that indicated by the experience 
obtained from forecasts made in the 1930s and 1960s.
FORECASTS OF OECD ENERGY SUPPLY POTENTIAL 1985
M illion  tonnes o il 
equivalent
Solid n i . Natural Nuclear Hydro* TOTAL 
Fuels Gas Power Power ENERGY
1974 forecasts fo r  1985
Base 944 938 828 657 133 3500
$9 Case 1052 1381 1100 756 161 4450
Potential 1100 1700 1350 756 161 5070
1 forecasts fo r  1985
Reference 864 887 773 464 307 3295
Accelerated 871 1008 871 522 307 3579
*  In 1974 Hydro + Geothermal 
In 1976 Hydro + Others
1974' forecast, P. 173 Vol. I (Energy Prospects to 1985, OECD Paris, 1975)
1976 forecast, P. 14 (World Energy Outlook, OECD Paris, 1977)
With the 1974 forecasts, the f,Baseu case assumed no substantial change in real 
prices of imported crude o il from the end-1974 level whilst the $9 case assumed 
a crude oil price f.o.b. of $9 barrel in constant 1972 US dollars.
With the 1976 forecasts, the ’’Reference” case assumed a continuation of 
existing OECD energy policies. The ’’Accelerated” case assumed a mere 
vigorous pursuit of energy policies.
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( iii)  Natural Gas
When deducing the precision which should be applied to 
natural gas forecasts, an approach should be used sim ilar to 
that outlined fo r solid fuel. That is one should isolate the 
firm  production levels which are backed by sector 
consumption forecasts and decide just how speculative are 
the supplies above that level. I t  may be anticipated that 
gas supply and consumption forecasts made up to  about five 
years ahead w ill have good precision, but beyond that 
period the speculative element may increase substantially. 
In any country or area, a gas forecast made fo r a decade or 
more ahead could be upset by the discovery and 
exploitation of a new gas fie ld .
The substantial downward revision of the OECD gas 
forecasts in 1976 (see Table 3.31) was due partly to the 
realisation that the high levels forecast in 1974 were 
physically impossible to atta in.
( iv) Hydropower
In the past, hydropower forecasts have been reliable and 
may be expected to be equally precise in the fu ture . Even 
w ith  the 1974 forecasts quoted in Table 3.31, the 
ob jectiv ity associated with hydro-power forecasts was high; 
sites have to be indicated and developed lasting a decade 
undertaken; that the large speculative elements included 
w ith the other four energy source forecasts were absent in 
the hydropower forecasts.
( v) Nuclear Power
Nuclear power forecasts have had a poor precision. In 
future, as in the past, nuclear forecasts are like ly  to be 
heavily biassed on the optim istic side i f  they are allowed to 
re flec t merely to aspirations of the nuclear power industry.
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The nuciear power forecasts shown in Table 3.32, fo r 
Western Europe well illustra te this point. The downward 
revision of forecasts in a two year period was about 50 per 
cent on both the lower and upper lim its  quoted.
TABLE 3.32
NUCLEAR POWER FORECASTS FOR OECD EUROPE IN 1985
GW
OECD 1974 Report (pub. 1975) 175 to 227*
OECD 1976 Report (pub. 1977) 115 to 139
*  accelerated programmes
References as in Table 3.31
( vi) O il Forecasts
From Table 3.31 i t  w ill be seen that although from 1974 to 
1976 the solid fuels, natural gas and nuclear power 
forecasts were all revised downwards; so too were the oil 
forecasts. I t  is of the greatest significance that i t  is no 
longer possible to increase oil supplies at w ill when there is 
a shortfa ll in the supply from other sources.
The upper lim it of OECD oil consumption w ill be set by 
adding to the OECD oil production levels the level o f 
imports from the OPEC nations. There is considerable 
po litica l uncertainty in this area and oil consumption w ith in  
the OECD countries w ill be influenced by factors such as 
the level o f Saudi Arabian oil production which in 1985 
could be perhaps near 10 m illion  b/d (500 m illion tonnes per 
year) or perhaps near 20 m illion b/d (1000 m illion tonnes 
per year). In 1985 oil w ill be a balancing fuel but w ill be 
subject to an upper lim it which did not prevail in the 1960s.
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A good discussion of the lim its  to oil consumption is 
; provided in WAES report*, Chapter 8, "C ritica l Problems,
; Energy Demands and Supplies Mismatched".
(vii) OECD Europe Energy Consumption in 1985
Based on the foregoing, (i) to (vi), the following precision 
data are quoted as examples of the like ly  margin of error 
surrounding the latest OECD forecasts fo r 1985.
TABLE 3.33
ENERGY CONSUMPTION OECD EUROPE IN 1985**
Energy Source
OECD
Reference
OECD
Reference
Precision
Case *t Case f L owest Upper
o il
(m illion barrels per day)
18.0 14.6 14 20
Natural Gas
(billion cubic metres per year)
311.8 341.9 275 350
Coal
(m illion tonnes per year)
516.0 552.6 475 550 ?
l
Nuclear Power 
(te ra-w att hours per year)
702.0 850.0 400 850 ^
Hydro and Geothermal Power 
(te ra-w att hours per year)
474.2 474.0 425 475.
i
Total Energy Requirements 
(m illion tonnes oil equivalent per year)
1704.4 1619.2 1400 1800|
l
I
*  "Energy and Global Prospects 1985-2000" 
Workshop of A lternative Energy Straegies (WAES) 
C.L. Wilson, Project D irector 
McGravv 1-111^ 1977.
* *  World Energy Outlook, OECD Paris, 1977, Page 54.
\ v~ vV i o v \ ,  S £ J £ .
-99 r
The precision data quoted are subjective but not 
necessarily more so than the OECD forecasts themselves. 
The lower and upper lim its  quoted may be considered as 
representing approximately 95 per cent probability or 
confidence lim its , but it is not possible to jus tify  these 
lim its  s ta tis tica lly*. Such lim its  are quoted to indicate 
that they do not include possibilities such as major po litica l 
or c iv il disturbances or catastrophes which then im p lic itly  
have a probability of occurring of less than one year in 
twenty.
*For a discussion of the use of probability distributions in 
the context of forecasting see, "Business Forecasting - An 
Economic Approach"
C. Robinson, Nelson, 1971, Chapters 1 and 9.
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The relationship between some of the macroeconomic variables, energy
and the petrochemical sector
4.1 Background and Purpose
i
The main procedure which has been employed and s till is employed to 
forecast the level of energy consumption is firs t to postulate the level of 
economic ac tiv ity  and then deduce the level of energy consumption 
which w ill be required to support that level of economic a c tiv ity . Both
i
1 the GNP and the index of industrial production (IP) have been used and, 
when sector detail has been employed, a disaggregation of the IP on a 
sector basis.
It  is possible to argue that it  is no less subjective to postulate energy 
growth of 3 per cent per annum for the next 20 years and derive GNP 
rather than postulate GNP growth of 3 per cent per annum for the next 
20 years and deduce the associated energy growth rate. There are two 
examples when i t  is more sensible to postulate the level of energy 
consumption and then deduce the level of economic ac tiv ity . The firs t is 
when there is a short term energy crisis and the second when, fo r one 
reason or another, long term  energy supplies are like ly to be lim ited . 
The increase in energy prices was like ly to have fa llen short o f demand 
in the la ter 1970s had energy prices remained low and economic growth 
rates high. In practice, i t  is not possible any more to make a projection 
of economic growth in ignorance of the ava ilab ility  of energy supplies 
and economic ac tiv ity  are best made jo in tly .
The purpose of this part is threefold.
To examine the relationships between the macro economic 
variables, energy consumption and petrochemicals consumption.
To consider the significance of the deviations of the energy 
consumption data from the established trend relationships.
To fo llow  the development of the European petrochemical industry. 
This was a sector which was v irtua lly  nonexistent in 1953 but had 
become an improtant sector from every point of view in 1975.
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The inclusiori of a study of US data is useful because the per capita 
energy consumption values in the US have been so much higher than in 
Europe. Energy consumption in Western Europe was less than 2 tonnes 
oil equivalent per capita in 1955 rising to over 3 tonnes per capita in the 
peak year 1973. Even in Western Germany, energy consumption reached 
only 4.5 tonnes per capita in 1973. In the US, energy consumption was 
5.7 tonnes per capita in 1950 and rose throughout the period to 8.4 tonnes 
per capita in 1973.
When long term  forecasts are based on aero economic relationships 
such as the PE to GNP ratio  i t  is of importance to have evidence 
that the relationship is like ly to be valid fo r extrapolation. Such 
evidence was amply provided fo r European forecasts by the US 
experience throughout the 1955-1975 period.
4.2 Western Europe 1955-1975
The data employed in the sta tistica l analysis are shown in Table 4.1 and 
the ir correlation coefficients in Table 4.2. I t  w ill be seen from  Table 4.2 
that i t  makes l i t t le  difference which measure of primary energy (PE) is 
used and that weather corrections applied across Europe on an annual 
basis did not improve the correlation between energy and GNP or energy 
and IP. The energy measurement used in the follow ing calculation was 
on the basis of 10000 k.cal/kg w ith the low factor fo r nuclear and 
hydropower employed.*
The main feature of the correlation coefficients contained in Table 4.2 is 
by normal statistica l standards, the high correlations existing between all 
the macro variables and between the variables and tim e. The correlation 
coeffic ien t between the IP and PE is 0.996, between GNP and PE is
0.990. But to put these high values in perspective, the correlation 
coeffic ient
between GNP and time is 0.991. Petrochemicals w ill be considered la ter 
but i t  may be noted here that the correlation coeffic ien t between 
benzene consumption and time is 0.999.
*(Although energy data were constructed measuring energy consumption 
w ith oil rated at 10500 k.cal/kg w ith both high and low fac to r measures 
of hydro and nuclear power, sta tistica l calculations are reported only on 
the basis 10000k.cal/kg and the low factor.
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actually mean. A ll too frequently, high correlation coefficients are 
quoted in the litera ture  as evidence of relationships that are very close 
and are sometimes accompanied by the implication that no other factors 
are necessary to explain the relationship or that the relationships are 
suitable fo r use in providing forecasts. The correlation coeffic ien t is 
much more a function of the range of the variables considered rather 
than goodness of f i t .  The sta tis tica l parameter which is a much superior 
measure of the usefulness of a relationship is the standard deviation and 
this is best supplemented by an examination of the calculated and 
observed results fo r the data.
Calculated and observed values of the PE from the IP are shown in Table
4.3 together w ith values of the IP calculated from the PE. Table 4.4 
contains the calculated values from the PE/GNP relationship. The 
equations are set out in Table 4.5. In the equations considered i t  made 
l it t le  difference which variable was specified as the dependent variable 
since the amount of error variance was comparatively low.
Although there were considerable changes in the GNP mix and in the 
composition o f the energy supply from 1955-1975, there is only some 
indication of this in the dat.a in Table 4.3. When a linear relationship is 
f itte d  through a smooth curve, points at both extrem ities w ill lie  one side 
o f the line whilst the points in the middle w ill lie on the opposite side. 
In Table 4.3, calculation of the PE from  the IP, and vice-versa, the 
evidence fo r a curvilinear relationship between IP and PE is as follows. 
In 1955 to 1957 (rows 1 to  3), there is considerable positive bias. The 
calculated energy required to sustain the level of IP is less than was 
actually consumed. From 1959 onwards to 1969 (row 15) there is 
negative bias w ith the exception of the years 1962 and 1963. The w inter 
o f 1962/1963 was severely cold. Although w ith this highly aggregated 
data set i t  was not possible to derive a s ta tis tica lly  significant 
correlation between energy consumed and the degree day data, the 
negative bias is resumed which may be taken as evidence fo r a 
comparative reduction in the energy intensiveness o f the IP mix. The 
positive bias in 1974 (row 20) was undoubtably due to the sharply reduced 
level o f energy consumption following the sharp increase in energy 
prices.
When measuring energy conservation i t  is necessary to decide on the rate
of energy consumption at one price level and on an appropriate base year
against which to assess conservation.
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I t  w ill .be seen from. Table 4.3 that the IP calculated from the PE 
was a perfect f i t  in 1973. Thus 1973 is a convenient base year to 
assess '1974. In 1974 the energy consumed, calculated from  the 
regression equation, would have supported a ievel of industrial 
production of 165.8 points only in 1974 compared w ith the actual 
level of 173 points. On this basis energy conservation in Western 
Europe was 4.1 per cent. However in 1975 the energy consumed 
would have supported a level of production of 160.9 points 
compared w ith the actual o f 158 points, thus plant operating at 
below the 1974, or fo r that m atter below the 1972 level, on average 
was not running as e ffic ien tly  as possible in energy terms. On this 
yiew the 1975 slump caused a loss in e ffic iency of energy use of 1.9 
per cent compared w ith 1973.
Using the GNP calculation from the PE, and taking 1973 as a base 
year, the result is sim ilar. Applying the bias observed in 1973 to 
the 1974 and 1975 values of the GNP, conservation of 5.6 per cent 
was achieved in 1974 from 1973 whilst a loss in energy e ffic iency 
o fl.8  per cent occurred in 1975 compared w ith the 1973 level. I t  
should be noted that stock changes have not been taken into 
account.
Reversing the regression data, that is calculating energy from  IP 
and energy from GNP gives sim ilar results. The equations used are 
quoted in Table 4.5.
The foregoing is also of significance as a demonstration of the fac t 
that high correlation coefficients, in this case 0.996 between 
primary energy and industrial production, do not necessarily mean 
that the relationship is suitable fo r short term  forecasting. The 
year on year differences can be substantial compared w ith  the 
precision which is sought in short term  forecasts. As this example 
demonstrates, to have forecast successfully 1974 and 1975 energy 
consumption levels from the 1973 base, forecasts of the e ffic iency 
of energy utilisation as well as the level o f industrial a c tiv ity  would 
have been necessary.
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Whilst the petrochemicals industry was already well established in 
the US in 1950, in Europe i t  was non-existent in many countries, 
the UK accounting fo r most of that which existed, see Table 4.6. 
Consumption of ethylene, the main petrochemical building block, 
rose from  0.15 m illion tonnes in 1955 to over 10 m illion tonnes in
/ 1974 before fa lling back in the 1975 slump. A sim ilar pattern of 
expansion of benzene consumption was exhibited (see Table 4.7).
As would be expected the correlation between benzene and 
ethylene is high, the coeffic ient being 0.996, (see Table 4.2). The 
correlation coefficients w ith all the other variables w ith  the 
exception of the degree days are also high. As w ith  the PE/IP and 
PE/GNP relationships, the correlations between the petrochemicals 
and the macro-economic variables may appear to explain history in 
broad terms but are of lim ited  use fo r forecasting.
. The reason why historic relationships, even w ith such high 
correlation coefficients, are of lim ited  use fo r forecasting is that 
the plastics mix and the relative rates of expansion of the 
economic sectors, can vary appreciably, as shown for Western 
Europe by product type in Table 4.8. Taking the ethylene content 
of the individual plastics and allocating consumption on an 
economic sector basis, the consumption of ethylene in 1974, is 
shown in Table 4.9.
When forecasting ethylene demand, there- may not be any 
jus tifica tion  for assuming that ethylene usage in the construction, 
engineering and packaging sectors w ill keep pace and ju s tify  the 
historic macro relationship.
Publication of Shell Chemicals forecasts for ethylene demand in 
the UK underlined the problem of extra —polating ethylene 
consumption even in a post-1974 environment.* Forecasts of 
ethylene demand in the UK in 1983 were revised downwards as 
follows; the 1974 forecast was 2.5 m illion tonnes, the 1975 forecast 
was 2.3, the 1976 forecast was 2.2, the 1977 forecast was 2.9 and 
the 1978 forecast was 1.75 m illion tonnes.
♦Financial Times, 15th June 1978 P8.
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TABLE U. 1
WESTERN EUROPE-ENERGY/ECONOMIC DATA 1955 TO 1973
X1 X2 * 3 X4 * 5 X6 X7 X8 X9 X10 X11 X12
55 53 54 5 63 2 ' ”’ 5 l  55 5 41.9 6 6 254 33-93 330 1 5 4 ' 9 75 390
r»6 5550 595o 5u 54 5 7 3? 69 202 3 207 4 30 2 03 1 06 0 4 22
57 5 66 5 5 9 ? 0 6 4 8 1 577 1 73 32.1 3 2 5 5 470 244 970 44?
5B 5 5 7 9 592:1 5 3 3 9 571 4 75 331 3 207 54 0 3 37 10 0 0 4 77
59 5531 5 95 6 5 4 4 7 5784 79 349 3 3 1 9 660 481 970 50 9
6C 6 34 7 6 578 5 9 7 7 6 56 2 0 7 37 7 3 353 733 6 9 9 9 82 58?
53 6376 6802 63.32 6 586 91 397 3 38 9 870 840 888 6 C 9
52 7 0 {■ 9 7 24 0 660 9 70 21. 95 43 0 34 3 0 930 1 1 1 3 1 06 0 684
5 3 755? 785 6 71 53 7 607 1'OC 434 3 46 5 1100 1 3 1 8 1 1 3 5 7 16
64 7670 5 1 4 8 74 70 7 925 106 462 3 50 1 1245 164 9 1040 7 7 3
65 799  7 3 547 7 6 0 2 83 2 6 112 481 3 5 3 4 15 8 0 j 9 52 1 030 62 9
6 6 6 228 3331 8 0 4 1 8615 117 50 2 3 5 6 6 1 575 2 37 2 1001 £•77
67 64 26 9 0 0 9 6 2 4 6 S 82 8* 119- 517 3 5 9 4 1755 2 9 5 9 9 5 2 924
66 90(17 9 6 4 3 8 81 6 9 42 6 12.5 544 3 8 2 2 1935 3 7 3 2 1 0 3.0 9 9 9
69 9 7 5 0 1 0 4 0 1 9 5 5 8 1 0 1 7 5 141 575 3&53 2 30 0 4 6 93 1 0 6 7 10 30
70 10 4 B 4 1 11 5 7 3 0236 1 0 9 2 5 148 605 3 88 4 2 80 0 566  7 10 63 1 1 5 ?
73 3 0791 1 1 4 5 3 3 0591 1 1 2 5 0 151 62b 3 71 7 3195 6 51 1 93U 12 5 0
72 1 1 2 2 5 1 1 9 4 6 1 1 P 2 6 3 3 7 1 ? 18 0 655 5 7 4 0 3555 7 6 55 9 7 6 13 7 0
75 1 1 6 5 6 1 2 5 6  u 116.50 1 2 3 1 9 172 891 3 7 7 9 4 265 9 3 6 8 1 0 2 3 14 7 0
74 13.467 1226c 1 1 2 5 5 1 2 0 0 5 173 707 3 811 4620 1 0 2 5 6 8 54 15CC
75 1 1 1 5 0 1 1 9 0 0 1 G 9 0 0 1 165b 158 637 3 8 4 3 3 525 78Q5 930 15 G 0
XI 
X2 
X3 
X4 
X5 
X6 
X7 
X8 
X9 
X10
XII 
X12
For explanation of low factor and high factor see'Glossary
Year - 1900 (hase)
PE x 105 Low Factor 10000 k.cal/kg 
PE x 105 High Factor 10000 k.cal/kg 
PE x 10| Low Factor 10500 k.cal/kg 
PE x 1(r High Factor 10500 k.cal/kg 
IP; 1963 = 100 1  
GNP; 10^  $ 1963q V(OECD Economic Indicators)
Population x 10 J r
Benzene Consumption 10 tonnes (BP Chemicals International) 
Ethylene Consumption 106 tonnes (BP Chemicals International) 
Weather as percentage of normal measured in degree days x 10. (Platt’s 
Electricity Consumption x 10^  KWh. (U.N. Series j). Oilgram)
]
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TABLE k . 3 TABLE A.A
A TED VALUES OF X 2 (PE from IP) CALCULATED v a l u e s of >; £ (PE from GNP)
CALCULATED OBSERVED OBS-CALC CALCULATED OL S E W E D 0BS-C/*lC
ROW ROW
1 5109.95 5354.00 244.050 1955 1 4 679.98 5?5 4.00 674.0 97
2 5299.99 5658.0 0 SEP.010 2 *97 0 .5° 5 L 5 8 . 0 0 8.c 7 . 1 n
3 5 555.3 3 56 06*00 132.624 3 t> Cl 0 (; #41 EC'S, no 6: . f-SvT
u 5630.07 5579.0 0 -101.069 4 5761.90 5579.0 0 - H  2.9C-0
5 5 9 5 3 • A 6 5631.00 -302.455 5 8052.59 58 31.0 0 -l; 1 . r.?o
f> 64 40.25 614 7.00 -293.228 rO 650 4.77 614 7 » 0 0 -3-7.770
7 6693.61 6 3 7 6 . 0 0 -315,614 CL 7 6527.75 637 8 .0 0 -44?.7 55
B 6 94 7.00 7 089.0 0 141,999 ~Z.o fj 7037.70 7 0 B 9 . 0 0 51 . 30 48
9 7263.73 7359.00 95.2 66 5 9 7425.23 7359.0 0 -68.2775
10 7770.51 7670.00 -10 0.506 Eo 10 7577,4 6 767 0.on -207,457
11 8 0 23.89 7997.00 -26.6924 t_u- 11 . . . . 8184.29 7997 . 0 0 -107.2-3
12 8 540,63 £ 228.GO -112.825 LJ 12 5 523.43 822 8.GO -295.427
15 8467.32 84 28 * 0 0 -39.3184 CL 13 67 65.67 8428.0 0 -33 7,8 66
14 9 0 57.A 4 90 0 7. 0 0 -30.4376 14 9201.70 ?DG7.00 -194.896
15 98b0. 94 9750*. 0 0 -110,943 15 9702.32 975 0.0 0 47.6766
IS 10 3 0 '4 , 'J- 10 484.0 179.831 IS 1U1B 6 . 6 10464.0 29 7.19?
17 10 494.4 10791.0 298.591 17 10525.9 10791.0 26 5.064
13 11064.5 11.225.0 16 0.4 72 IB 10 994.3 11225.0 2 3 0.756
9 11824.7 11655.0 33,3131 19 11575.6 11850.0- 202.562
' o 11P68.0 114 6 7.0 -421.033 20 11834,0 11467.0 -367.026
1 10937.S 11150,0 212.165 1975 21 10703.6 11150.0 446.42?
ATED VALUES OF X 6 (IP from PE) CALCULATED VALUES OF X 7 ( GNP • 'from:-PS
CALCULATED o b s e r v e d OBS-CALC CALCULATED o b s e r v e d OBS-CALC
OW ROD .. ...... ./ ' ;7 •
1 70.2709 66.0000 -4,27090 1955 1 310.027 264.000 -46.0273
2 75.0258 69.0000 -6.02576 2 328.400 282.000 -46.3995
3 75.4637 73.0000 -2.46371 3 . 330.092 321.000 -9.09166
A 73.7901 7£.C00u 1.20987 4 323,625 331,00 0 7,37464
5 74.6035 79.0000 4.39654 5 326.768 34 9.000 22.2322
6 82 * 67*12 6 7 . 0 0 0 0 4.32579 LU 6 357.952 377.000 15.0479
7 86.2873 91.0000 4.712.73
LL.
j 7 371.913 397. 000 25.0674
8 97,4080 95.0000 - 2 . 4 0 8 0 2 E e 4 1 4 . 8 8 2 4 1 0 . 0 0 0 - 4 . 8 6 1 7 0
9 1 0 1 . 6 3 1 1 0 0 . 0 0 0 - 1 . 6 3 1 0 8 oc. 9 4 3 1 . 1 9 9 4 3 4 . 0 0 0 2 . 8 0  09 0
0 1 0 6 . 4 9 5 1 0 6 . 0 0 0 1 . 5 0 4 5 7 10 4 4 9 . 9 9 4 4 6 2 . 0 0 0 1 2 . 0 0 5 7
1 1 1 1 . 6 1 0 1 1 2 . 0 0 0 . 3 8 5 9 6 6 Q. 11 4 6 9 . 7 5 6 4 8 1 , 0 0 0 1 1 . 2 4 3 5
2 1 1 5 . 2 2 3 1 1 7 . 0 0 0 1 . 7 7 6 9  0 2 12 4 8 3 . 7 1 7 5 0 2 . 0 0 0 1 8 . 2 8 3 1
3 1 1 8 . 3 5 1 1 1 9 . 0 0 0 . 6 4 8 7 0 1 O 13 4 9 5 . 8 0 4 5 1 7 , 0 0 0 2 1 . 1 9 6 1
A 1 2 7 , 4 0 7 1 2 6 . 0 0 0 . 5 9 2 5 6 9 14 5 3 0 . 7 9 6 544 . 0 0 0 1 3 . 2 0 4 4
5 1 3 9 . 0 2 9 141 . 0 0 0 1 . 9 7 1 3 2 15 5 7 5 . 6 9 9 5 7 5 . 0 0 0 - . 6 9 6 6 9 6
6 1 5 0 . 5 0 9 1 4 6 . 0 0 0 - 2 . 5 0 9 1 7 16 6 2 0 . 0 5 8 6 0 5 . 0 0 0 - l t: . 097.0
7 1 5 5 . 3 1 1 1 5 1 . 0 0 0 - 4 . 3 1 0 9 5 17 6 3 8 . 6 1 1 6 2 6 , 0  0 a - 1 2 • b l l A
8 1 6 2 . 0 9 9 1 6 0 . 0 0 0 - 2 . 0 9 9 1 4 16 6 6 4 . 8 4  0 b 5 5 . 0 0 0 -9.84 U02
9 1 7 2 . 0 0 0 1 7 2 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 1 1 4 19 7 0 3 . 0 9 5 6 9 1 . 0 0 0 - 1 2 . 0 9 5 2
0 165 • 884 r 1 7 3 . 0 0 0 7 . 1 1 5 7 4 20 6 7 9 . 4 6 5 7 0 7 . 0 0 0 27 . 5 3 4 8
1 1 6 0 . 9 2 6 1 5 6 . 0 0 0 - 2 . 9 2 6 0 7 1975 21 6 6 0 . 3 0 7 6 3 7 . 0 0 0 -23,3074
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lVA-D-Lilli Q
WESTERN EUROPE ENERGY-ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS 193I5~1973
EQUATIONS
Units, PE in million tonnes o.e. low factor; IP Index, 1963 = 100;
GNP in 109 $ 1963.
1. PRIMARY ENERGY = 92.9+ 6.335 x IP Index
i
r  = 0.995 Standard Error =22.
Example, Year 1973 
PE = 92.9 + 6.335 x 172 = 1182.5 
• 1 Observed value PE = 1185.8 million tonnes o.e.
2. PRIMARY ENERGY = 41.6 + '1.615 x GNP 
Tr= 0.989 Standard Error =36 
Example, Year 1973
PE = 41.6 + 1.615 x 691 = 1157.6 
Observed PE =‘1185.8
3. IP = 0.1564 x PE - 13.5
r = 0.995 Standard Error = 3.5 
Example, Year 1973 
IP = 0.1564 x 1185.8 - 13.4 = 172.1 
Observed IP = 172.0
4. GNP = 0.6043 x PE - 13.6
r. = 0.988 Standard Error =22 
Example, Year 1973
GNP = 0.6043 x 1185.8 - 13.6 = 70^ .0 
Observed GNP = 703
5. Rewriting equation (l) gives
PE = 0.1579 x IP - 14.7; compare with equation 3 
The calculated IP for 1973 is 172.5
The similar results obtained by reversing the dependent and independent 
variables are due to the high correlation coefficient.
Note In the above equations .the constant terms and coefficients were 
adjusted by 10"^  so that the energy units were million tonnes.
s
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TABLE k . 6
PETROCHEMICALS AS PERCENTAGE OF ALL ORGANIC CHEMICALS
Western
• U*S»A. Europe France Germany U.K»
1950 50 4 0 2 10
1960 88 58 54- 50 61
1965 94 66 66 61 68
1971 96 91 90 91 90
Source: BP Chemicals
110 -
  -------   uav/j.w million tonnes
Ethylene LDP for Ethylene Net of SC Gasoline Benzene
TOTAL 
LDF Net
1955 154 0.8 550 1.4
1 956 205 1.0 450 1.9
1957 244 1.2 470 2.5
1958 557 1 .7 540 5.1
1959 481 2.4 660 4.2
1960 699 . 5.4 ■ 755 5.6
1961 • 840 4.1 870 6.6
1962 1115 5.4 950 8.2
1965 1518 6.4 1100 9.7
1964 1649 7.9 1245 11.6
1965 1952 9.5 1580 15.9
1966 2572 11.2 1575 16.5
1967 2959 15.9 1755 20.0
1968 5752 16.6 1955 24.1
1969 4695 19.8 2500 28.7
1970 5667 22.7 2800 51.9
1971 . 6511 24.8 5195 54.2
1972 7655 27.8 5555 58.5
1975 9568 52.6 4285. 44.5
1974 10256 54.2 4620 45.6
1975 7885 26.5 5525 55.9
Ethylene is the major building block in the petrochemicals sector; it is used 
to manufacture high and low density polyethylenes, polyvinyl chloride (PVC) 
and polystyrene.
The total Light Distillate Feedstock (LDF) net comprises of LDF feed to . 
ethylene crackers (steam crackers) with allowance made for returned steam 
cracked gasoline (SCG). A gross value of the feedstock may be obtained by 
adding 25 per cent to the net value.
Total LDF net is comprised of LDF net for ethylene manufacture, aromatics 
net i.e. benzene, toluene, xylenes, ethyl benzene and other aromatics and 
LDF (or naphtha) used for ether petrochemical plants such as ammonia, 
methanol and acetic.acid.
In calculating the LDF, the small amounts of petroleum gases (ethane, propane 
and butanes) have been included as have small quantities of feedstocks heavier 
than naphtha such as kerosines and gas oils.
r
Source, BP Chemicals.
111 ~
m o t - o m
o •sf o
**— CM •M - tn * —
*— T— r - T —
Suxpxxng ouauAqsAxoa
CM Otn invj- inin Oc m
0
•H
0
o
r H
P
O
rH
> 5
0
* H
►>3
rH
O
PH
II
O
£
>3
- P
• HCQ
0
(D
P
>r^*
O
P
PP
> 3
- P
• HCO
0
0
P
*§>•H
^ u x S c ^ o u j  . z o j  o u a u A x s A x o a
co
v } -
o
COin
O
r -in
m
CM
m
tn O O o o
•H- VO V O CM tn
tn vo tn CM in
CM CM tn tn CM
OAd p a s x o T ^ s o u  io q .0 ^
oin
O
O
CO
o
o
c -
CM
O
CMin
oin
O
DAd P T ^ T H
tn Otn oCM
CT>
O
O
O '*
O
CO
-M -
e a d x a  *i o j  o / id  P I - T H tn-M -
in
CMvo
O
tnco
or— 
t -
O
V Oin
auaxAdojdAjoa xnq.oj/ oin
tn
o
CM
■'3'
O
Vi­
vo
Ovo
vo
o
ovo
ga Axxsuoq wox xaq.oj O o tn o Otn tn O o vo
CM vo — — tn
CM Cvi tn tn CM
aaai suxxaaqs p '^  ^ iTd
o o in O
o Q vo vo t" "m CD , — ^— V O
* — CM CM v —
sa Axxsuoq 1{^XH o£
o o
tn
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
0
a
0i—i
£•p
0
> 3
rH
O
P
II
w
p
HdQH ^ uTPI°Ii vioxqoaCux
o
tn
tn
CM•H-
tn
o
CMvi-
in
cntn
O
O '*
tn
Sdcni suipxoK /4oxa
Lnco
CM
o
tn
tn
ovi-
vj-
O
inV-
tnmsf
JCBOX
*— CvJ tn ■ vi- tn
t"- t - p n - t -
cn OA G> cn O'*
«— r~ T~* —^■ T-
- 1 1 2  -
So
ur
ce
; 
Mo
de
rn
 
Pl
as
ti
cs
 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l#
 
Ja
nu
ar
y 
Nu
mb
er
s 
19
71
 
- 
19
^6
Total Western Europe 1974
Ethylene Consumption 
(million tonnes)
Sector Ethylene Consumed
2.15 
0.52 
1.68 
0.21 
0.32 
5.58
10.26
Source; Calculated from the ethylene contents
of Plastics Consumption reported in Modem 
Plastics International, January, 1976, P9*
Building/Construction
Agriculture
Engineering
Motors
Miscellaneous Production 
Sales Paclcagings
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The data set comprised annual data 1950 to 1975 and the 
correlation coefficients obtained are shown in Table 4.10.
The correlation coefficients existing between the macro variables 
are again high as they are w ith time. Some parameters which were 
not considered w ith the European data were included in the set. 
The correlation of energy consumption w ith personal disposal 
income (PDI) is high at 0.997, as is the PE/IP coeffic ient, 0.989 and 
so is the PE/GNP coe ffic ien t 0.995.
These high correlation coefficients, at higher levels o f energy 
consumption that experienced in Western Europe, are a 
consequence of the ranges of the data considered and also o f the 
strong tim e trend through the period.
The real price of energy, the price of energy in current dollars 
divided by the wholesale price index, was one o f the variables 
considered.* I t  was not correlated w ith the other variables 
examined and attempts to use this variable in regression equations 
were not successful. Lagging the price of energy by one year did 
not help.
In 1950 the petrochemical industry in the US was much more 
advanced tha t i t  was in Europe, (see Table 4.6) and high correlation 
coefficients were observed as w ith  the European data. Two 
additional but not chemically independent, petrochemicals were 
considered, polystyrene and polyvinyl chloride (PVC). A ll four 
petrochemicals were highly correlated w ith each other but 
polystyrene and PVC were less highly correlated w ith  the 
macroeconomic variables than the intermediates, ethylene and 
bezene.
*The real price of energy in the USA was reasonably constant 
throughout the period. In standard units representing dollars per 
barrel o il equivalent in 1975 dollars), the 1950 price was $10.65, 
from 1951 to 1973 it  v/as in the range of $9.4 to $10.6, in 1974 
$13.01 and in 1975 $13.90.
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The following detail illustrates the lim ited usefulness of the 
relationships for forecasting purposes.
Calculating Ethylene Consumption from Personal Disposable 
Income, PDI.
Equation used;
Ethylene = x PDI + constant, R = 0.985
2 PDI Actual Calculated
10 $(1958) ethylene consumption, m illion  pounds
1973 5521 22164 20747
1974 5395 22866 19940
1975 5460 18650 20357
Thus the changes in the PDI were not good indicators of ethylene 
consumption.
Calculating Ethylene Consumption from Energy Consumption. 
Equation used;
Ethylene = x Energy + constant, R = 0.991
Units = m illion pounds 
Actual Calculated
1973 22164 21010
1974 22866 20167
1975 18650 19595
Whilst energy is an improvement on PDI, the fa ll in ethylene in 
1975 was more severe than the fa ll in energy.
Adding the real price of energy to this equation did not improve i t  
(the price term was not significant at the 5% level, t = 1.34).
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benzene, PVC and polystyrene to the macroeconomic variables and 
the price of energy (lagged and not lagged) but none of the 
relationships seemed useful for medium term forecasting. As fa r 
as long term forecasting is concerned, the relationships re fle c t the 
historic growth rates between the variables which are not 
necessarily a sound basis fo r extrapolation.
On rather weak grounds i t  may be stated that the increase in the 
price of energy did not significantly influence petrochemicals 
consumption. Perhaps much higher energy prices and/or longer 
time lags are necessary before the petrochemicals consumption w ill 
become price elastic.
In future i t  is like ly  that the most successful projections of 
petrochemicals demand w ill be those linked to a structura l model 
o f the economy. This linking should ensure that a c tiv ity  in the 
petrochemicals sector w ill be reflected in the economy as a whole 
and vice-versa.
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Consideration o r f  data from a single country which has had lower 
than 'average economic growth should produce correlation 
coefficients Between the macro variables which are lower than 
those fo r countries or areas with higher rates of growth when equal 
tim e periods are considered. This would be a direct result of 
lim iting  the ranges of the variables considered rather than by any 
change in the causality of the relationships.
The data fo r the UK, 1955 to 1975 are described in Table 4.11 and 
the correlation coefficients are given in Table 4.12.
Variables not considered fo r the USA and Western Europe were 
included. An additional price index was considerd, two energy 
series (mohas and e lec tric ity  consumption) and steel production 
were included.
As anticipated the correlation coefficients decreased appreciably. 
The correlation coeffic ient between energy and GNP was 0.842, 
and between energy and IP was 0.889. Consideration of price data 
did not improve the relationships.
The smaller values of the correlation coefficients are due, as 
mentioned previously, to relative reduction in the ranges of the 
variables which reduce their associated variance. A sim plified 
explanation of the phenomenon is as follows. Assume tha t from 
one country to another the relationship between two macro 
variables, such as GNP and IP, w ith PE is approximately equally 
precise. That is to say, the. value of the PE calculated from  the IP 
w ill generally lie w ithin, fo r example, 3% of the observed value. 
Thus the standard deviations of the equations relating PE to IP fo r 
a ll countries w ill approximately the same.
The correlation coeffic ient, is obtained from  the fo llow ing formula. 
2
r = Total Variance - Error Variance 
Total Variance
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Consider firs t the high correlation coefficients (about 0.99) 
obtained in many instances with the US and European data. A 
typical situation would be.
r2 = 1000 - 10 
1000
So the correlation coeffic ient (r) would be 0.995. Reducing the 
to ta l variance of the system of 100 units (lower ranges, lower 
historic growth rates) could result in the following.
r2 = 100 - 10 
100
The correlation coeffic ient (r) in this case is 0.95. When the 
average growth rates have been very low, the to ta l variance could 
be much lower s till.
r2 = 20-10 
20
Here the correlation coeffic ient (r) would be 0.71.
The important aspect is that in all the above three cases considered 
the relationship is equally good fo r explaining the historic f i t .
As was calculated fo r Western Europe, i t  is possible to calculate 
the energy conservation achieved in the UK. Working w ith the 
IP/PE relationship, rather d iffe rent results were obtained from 
those suggested by a superficial consideration of the data.
In 1974 the IP fe ll by 3.6% and the PE by 4.3% In 1975 the fa ll in 
the IP from 1974 was 4.5% whilst the PE fe ll by 9.9%. The 
regression analysis approach using the 1955 to 1975 data and using 
1973 as the base year, suggested 3.4% conservation in 1974 and 
11.5% conservation in 1975. There are clearly a number of Ways in 
which conservation can be estimated and even w ith exp lic it 
methodology subjective judgement w ill be involved.
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products, petrochemicals and macro economic variables to have 
high correlation coefficients.
With the the UK data, motor sp irit consumption and e lec tric ity  
consumption have been highly correlated w ith certain other 
variables, the relationships not necesssarily being causal ones.
Correlation Coefficient
Mogas and IP 
Mogas and E lec tric ity  
Mogas and PDI
E lec tric ity  and IP 0.993
The study growth pattern exhibited by so many variables was not 
shared by UK Steel production which had rather an erra tic  record 
in the area 23 + 3 m illion tons. Thus correlation coeffic ients are 
low.
Correlation Coefficient
0.631 
0.586 
0.622
0.503
On this record the IP/steel correlation would not be considered 
particularly suitable for projecting UK steel production. This 
serves as a useful reminder that the value of a relationship fo r 
forecasting must be justified  on c rite ria  other than sta tis tica l 
goodness of f i t  w ith historic data.
Steel and IP 
Steel and GNP 
Steel and E lec tric ity  
Steel and PDI
0.991
0.989
0.984
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the energy supply position, the question arises as whether i t  is more 
precise to forecast energy demand as a function of time or whether i t  is 
preferable to forecast the level of economic ac tiv ity  and hence energy 
demand. I f  there is thought to be a significant systematic change in the 
ra tio  of energy consumption to economic ac tiv ity , then i t  is obviously 
desirable to build such a charge into the forecasting procedure.
I t  is possible to examine the degree of interdependence between 
economic activ ity , energy consumption and time by using the 
m ultivaria te statistica l procedure of principal components analysis. 
B rie fly , this procedure may be used to establish the number of real 
dimensionsin a system. Thus i f  the three variables of economic ac tiv ity , 
energy and time are independent, the system w ill have three dimensions 
and three significant components. On the other hand, i f  three variables 
the components analysis w ill re flec t this.
The technique of components analysis can be applied to  the examination 
of any number of variables simulatneously and the number of s ignificant 
components w ill reveal the number of real dimensions in the system.*
A typical result was obtained examining UK data over the period 1959- 
1969. The firs t component accounted for 99.1% of the variance, the 
second 0.8%, the th ird 0.1% w ith the fourth  being less than 0.01%. Only 
the firs t component is considered significant.
Table 4*13 -  Components Analysis o f UK Data 
COMPONENT 
NUMBER 1 2 3 4
VECTOR
Year (Time) 0.502
Population 0,501
Energy 0.497
GDP 0.500
Associated Variance 99.1% 0.8% 0.1% 0.01%
(Relative Importance)
*For Additional background see,
"A course in M ultivarant Analysis'*
M.G. Kendall, G riffin , 1957.
For applications in the petroleum industry see, 
G.I. Jenkins, The Statistician 17, 141, 1967.
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composed of practically equal weights of each of the four 
variables. This of course is to be expected when the vector 
accounts of such a large proportion of the variance in the system.
The message from the components analysis is a simple one, over 
the 1959-1969 period the close correlation between the four 
variables considered meant that the degree of independence 
between the variables was very lim ited in sta tistica l terms.
Similar results were obtained from components analyses using data 
from France, Germany and the U.S. and would also be obtained 
from any other country or area fo r time periods of steady economic 
and energy growth.
Components analyses indicating a system with only one real or 
significant dimension arise from very high correlation coefficients 
existing between the variables.
Correlation coefficients were established fo r consecutive five year 
periods from 1955 fo r energy with time and fo r energy w ith  GNP 
fo r France, West Germany and the US and also fo r the USA. Even 
for these five year periods the correlation coefficients were usually 
extremely high*. When there was a fa ll in the correlation 
coeffic ient between energy and time, this was accompanied by a 
fa ll in the correlation coeffic ient between energy and GNP because 
GNP and time strongly correlated.
Table 4.14 -  Correlation Coefficients fo r Various Time Periods
Country Period Energy/Time Energy/GNP
France 1955-1959 0.833 0.867
H 1960-1964 0.990 0.987
II 1964-1968 0.996 0.998
West Germany 1955-1959. 0.526 0.586
n 1960-1964 0.977 0.955
ii 1965-1969 0.919 0.994
UK 1959-1963 0.964 0.964
ii 1965-1969 0.875 0.878
USA 1955-1959 0.816 0.908
ii 1961-1965 1.000 0.998
*When the time period is reduced the ranges of the variables are 
reduced and consequently imperfections in the correlations are 
more like ly to show up.
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by sta tis tica l non-causal time series procedures is demonstrated 
when a break occurs following a period of steady expansion. In the
20 years prior to 1973, i t  would be possible to demonstrate that 
there were many advantages to have been gained by using time 
series methods. But in the post 1973 period the hopelessness of 
trying to use time series forecasting methods for energy production 
was clear to all except the most ardent supporters of sta tistica l 
time series methods.
In the years 1974 and 1975, negative growth rates of -10% and -20% 
were encountered w ith some petroleum products. Petrochemicals 
feedstocks were particularly depressed in all European countries and 
in such circumstances time series projections gave quite 
unacceptable results, i.e. the projections had zero cred ib ility  and 
consequently the forecasting technique was deemed to be not 
suitable.
A report published in 1976* examined the relationship between 
energy and GDP for 50 countries. The data covered the period 1950- 
1971 fo r 33 countries but w ith shorter data spans for the others. 
The results were not reported in detail but a conclusion was "most of 
the correlation coefficients were 0.99 indicating that there is 
v irtua lly  perfect linear relationship between the expansion o f the 
GDP and the growth of the total commercial energy consumption - 
irrespective of the nature of the nation's economy and its 
development stage". The perfect linear relationship applies to the
21 year period only, over shorter time spans the f i t  is not so good 
but the work illustrated that the high correlation coeffic ien t 
between PE and GNP existed in all the industralised countries and 
many other countries as well.
*A  New Look at Energy and GDP Correlation
V. Smil and T. Kuz, Energy international, January 1976, P31.
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European Energy Price Form ation and the R otterdam  O il Products M arket
5.1 Introduction
There are two aspects of the work on forecasting and precision 
which are of considerable importance to energy policy. The firs t is 
the price assumptions made, i f  any, when energy consumption 
forecasts are prepared and the second is how does the precision of 
the forecasts, or the occurrence of errors in forecasts, influence 
prices.
The object of this section is to explain price formation in European 
markets and quantify as fa r as possible some of the factors 
influencing oil product prices and the relationship between prices 
of oil and those of other fuels. Although State O il Companies were 
well established in the European market (see Appendix 7), they 
were not a prime influence on o il price form ation.
A b rie f background to world energy prices, which w ill be expanded 
as the individual points arise, is as follows. The price of crude oil 
in the exporting countries was earlier set by the oil companies; 
since 1973, i t  is set by the OPEC, influenced by the overall world 
energy balance and po litica l factors. Competition between coal 
and fuel oil is a substantial facto r in setting the free market price 
o f fuel oil fo r all periods except the short term  (periods of about 
one year).
Although the proportion of oil products can vary from one crude oil 
to another and be influenced by the type of processing employed, 
there is a general price equilibrium between the world's o il 
products marginal markets.
Oil product markets such as Rotterdam and Genoa became well 
established only; in the 1960s. H itherto  active markets of the 
wholesale or marginal type had been confined to the USA. 
(Elsewhere in the world oil product trading had been done at 
companies' posted prices). However those marginal markets are 
now well established and i t  is like ly  that they w ill survive; even 
w ith  the eventual downturn in crude oil production.
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in the energy industry. Some, such as F'rance, have a long history 
of strong direction of their energy industry coupled w ith successful 
indicative planning of the whole economy. But however much an 
individual government seeks to control energy prices in its own 
country, i t  cannot remain uninfluenced by the free market prices of 
o il products. Thus to fac ilita te  the understanding of Europe’s 
energy policy and energy prices, these are analysed in a world 
context.
The year in which oil consumption peaks out is uncertain but i t  w ill 
almost certainly be a fte r 1985*. As solid fuels, natural gas and 
nuclear power substitute fo r fuel oils, a greater proportion of the 
barrel w ill be cracked into lighter products. However i t  is not 
going to be practical or economic to crack completely the heavy 
components currently blended into lighter products. Probably 
about 25 per cent of world crude oil w ill need to be consumed as 
bitumen, lubricants and specialised products, inland fuel oil and 
ocean bunkers. As far as changes in the primary energy balance 
are concerned, there are no fundamental reasons why world energy 
markets should be any d ifferent in the future from what they are 
now. Natural gas, hydropower and nuclear power supplies w ill 
always be re la tive ly fixed in the short and medium term  as w ill 
large proportions of coal and oil but coal and oil w ill reta in the ir 
supply fle x ib ility  and be the fuels traded in the marginal markets.
Thus the oil product markets, such as Rotterdam, are unlikely to be 
temporary phenomena. I f  one or more of these markets were 
supressed by local po litica l activ ities, the market would probably 
re-establish itse lf elsewhere or some other means would be found 
of expressing oil products marginal prices.
*The widely supported WAES study suggest that around 1985 is the 
period that oil supplies are like ly to peak out.
’’Energy: Global Prospects = 1985-2000”
Report of Workshop on A lternative Energy Strategies (WAES) 
C.L. Wilson, Project D irector, McGraw H ill, 1977, Chapter 3.
c
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Costs o f transportation constitute qni important part in the price 
form ation. A large proportion of free world crude oil production, 
in recent years about 70 percent, is moved to the markets in 
tankers. There have been times when many more tankers have 
been available than were required and other times when the 
quantity of oil moved was lim ited by the supply of tankers. In the 
la tte r  instance, fre ight rates rose to high levels; as much as $30 ton 
fo r the Persian Gulf (PG) to North West Europe (NWE) movement. 
A t other times, when the supply o f tankers was much in excess of 
the ir requirement, the rate fo r a single voyage fo r the PG-NWE 
route fe ll to  as low as $2 ton.
The main factors influencing the world demand fo r tankers, 
presented in logical sequence are: economic ac tiv ity , energy
consumption, supply of non-oil fuels, demand fo r o il as the 
balancing fuel, and the modes used o f oil transportation (i.e. 
pipelines, Suez Canal etc.)
The supply of tankers is composed of the oil tanker fle e t plus bulk 
carrier vessels trading in oil, the proportion of which varies 
depending on the state of the dry cargo market. The size and 
structure of the tanker flee t is adjusted continually by the addition 
of new-buildings and by scrapping o f the older vessels.
When an assessment is made of the landed cost of crude at a 
refining centre or marginal market fo r o il products such as 
Rotterdam, i t  is not always apparent which fre ight rate or index 
should be used fo r the fre ight element. When, fo r example, a 
substantial surplus of tankers exist, such as the 1975 surplus 
position w ith surplus VLCCs forming the major proportion of the 
theoretica l surplus, the s tr ic tly  marginal cost of transporting crude 
oil from the PG to Rotterdam was the marginal cost o f a VLCC 
spot charter which was about $3 ton. However, not a ll crude oil is 
transported in VLCCs fo r operational reasons and the fre igh t 
element of the landed cost of crude at Rotterdam may be 
represented by weighted averages of fre ight rates fo r d iffe ren t size 
tankers.
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Persian Gulf to North West Europe, consider the AFRA rates when 
the fre ight market was very depressed at the beginning of 1975.
Worldscale 1975 Rates (Worldscale 100 was $14.57 ton
fo r PG to NWE)
General Purpose 140.8
Medium Range 121.8
Large Range 1 80.5
Large Range 2 60.8
VLCC 55.0
The real cost of a spot VLCC charter at this tim e was about $3 ton,
i.e. less than half the AFRA rate (which was 0.55 x 14.57 = $8.01).
From the foregoing, the importance of the fre ight market to 
energy prices and energy policy w ill be appreciated. Western 
Europe’s oil tanker policy is discussed in some detail in Appendix 8.
5.3 The marginal fuel markets
The world’s marginal energy markets are the bulk coal markets and 
the bulk crude oil and oil products markets.
Since World War II, the US has been the leading coal exporter. 
Much of the world coal trade is contract business w ith a re la tive ly 
small amount of spot business. The world’s main coal market is on 
the East Coast of the US at Hampton Roads. In the mid-1970s 
world coal trade, about 100 m illion tons year, was probably about
90 percent contract and 10 percent spot. In 1974, w ith  the oil
1
embargo, spot trade in coal increased appreciably and the price of 
steam coal rose from $60 to $100 ton.
-129 -
refin ing centres, usually those w ith surplus refining capacity 
available and good product distribution fac ilities . Such centres 
exist in the Far East, Middle East, Western Hemisphere and Europe. 
Trade in oil products is carried out in quantities termed barge lots 
(500-5000 tonnes) and cargo lots (more than 5000 tons w ith no 
upper lim it). Prices fo r the main trading centres are quoted daily 
in P latt's Oilgram Price Service which is the main reporting source 
fo r world oil product prices. In Europe, Rotterdam and Genoa are 
the two marginal oil markets.
The rise of the marginal markets at Rotterdam and Genoa, the 
building of export refineries in the Mediterranean and the push 
provided by the crude oil surplus were all factors contributing to 
much increased market activ ity  in petroleum products in Europe 
which developed strongly in the 1960s. This increase fac ilita ted  
the direct buying o f product by large consumers such as 
petrochemical companies and e lec tric ity  generating authorities. 
These companies, by being able to buy d irectly from an independent 
re finer or independent jobber, were thus in a stronger position to 
negotiate prices w ith the integrated oil companies. This fac to r in 
turn tended to influence all inldnd market prices.
The growth in oil consumption was substantial in all areas in the 
1950s and 1960s and Rotterdam participated fu lly  in this growth. 
In 1951, 9 m illion tons of oil and products entered Rotterdam, 29 
m illion tons in 1960 and 139 m illion tons in 1972. O f which about 
10 m illion tons were refined products. A check in this growth 
occurred in 1973 but in 1980 crude oil arrivals at Rotterdam are 
expected to be about 150 m illion tons and reach 250 m illion tons in 
1990*. About 70 m illion tons of the arrivals in 1980 w ill be meant 
fo r transit, 75 percent by pipeline and 25 percent by sea.
I t  is important to remember that oil products move free ly between 
these marginal markets and so there is long term  price equilibrium 
between areas. Thus it  is quite possible fo r gas oil prices at 
Rotterdam, w ith Europe enjoying a m ild w inter, to rise sharply due 
to a relative de fic it of gas oil in the US.
*  Rotterdam Europoort Delta (2) 1976, P26.
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me prices in Lnese marginal energy mari<ets win tnereiore De a 
consequence of the world environment energy supplies (crude oil 
and coal), the tanker balance, the refinery capacity situation and 
the oil product demand pattern. As fa r as the Rotterdam oil 
products market is concerned, local (i.e. North West Europe) 
influences are important in the short term , i.e. month to month, 
but they are of l it t le  importance in the long term . The prices of oil 
products or the price of coal quoted in the marginal markets is not 
a function of the volume traded. When bids and offers are not 
acceptably close, no trade may actually be done but a price level is 
established.
In the short term there is l it t le  competition between coal and fuel 
oil because of a re lative lack of f le x ib ility  by consumers. I t  is 
expensive and time consuming to switch from  coal to fuel oil or 
vice versa. However w ith the expectations fo r energy demand and 
particu larly e lec tric ity  demand being considerably reduced 
following the 1973 energy price increases, there was some 
fle x ib ility  due to to excess e lec tric ity  generation capacity. 
E le c tric ity  supply companies sometimes had the option of using 
either coal or oil fired stations.
Oil product price form ation
To examine oil product price formation in the world energy 
environment means consideration of long run prices. But in a 
particular area, such as North West Europe, influenced by the 
Rotterdam market, short term influences w ill be dependent on the 
re lative stock positions of oil products which w ill modify the 
general level set by the world environment.
In the energy market, installed capacity fo r hydro-e lectric ity  
usually represents the cheapest source. Next in rank are usually 
those fossil fuels (natural gas, oil and solid fuels) which are 
consumed near the ir sources of production. But many areas do not 
possess the ir own energy sources. The cost of energy is then the 
price of energy in the producing area plus the price, of transport to 
the consuming area.
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supplies 01 nyaro-eiectric power ana natural gas nave aiways D e e n  
cheap and a ttractive  to consumers near the ir areas of production 
and so have been consumed locally. Competition has therefore 
been between coal and oil to supply the remainder, which is usually 
the bulk of the market, both w ithin countries and in international 
trade. - ■
In the 1950s and 1960s the cost of crude oil production in the 
p ro lific  producing areas of the Middle East was about 10 cents per 
barrel and during this period most of Middle East and A frican crude 
o il production costs were about $ l/tonne or less. This cost was 
substantially cheaper than that fo r coal. Producer government 
taxes on crude oil wer* about $7/tonne in this period, so the tax 
paid cost of oil to the producing companies was about $8 tonne. 
The cost of transporting crude oil to Western Europe or to the USA 
fe ll considerably during the 1950s and 1960s. In 1975 dollars the 
cost was of the order of $15/tonne at the sta rt o f the period and 
about $5/tonne at the end, using always the largest crude carrier of 
the day. Due to variations in the supply of shipping, the price of 
shipping crude oil from the PG to NWE varied from  about $3 to 
$30/tonne.
The landed cost of crude oil in Europe, of the order of $20 tonne, 
was the price of energy w ith which coal had to compete*. Coal 
however was not competing w ith crude oil, but w ith the fuel oil le f t 
a fte r certain premium products had been extracted from  crude oil 
by refining. The market fo r petroleum products, other than fuel 
o il, developed rapidly during the period and demand fo r products 
other than fuel oil tended to set the quantity of oil refined. The 
surplus product was therefore fuel o il and this was the product 
which competed d irectly w ith coal. The non-fuel o il markets were 
markets which were able to pay a proportionately higher cost share 
of the crude oil barrel and, together w ith the need to supply 
incentive to process crude oil, fuel oil prices were usually lower 
than the landed cost of crude.
*  In the EEC-6, SOEC statistics showed that imports of crude oil 
were $21.09 tonne in 1955, $15.32 tonne in 1966 and $16.48 tonne in 
1970, see Table A10.1.
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fuel would be reached when, taking all distribution costs into 
account, all coal production costing more than the equilibrium 
price had been eliminated.
Although much was done to protect the European coal industry by 
consumer governments placing taxes on fuel oils and subsidising 
coal production, a great deal of coal mining capacity was closed 
down. In retrospect this was riot surprising because as the data in 
Table A'10.2 show, market prices of heavy fuel oil did not increase 
in real terms in the 1960s and (in France actually fe ll).
In the world as a whole, more d istillates, gasolines in particular, 
have been required from the crude oil refined than could be 
manufactured by simple d istilla tion  of crude o il. The problem may 
be solved either by processing the quantity of crude oil to meet the 
gasoline demand and dumping the surplus fuel oil, or by installing 
cracking units to manufacture additional d istilla te  m ateria l from 
fuel oil. In either instance the price of distillates must be higher 
than the price of fuel oils. The minimum extent to which the price 
of distiallates w ill be higher than fuel oils w ill be set by the cost of 
cracking. Under price conditions prevailing at the end 1975 and 
taking a price of fuel oil as $70 tonne, gas oil at $110 tonne and 
regular grade motor sp irit at $130 tonne would give a satisfactory 
return on the capital of cracking plant.
With cracking plant installed to make the barrel balance in quantity 
terms w ithin the d istilla te  ranges, there remains the question of 
product quality. There is one aspect of this which contributes 
significantly to price formation. Premium motor sp ir it is 
manufactured w ith extensive use of the cat. reform ing process. To 
manufacture PMS quality ca ta lytic  reformate from naphtha 
involves the manufacture of about 25 per cent gas, but the major 
proportion of the gas is butane which can be blended into motor 
sp irit. Thus a sim plified view of the reform ing is that the yield is 
85% liquid (liquid reformate plus most of the butane) and 15% gas 
(methane, ethane, propane and some butane).
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premium motor sp irit must tneretore include this cost, r r ic e  
d iffe rentia ls  w ill vary according to local conditions and w ith the 
season but the price of PMS should be about 10 percent higher than 
the price of RMS or naphtha. With fuel oil at $70 tonne, a very 
depressed level of d is tilla te  prices would be PMS $100 tonne, RMS 
= naphtha = $90 tonne. A more satisfactory level, giving an 
adequate return on investment in cracking and reforming plant, 
would be PMS = $170 tonne, RMS = naphtha = $150 tonne, FO = $70 
tonne.
In the USA, over the period 1955-1975, on a crude oil adjusted basis 
w ith  crude oil being $100 tonne, product d ifferentia ls have been 
re la tive ly steady w ith  motor sp irit at $160 tonne, gas oil $110 
tonne and heavy fuel oil at $50 tonne.
Whilst long term  prices of oil products are influenced by the world 
energy environment, w ith in geographical areas re lative product 
stock positions coupled w ith demand-supply expectations must 
influence prices in the short term. Out of balance positions on 
product stocks arise because oil product consumption patterns 
cannot be perfectly forecast. A t Rotterdam the supply routes are 
long; typ ica lly crude oil from the Persian Gulf, products from Ita ly  
and the Caribbean. So out of balance positions cannot necessarily 
be corrected in a m atter of days. Such positions do not however 
develop in days unless they are caused by po litica l rather than 
economic forces. There is not ideal area over which to assess 
stocks. Although France has exercised very considerable control of 
its petroleum industry, to the extent that i t  has participated l it t le  
in o il products trade, product stock levels in France could influence 
Rotterdam prices by influencing short term crude oil purchases.
An approximate rule is that refiners w ill have product and 
component storage amounting to about 10 per cent of the ir annual 
crude oil d istilla tion capacity. In the Rhine Estuary, product and 
component storage is about 10 m illion tons. This is supplemented 
by about 8 m illion tons of independent storage and a fu rthe r 3 
m illion tons of storage owned by integrated oil companies but 
remote from refiners. In the UK, refinery product and component 
storage amounts to about 15 m illion tons and independent storage 
to about 4 m illion tons. Hence there is adequate scope fo r trade in 
oil products by concerns other than the integrated oil companies.
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expressed in Figure 5.1 between European product stocks levels and
product prices were deduced on the following basis using the 
assumption that the basic form of the relationship would be sim ilar 
to that fo r the spot fre ight market shown in Figure 5.2. Product 
stock levels may vary from about 65 days supply to about 115 days 
or a l i t t le  more.
The following product stock levels were considered to be associated 
w ith  the maximum and minimum price levels.
Table 5.1 -  Product Stock Levels and Prices ( 197/4. -1975  Period)
Maximum Minimum Minimum Maximum
Price $ tonne Pays Stocks Price $ tonne Days Stocks
These three product price scales were assessed on the same curve 
because the relationship between stocks and finds v/as not 
su ffic iently  precise to* warrant slight modifications when changing 
from one product to another. A major critic ism  of using a variable 
in units of days stocks alone, is that the stock level is assessed by 
the market w ith respect to season. Thus a 75 days stock level of 
gas oil in May may be considered ample but a 75 days stock level in 
October is like ly  to be associated with higher prices. S im ilarly low 
motor sp irit stocks may be acceptable in October but not in March. 
I f  European product stock levels were su ffic ien t to dictate product 
price levels, then Rotterdam and Genoa prices should be in closer 
agreement than is usually observed. I t  is possible fo r RMS at 
Genoa to be $9 tonne lower than at Rotterdam as was observed in 
June 1976.
PMS $198
GO $122
FO $ 72.5
68 days 
70 days 
75 days
$106 
$ 79.5 
$ 51.5
110 days 
120 days 
115 days
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sentiment in a market and i t  is not necessarily true that the real 
factors carry more weight.
There is no reason why the stock levels of d iffe ren t products should 
be the same; seasonal stockbuild and stockdraft patterns d ictate 
otherwise. I t  is instructive to consider the implications of stock 
levels on a number of points. In 1974 and 1975, the landed cost of 
crude at Rotterdam was about $90 tonne in the current dollars. 
Using the equation for the GPW referred to la te r*  and fo r 
s im plic ity  taking equal stocks of products, at about 100 days1 stocks 
the GPW is $80 tonne, at about 75 days’ stocks $100 tonne and at 
about 70 days' stocks $110 tonne.
The usefulness of Figure 5.1 is therefore mainly as an aid to 
understanding the relationship between o il product stocks and 
prices and the relationship should be treated as a sem i-quantitative 
one.
A high stocks position puts downward pressure on crude oil prices 
because even without charging fo r fre igh t and refin ing, i t  is not 
possible to recover the f.o.b. crude oil price in the marginal 
market. This is what in fac t happened in 1975 w ith the low level o f 
economic ac tiv ity  leading to high oil stocks. With low stocks 
however there w ill be considerable pressure to im port more crude.
This theoretical discussion also provides an insight into one of the 
consequences of consumer governments promoting at least 90 days’ 
stocks as an important feature o f oil and energy policy. The 
greater the stocks of to ta l oil (crude plus products), the less chance 
there is of any particular product stock fa lling near the c r it ic a l 
minimum operating level. For example, when gas o il stocks are at 
the 100 days' level, a sudden cold spell consuming an extra 10 days’ 
stocks above the average weather consumption level would have 
l it t le  e ffec t on gas oil prices. The e ffec t of weather on product
v
stock levels and hence marginal market prices also serves to show 
the impossibility o f making short term  energy forecasts su ffic ien tly  
precise so that forecasting errors w ill not be an influence on prices.
*Page 12*6 *
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|XUt-LI:;t UcJltl pruuuuL prices
Before P la tt’s Oilgram Price Service established regular quotations 
fo r oil products at Rotterdam and Genoa, there was no single 
acknowledged source of oil product prices in European markets. 
The markets of course were not formed overnight but evolved, 
largely during the 1960s. In the 1950s the Rotterdam and Genoa 
markets did not exist to a significant extent compared w ith the 
levels attained in the 1970s, but nevertheless, the same market 
forces existed and influenced oil product prices. Data collated by 
the S tatistica l O ffice for the European Communities (SOEC) 
illustra te  the response to the 1967 Suez crisis and the 1970-71 
fre ight boom quite clearly, see Table A10.3. In 4Q 1967 the 
Rotterdam fuel oil price peaked at $19 tonne before declining to 
less than $16 in 4Q 1968: The 1970-71 fre ight boom put about $10 
on fuel oil prices at Rotterdam. The re la tive ly fixed d iffe rentia ls  
between Rotterdam prices and the other European centres is also 
illustrated.
For reference purposes, monthly product price data fo r oil products 
at Rotterdam 1967-1975, are included in Tables A10.4 to A10.12. 
The price data are sim ilar to P latt's barge prices and fo r periods 
when Platt's was not reporting, estimates have been made. Also 
included in these tables are the spot market fre ight rates, weighted 
(tonnage) average from the PG to Rotterdam together w ith 
estimates of the market price of a marginal crude o il. The crude 
oil is termed Arabian L ight quality since the yield quoted is tha t 
obtained w ith  some (unspecified) secondary processing from  crudes 
o f that approximate quality.
Petroleum products consumption data exhibit pronounced seasonal 
patterns and the data in Tables A10.3 to A10.12 may be used to 
analyse the seasonality of Rotterdam product prices. There is one 
general problem in determing the seasonal ratios of the product 
prices. Although the data represent a nine year period, there is not 
a simple trend in the prices which could be elim inated and there 
are many special factors influencing the price in particular 
quarters. For this reason, the seasonal data were derived as simple 
arithm etic  averages of the quarterly prices expressed as a 
percentage of the annual means.
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In Western Europe, consumption and price pattern of motor 
gasoline are as follows.
Table 5.2 -  Motor Sp irit Seasonality and price in Western Europe
Q1 02 03 03
Consumption 22 26 28 24
Prices (Rotterdam) 24 25 26 25
Figures are per cent of the annual average.
The price pattern is steadier than the pattern of the consumption. 
The seasonal pattern of the prices varies so much on a year to year 
basis that the differences between the averages quoted for each 
quarter are not really significant.
For gas oils^the seasonal pattern fo r consumption is more marked 
than with motor spirits but the price variation from quarter to 
quarter is only a l i t t le  more.
Table 5.3 -  Gas Oils Seasonality and Price in Western Europe
Q l 02 22 03
Consumption 30 21.5 20.5 28
Prices (Rotterdam) 25 23 25 27
A possible explanation of the poor price realisation in the firs t 
quarter is that gas oil is invariably overstocked fo r the w inter and 
consequently the price is liable to collapse when exceptionally cold 
weather does not materialise.
Whilst fuel oil has a pronounced seasonal consumption pattern, the 
pricing pattern is comparatively f la t.
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Q1 02 03 04
Consumption 29.5 21.5 20.5 28.5
Prices (Rotterdam) 26.5 25.0 24.5 24.0
One explanation as to why the pricing pattern is re la tive ly f la t is 
that fuel oil stocks are usually high and consequently consumption 
seasonality has minimal e ffec t on prices. The data fo r the prices 
by quarter are summarised in Tables A10.13 to A10.15. The gross 
product worth has also been summarised on a quarterly basis and 
the data are included in Table A10.16. I t  w ill be seen tha t there is 
no significant seasonal pattern.
The firs t of two periods when the GPW was healthy (see Table 
A10.17) was associated w ith  the fu. o il "shortage"-of 1971 and the 
second w ith the boom in distillates associated w ith the po litica l 
uncertainties and high spot fre ight levels of 1973.
Table A10.17 shows the quarterly pattern of the landed cost of 
crude. A fundamental change occurred in 1974 w ith the emergence 
of the substantial tanker surplus and the large increase in the price 
of crude oil. In the period 1967 to 1973, the spot fre igh t rate 
varied between about $3 and $30 ton fo r the PG-NWE route and 
w ith  the possibility of a closely matched supply and demand 
balance fo r tankers, tanker fre ight rates could have exhibited a 
strong seasonal pattern. The influence on the spot fre igh t rate on 
the landed cost of crude could therefore have been considerably 
more than the cost of crude f.o.b.
From 1974 onwards the cost of crude was about $90 ton and spot 
fre ight about $3 to $5 ton. The large surplus of tankers precludes 
the establishment of the high fre ight rates and, unless there is 
some a rtif ic ia l restraint, of the establishment of high or seasonal 
fre ight rates on the PG-NWE route.
Table 5.5 -  Cost o f Crude Oil at Rotterdam, $ton
Cost Freight Cost Crude f .o .b * Landed Cost Crude
15 9 24
6 80 86
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1970
1974
seasonal pattern.
The prices quoted daily at Rotterdam, or at any bulk oil trading 
centre fo r that m atter, are prim arily set by the world environment 
but are modified by local stocks and local expectations. Selling - 
prices of oil products to consumers are influenced by the same 
factors which influence marginal markets, but superimposed on 
these world factors are the product stock levels in the particular 
country or region and the competitive environment. Any seller of 
o il products to a consumer has the opportunity of buying product in 
the bulk market in addition to refining crude oil. From this point 
of view the marginal market prices w ill influence the prices at 
which oil products are sold to consumers. But refiners of oil in any 
country also have the option of selling oil products in the marginal 
markets. So surplus product could be moved to the marginal 
market or to another area or country which might otherwise have 
placed a demand on the marginal market.
I t  is convenient to discuss product price levels in terms of marginal 
market prices because these are useful reference prices,-being free 
from consumer government taxes and also the delivery costs from 
refineries to consumers. I t  has been possible to compare 
Rotterdam prices w ith consumer prices in two ways: f irs tly  by
using market survey data and secondly by using average proceeds 
data from marketing companies.
Fuel oil prices, collected by the SOEC and which including those at 
Rotterdam, are shown in Table AiO.jJA great deal of s tab ility  is 
present in all the markets in the 1960-1966 period. This was due to 
factors such as the depressed and steady fre ight market, re la tive ly 
steady crude oil prices and a large and steady demand fo r fuel oil 
w ith v irtua lly  no price competition from other fields. In 1967 fuel 
oil prices were higher in Gctober compared w ith  January fo r all 
countries, re flecting the sharply higher fre ight levels w ith the Suez 
crisis. The pattern was repeated in 1973 w ith  the influence of 
increasing fre ight rates and with the crude oil price increase also a 
factor. January 1974 saw further increases in all the countries due 
to the large increase in crude oil prices.
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I t  is possible to compare data which re flec t average prices obtained 
in Europe by marketing companies. Two leading companies in 
Europe are Esso (Exxon) and Shell. These companies do not publish 
actual proceeds net of taxes but do publish the data as index 
numbers.
Indices of Rotterdam product prices and indices of Exxon European 
product sales realisations, 1973 to 1975 by quarter, net of taxes, 
are included in Table A.10.18. The published Exxon indices were 
converted to $/tonne to fac ilita te  comparison w ith the Rotterdam 
prices. The conversion was done as follows. The firs t quarter of 
1973 is chosen as the base year and this is appropriate because in 
this quarter both crude oil prices and spot fre ight rates started on 
the ir sharp increase above the levels reached in the previous few 
years. Crude oil prices were about $19 tonne in' 1Q73 rising to 
about double that level in 4WQ73 and to $86 in 1Q74. Spot fre ight 
rates on the PG-NWE route had risen from a low of $3 ton in the 
March to May period of 1972 to $12 in 1Q73 before peaking at $31 
tonne in September 1973 and fa lling to $4 tonne in December 1973. 
Gas oil rose from $38 to $186 tonne and fuel o il rose from  $16.5 to 
$119.5 tonne from the.lows of Spring 1972 to the peak 1973 prices.
With the spot market fre ight rate of PG-NWE at $12 tonne 
compared w ith a fu lly  bu ilt up cost of about $8 tonne fo r a VLCC, 
Rotterdam prices were at the level at which they could be 
recovered in the market. This is based on the reasoning tha t the 
Gross Product Worth (GPW) at Rotterdam w ill correspond to the 
price of crude plus the price of fre igh t and that Rotterdam and 
European market prices are most like ly to be in equilibrium in the 
middle range of fre ight rates. When fre ight rates from  the PG- 
NWE are $30 tonne o f $2 tonne, these w ill tend to be considered by 
the market as exceptional peaks or troughs. Consequently at the 
peak fre ight rates, the GPW w ill tend to be at a discount on the 
landed cost of crude and vice versa. Additional damping w ill also 
occur on the transmission of Rotterdam prices to the inland 
markets. Nevertheless i t  is an assumption that in 1Q73 Rotterdam 
prices were 100 percent recovered in the European market as a 
whole.
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me snarp rise in gasoline prices in was not tuny recovered in 
the ma'rket and gasoline market prices lagged Rotterdam prices in 
the next four quarters. I t  was not until 3Q74 that a sharp fa ll in 
Rotterdam mogas prices gave a margin to buy at Rotterdam and 
re ta il at a p ro fit.
The 1973 to .1975 data on a quarterly basis are most interesting 
because i t  was such a volatile period but the 1965-1975 annual 
data, Table A10.19, demonstrate the relationship over a long tim e 
period.
Shell product price
Data from 1969 to 1973 on an annual basis and from  the firs t 
quarter of 1974 to the firs t quarter of 1976 are shown in Table 
A10.20. The agreement between the Rotterdam data and the Shell 
data follows a sim ilar pattern to that observed w ith the Esso data 
and i t  is like ly  that the data of the other integrated companies 
marketing across Europe, such as BP or Mobil, would show a sim ilar 
pattern because major oil companies all tend to experience the 
same costs and pressures.
The Esso and Snell data included in Tables A10.18 to A10.20 do not 
completely overlap but do overlap to a sufficent extent to give a 
good comparison; this has been done and the results are shown in 
Table 5.6.
The remarkable feature of Table 5.6 is the very close agreement of 
the Esso and Shell data and the very real indication (1Q74) that 
when abnormal stresses influence Rotterdam prices, these stresses 
do not influence market prices to anything like the same extent.
A conclusion which could be drawn from this result is that the 
world environment is the factor which has a direct influence on 
market prices in Europe and Rotterdam is no more than a 
convenient reference point. In other words, abolishing the 
Rotterdam market and the trade which is carried on there would 
not influence European market prices.
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TABLE 5.6
Comparison o f Exxon and Shell Prices of O il Products in Western Europe
i
$ tonne
Gasoline Gas O il Fuel O il
Rotterdam Exxon Shell Rotterdam Exxon Shell Rotterdam Exxon Shell
69 25 39 38 20.5 26.5 26 10 10.5 11.5
72 39 31 46 26.5 34.5 32 14 17 15.5
73 97 65.5 64 83.5 55.5 -54 29 21.5 -20.5
74 163 105 99 112 94 92 82 45 39
74 163 129 127 87.5 100 102 65 53 51
74 118 126 127 93 100 101 62 55 54
74 113 125 127 92 97 105 68 59 59
75 120 143 142 84 108 109 70 68 66
75 135 143 140 96 106 106 65 66 64
75 127 134 134 108 105 104 57 55 55
75 134 134 134 112 112 112 55 55 55
urce of data, Tables A10.18, A10.19 and A10.20 w ith  Exxon prices adjusted to be in line w ith  
otterdam and Shell in 4Q75.
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5.6 The Relationship Between Crude O il Prices and Rotterdam Product 
Prices
The concept of gross product worth (GPW) provides a link between 
crude oil prices and Rotterdam product prices. The GPW is in fac t 
the to ta l worth of product barrel at the stated product prices, 
weighted according to the proportion of the products that may be 
obtained from the barrel. The GPW figures shown in all the tables 
were calculated using the following equation.
GPW = 0.10 PMS + 0.03 RMS + 0.07 Naphtha + 0.03 Jet kerosine 
+ 0.30 GO + 0.41 HFO (3 or 3.5% Sulphur)
This GPW is stated to be based on Arabian L igh t crude o il* , (PMS is 
premium motor sp irit, RMS is regular motor sp irit, GO is gas oil 
and HFO is heavy fuel oil).
GPW calculations are therefore sometimes linked to the average 
consumption barrel in the geographical area to which the product 
prices are considered to apply. This practice is open to c ritic ism  on 
several counts. Marginal market prices are marginal in a world 
sense and are not related to specific markets. Consumption 
patterns change with season and from year to year, and fina lly , 
there is no reason why a trader selling in a re ta il market should buy 
a balanced barrel in the bulk market. Nevertheless i t  is considered 
a useful concept.
*The statement is unrealistic in that i t  would require a cat. 
reform er feedstock end-point of at least 190 C which is high fo r 
European refinery practice. Also all gasolines contain o le fin ic 
components, so attribu ting  a GPW to a crude o il w ithout specifying 
refining processes is not always sensible. Also processing costs are 
a function of d istilla te  yield. ' ’ _ In
the GPW calculations the yield was taken as 94%. However a 
modern refinery w ith crude oil d istilla tion  and cat. reform ing only 
uses about 3£% fuel, addition of cat. cracking raises the refinery 
fuel requirement to 6% whilst inclusion of a coking operation fo r 
to ta l conversion of the heavy fractions to distilla tes and coke 
raises the refinery fuel usage to  9%,
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the re lative attractiveness of the various crude oils. Hence the 
way in which a marginal re finer w ill be influenced w ill depend on 
the prices of the products, the spot prices of the crude, the spot 
prices of fre iyh t and on the type of refinery capacity at his 
disposal.
The GPW calculated by a standard formula from marginal prices is 
not therefore a marginal value itse lf because a ll crude oils do not 
yield the same proceeds fo r a given set o f prices. For any 
particu lar set of prices, there w ill be a marginal crude oil in the 
sense that one crude w ill be more a ttractive  to a particu lar re finer 
or group of refiners. For a marginal refin ing pattern he should 
employ, he w ill seek a formula fo r the GPW which maximises the 
difference between the product barrel sold and the landed cost of 
crude. Unless he has the opportunity to buy spot crude c .i.f. 
Rotterdam, i t  w ill be necessary to forecast i f  products could in 
e ffec t be sold forward and covered by spot purchase o f crude o il 
f.o.b. and fre ight.
An im portant aspect of th is discussion of the GPW is that i t  serves 
to emphasise the link between crude oil prices and product prices. 
I t  w ill therefore be apparent that however much i t  may wish to do 
so, no country which trades in energy may isolate itse lf from  
market forces. The prices at which international trade in crude 
oils, solid fuels and natural gas is conducted w ill depend very much 
on the prices of petroleum products established in the world 
marginal o il product markets.
Whilst energy price levels w ill tend to be set by the world energy 
supply-demand balance, the finer points o f petroleum product 
pricing and the price of heavy and ligh t crude oils w ill be 
influenced by the balance of cracking capacity installed in the 
world's petroleum refineries. On the whole i t  is in the interests of 
consuming countries to see a surplus of cracking capacity 
established. Likewise producers of heavy crude oils such as 
Venezuela and Kuwait could derive a re la tive  benefit from  a 
surplus of cracking capacity, but a producer of ligh t crude oils, 
such as Algeria, would not benefit. The greater the surplus of 
cracking capacity, the smaller v/ill be the premium between ligh t 
and heavy crude oils.
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Governments’ extensive interests in the European oil industry (see 
Appendix 7 on State O il Companies) do of course give them direct 
access to all types of petroleum product prices and to their 
dealings in the marginal markets. But nevertheless, greater 
transparency in oil pricing has been a long standing objective of the 
EEC’s Energy Commission in Brussels.
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Energy: forecasting, prices and po licy
6.1 Feedback of Demand Forecast to  Energy Prices
From 1555 to 1972 energy forecasting consisted of projecting 
economic growth at the highest credible given rate and then 
calculating the growth rate which was required fo r primary energy. 
The to ta l primary energy was resolved into its components by firs t 
taking appropriate values fo r the non-oil energies and placing the 
balance of the demand on oil. When considering the global 
forecasts, governments were occasionally concerned w ith  security 
of supply aspects. Were the sources of oil su ffic iently  diversified? 
Were there suffic ient tankers to cope w ith  various postulated 
disruptions to the normal oil supply pattern? The major oil 
companies allocated the demand fo r oil amongst the various 
countries leaving the balance to be supplied by the Middle East 
countries, in particular Saudi Arabia, Iran and Kuwait. There was 
one problem. The quantity of oil required from these countries was 
less than they were capable of supplying and was considered to be 
. fa r less than would finance the ir development aspirations.
When there is an excess energy supply, the price w ill tend to fa ll 
and demand w ill be stimulated. Economic development in the 
industrial world flourished on ever cheaper energy in real terms 
from 1955 to 1972 and long term real GNP growth expectations 
were revised upwards fo r Western Europe as a whole from  around 
the 2% p.a. level to the 5% p.a. level as one progressed through the 
period.
What, in retrospect, were overmodest forecasts of economic 
a c tiv ity  led to forecasts of energy supplies being lower than were 
actually required. Therefore the gap between forecast possible 
energy production levels and forecast energy requirements was 
unrealistically large. Underforecasting economic growth, as i t  
turned out, possibly proved to be of some benefit to stim ulate 
economic ac tiv ity  by keeping energy costs at the lowest possible 
level. Cheap energy was a prime fac to r o f energy policy.
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D irect economic benefits of cheap energy included rapid expansion 
of the oil industry, benefits to the ship-building industry w ith a high 
demand fo r tankers and the construction of the petrochemicals 
industry to a major economic ac tiv ity  from practically nothing in 
1955.
Thus, as i t  turned out, the low forecasts of economic a c tiv ity  by 
apparently minimising the stress on energy supplies were a benefit 
to energy policy.
From 1955 to 1970, the unit revenues to Middle East and North 
A frican countries from oil exports were approximately steady in 
money terms. Producer government average proceeds were 81.1 
cents per barrel in 1955 and fe ll slightly to 75.6 cent in the early 
1960s then rose steadily to 86.3 cents.* Because of the 
considerable growth in G il production, to ta l oil revenue rose from 
$1450 m illion in 1960 to $5850 m illion in 1970 which represented 
growth substantial enough fo r the oil exporting countries during 
that period. Looking back now, i t  is hard to see how payments to 
the oil producing countries could have been any smaller but in the 
absence of any indication of a tightness in energy supplies, there 
was l i t t le  scope fo r increasing the price of crude oils f.o.b.
OPEC of course wished to obtain higher revenues fo r its  members 
i f  possible but its line of approach during the 1960s was to point out 
that producer country revenues were (to them) an unreasonably 
small proportion of the cost of oil to the ultim ate consumer. OPEC 
published the following breakdown of the average cost of oil in 
Western Europe in 1967.
*For a good discussion and detailed tables of crude oil prices, 
acquisition costs and margins see, "Vertica l D ivestiture and OPEC", 
Petroleum Industry Research Foundation, New York, January 1977.
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TABLE 6.1
Taxes and Costs in the Price o f O il, 1967
$ Per Cent
Cost o f production 0.-285 2.7
Cost o f refining 0.350 3.3
Tanker fre ight 0.680 6.3
Storage, dealers margin 
e tc . 2.790 26.0
Oil companies’ net profits 0.681 6.3
Oil taxes in consuming countries 5.100 47.5
Revenue of producing countries 0.853 7 .9
10.739 100.0
Source; OPEC Bulletin, September/October 1969
published by OPEC information Department,
Dr. Karl Lueger-Ring 100, 1010 Vienna, Austria
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additional revenue from crude oil. A t the same time the debate on 
the u ltim ate potential of oil reserves was re la tive ly active. 
Warman*, fo r example, published a paper showing that i f  oil 
demand continued on its then present trend fo r another sixteen 
years, known oil reserves would be completely exhausted i.e. by 
1987. One cannot deplete oil reserves to zero at a tim e of 
increasing production. To maintain an adequate reserves to 
production ra tio  would call fo r more oil to be discovered in the 
period to 1990 than had been discovered from 1860 to 1970.
The position outlined was a classical Malthusian trap w ith 
exponentially increasing demand against an arithm etic expansion of 
the supply. Opinions concerned w ith  the paucity o f resources as 
measured against increasing demand outweighed the optim ists and 
economic rationalists who maintained that adjustment of prices 
would restore equilibrium. The work of the "Club of Rome" whilst 
not particularly concerned w ith  oil, did much to focus attention on 
the more lim ited  resources.**
In 1972 economic forecasts and subsequently energy forecasts were 
made on the basis of no significant change in energy prices. When 
these 1972 oil demand forecasts were assessed against the oil 
supply forecasts, i t  was found that there was a theoretical 
possibility of oil demand exceeding oil supply in the 1970s. The 
British Petroleum version of this fo recast***, was accompanied by 
the comment "that the chances of a sta tis tica l shortage (of oil) 
increased significantly from  1975.
Participation (nationalisation) of oil production fac ilitie s  plus the 
economic boom of 1973 with a sharp rise in world commodity prices 
and general in fla tion, were additional but secondary reasons fo r the 
substantial rise in energy prices.
*  H.R. Warman, Future Problems in Petroleum Exploration 
Petroleum Review, 1971, P96-101
**The L im its  to Growth, D.H. Meadows et al, Earth Island L im ited , 
London 1972.
***W orld  Energy Prospects, Policy Planning S taff, B ritish 
Petroleum, 1973.
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Although there Wtas .much printed to cloud the issue at the time, 
and the Arab oil embargo brought the po litica l interests to the 
forefront, the increases in crude oil prices effected in October 73 
and January 1974 were required to induce conservation and 
substitution and bring expectations of oil demand into balance w ith 
expectations of oil supply. An economic analysis of both the short 
and long term  implication of the crude oil price increases has been 
made by Robinson*. The transition from low cost oil to high cost 
alternative energy sources w ill not be a simple one.
As far as energy demand forecasting was concerned, the feedback 
from the assessment of the 1972 demand forecast against the 
supply forecast was immense. Energy demand forecasts, made by 
individual countries or areas and based on simple projections of 
economic ac tiv ity  or the countries' economic aspirations, were no 
longer credible. Henceforth energy demand forecasts needed to 
take into account the realities of energy supply and hence so did 
economic forecasts.
The level of energy conservation achieved in the 1974/1975 period 
was in fac t minimal. Reports from the OECD** and other 
organisations emphasised that greater e fforts were required.
Kouris and Robinson*** examined the EEC demand fo r imported 
crude oil basing the ir analysis on functional relationships w ith  real 
income and price. They concluded that i f  no UK oil supplies were 
available, i t  might be necessary to double real oil prices by 1985 to 
hold EEC oil imports at the 1973 levels. The results obtained were 
a clear indication that henceforth demand forecasts needed to take 
into account oil supply and price forecasts.
*  "The Energy Market and Energy Planning" C. Robinson in 
Long Range Planning, Vol 9, No. 6, December 1976 P30.
* *  For example OECD Observer, September/October 1976, P4.
* * *  "EEC demand for imported crude oil, 1956-1985"
G. Kouris and C. Robinson 
Energy Policy, June 1977, P130.
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Crude, oil prices have been quoted since 1860 and although in the 
1860s they were up to $10 barrel, in the 1870s up to $5 barrel, from 
1878 to 1970 w ith the exception of 1920 they were about $2 barrel 
or less. In the 1960s the posted price of Arabian L ight crude oil at 
Ras Tanura was $1.80 barrel and market prices were sometimes as 
low as about $1.30 barrel.
The progression of crude oil posted prices in the 1970s was as 
follows.
Table 6.2 Posted Price Arabian L ight 34°API
(Marker Crude) a t Ras Tanura
$ Barrel
Aramco Posted Price 1970 1.80
Teheran-Tripoli Agreement 15/02/71 2.29
Geneva I Agreement 20/01/72 2.48
Teheran escalation 01/01/73 2.59
Dollar devaluation, 
Geneva I 01/04/73 2.47
Geneva II Agreement 01/06/73 2.90
Geneva do Agreement 01/07/73 2.96
Geneva do Agreement 01/98/73 3.07
Geneva do Agreement 01/10/73 3.01
F irst unilateral posting 
(Kuwait announcement) 16/10/73 5.12
Geneva II Agreement 01/11/73 5.18
Geneva do Agreement 01/12/73 5.04
Second unilateral posting 01/11/74 11.65
Abu Dhabi Reduction 01/11/74 11.25
OPEC "Vienna" Adjustment 01/10/75 12.38
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In the period 1970 to the summer of 1973, the posted prices were a 
reasonable guide to the market prices of crude oil. In the autumn 
of 1973 however re lative ly small quantities of crude oil changed 
hands at prices of up to $20 barrel. This was a period of auctioning 
small quantities of crude oil by producer countries and there was 
considerable wild bidding. Many of the bids made were 
subsequently dishonoured but the fac t that bids of up to about $20 
barrel were made, possibly had some influence on the level at 
which OPEC settled posted prices on January 1st 1974.
In the 1970s the rate at which the industrialised nations were 
exporting infla tion increased substantially. The I.M.F. estimates of 
in fla tion  of exports by industrialised countries and of the price of 
all goods imported to Iran are as follows.
Table 6.3
Exports of 
Industrial countries
Iran imports
Thus although the cost of oil f.o.b. increased by a fac to r of six 
from 1970 to 1974, by the end of 1975 in real terms the increase 
was a factor of three.
In addition to infla tion reducing the real cost of o il, the substantial 
supplies of tankers which emerged in 1974 and also the refinery 
capacity surplus meant that the cost of oil to consumers contained 
only the marginal operating costs fo r tankers and refiners. In 1975 
money terms these combined costs were about one dollar per 
barrel.
Price Indices 
1970 1971 1972 1975 1974 1975
100 105 114 136 170 191
100 102- 111 138 160 167
Source: IMF
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As contracts perm itted, the price ot other tuels in international 
trade, mainly coal and gas, increased to coma into line w ith oil 
prices. This applied to trade v/ithin areas w ith common policies 
such as the EEC. For example UK coal and coal products exports 
to other Western European countries increased from £7.58/ton in 
1973 to £15.50/ton in 1974 to £22.00/ton in 1975*.
Imports to EEC countries from the U.S.A., Poland and the USSR all 
showed substantial increases by 1974. Examples include German 
imports from the U.S.A. increased from  $21.30/tonne in 1972 to 
$49.03 in 1974, Dutch imports from  Poland increased from  
$10.09/tonne in 1972 to$27.34/tonne in 1974 and Ita lian imports 
from the USSR from $19.74/tonne in 1972 to $31«66/tonne in 
1974.** The average value of German imports increased by 27 per 
cent in 1975 over. 1974***.
Lastly i t  should be pointed out that there were no thoughts in 
governments’ minds of reducing the price of energy to consumers. 
This could have readily been achieved with motor gasoline through 
a reduction in tax. But in an attem pt to encourage conservation, 
taxation was increased.
*  Trade and Industry, 2nd A pril, 1976, P39
* *  Energy Statistics Yearbook. Eurostat, Luxemburg 1975, P85.
* * *  International Coal Trade, 6th June, 1976 P12.
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Participation ar>d\he end o f Europe^ ”Own O il”  Aspirations
Accompanying the large increase in energy prices was effective 
change in ownership of oil reserves and a consequent change in 
several countries' energy policy.
The British position in the Middle East had its origins in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and was concerned w ith India. 
The ro le-of oil in British Government policy has been discussed by 
many, one of the concise accounts is that by Monroe*. I t  is not 
necessary to decide how much of the British presence was by 
accident or design, how much due to British Government a c tiv ity  or 
due to private enterprise, whether the British m ilita ry  presence 
was necessary or desirable but the other European nations at the 
end of World War II saw that B rita in  was there and had control of a 
considerable portion of the world’s oil reserves. The British had 
control of Iranian oil, a 50 per cent share in Kuwait, a 23J per cent 
share in the Iraq Petroleum company and also influence in the 
lower Gulf which had good prospects fo r o il reserves. The 
remaining large producer, Saudi Arabia, which was to become the 
dominating one, was controlled by US companies.
More European countries were also interested in having the ir 'own 
o il’. France with its  Algeria (Franc Zone) o il and widespread 
interests through CFP and la ter through the ERAP companies, 
actively pursued "own o il" policy w ith  lim ited  success. Ita ly , 
through ENI, spent a great deal of money which did not yield good 
dividends. Germany, w ith  Deminex organisation, operated on a 
modest scale. Spain working through Hispanoil was, also interest in 
"own oil".
Participation by the producer country governments, OPEC and non- 
OPEC, in the 197Q's killed ideas that owning oil reserves in foreign 
countries gave some security of supply. In retrospect i t  may be 
said tha t "ownership" of oil being equated w ith security of supply 
was an overrated aspect of energy policy.
*Elizabeth Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East 1914-1956. 
Chatto and Windus, London 1963.
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reserves was not synonymous w ith complete control. In most 
instances the ox-concessionairs were invited back as operators and 
service contractors’. Furthermore, the multinational oil companies 
retained substantial control of world movements of crude oil and 
its refin ing. The value of these arrangements to the U.S.A. was 
pointed out by the Mobil President, W.P. Tavoulareas*.
” I f  the US multinationals were to disappear from the scene for 
whatever reason, the foreign multinationals (many of them 
government-supported) could be expected to step into our shoes 
before they scarcely cooled to provide the services we had
offered  How secure w ill the United States feel when i t  has to
acquire oil d irectly from  foreign governments of foreign 
multinational?"
The oil controlled by European multinational oil companies was 
certainly as valuable to Europe as oil controlled by the U.S. 
multinational companies was to the U.S.A.
6.4 Change o f Policies and Forecasts in 1973
Expectations change and can change suddenly follow ing po litica l 
actions. The more usual course is fo r expectations to be modified 
over a period of time. In 1971 there were some people who 
considered that the cheap energy era was ending, in 1972 many 
people in the oil industry were convinced i t  would end soon and in 
1973 most industrial and governmental forecasters accepted that 
much higher energy prices were inevitable. Consequently in 1971 
economic and energy projections made on the basis o f a p lentifu l 
supply of cheap energy were very credible; in 1972 the c red ib ility  
diminished particularly that associated w ith the long term  
projections and by the end of 1973 most people were convinced that 
long term  projections of economic ac tiv ity  and energy demand 
based on the high growth rates of the 1955-1973 period had l it t le  
cred ib ility . The position was recognised by OECD in the Foreword 
of the ir "Energy Prospects to 1985’’* * .
*  Middle East Economic Survey 
11th October, 1976, P5
* *  Energy Prospects to 1985. OECD Paris 1974,
Published February 1975.
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" It was becoming already clear, more than two years ago, that the 
projected growth of energy demand in the OECD area (and the 
emergence of the United States as a potential primary importer of 
oil) was to put excessive pressure in re la tive ly low cost supplies, 
particu larly from the Middle East, creating the conditions of 
serious market disturbances, like ly to have long term  repercussions 
on the economic and social well-being of OECD countries. It 
appeared also that policy questions related to the energy market 
could no longer be regarded as purely sectoral issues, which could 
easily be isolated from more general economic, social and po litica l 
considerations such as balance of payments equilibrium, the figh t 
against * in fla tion, growth and development policies and 
environmental matters.
As a result, the Long Term Energy Assessment was undertaken 
following decisions of the OECD Council of 26th May, 1972, and 
24th October, 1972.
.............. Subsequent events have proved the timeliness of this
decision. During the last quarter of 1973, consuming countries 
were faced firs t w ith concerted export restrictions then w ith a 
dramatic rise in crude oil prices and the prospects fo r a return to 
an era of re la tive ly cheap energy dwindled considerably".
But in 1974 there were s till people who were not convinced that the 
cheap energy era had ended. High rates of expansion of economic 
ac tiv ity  in Europe had not necessarily also ended, they were like ly 
to be more d iff ic u lt to achieve but views on this topic were quite 
mixed. In 1974 independent tanker operators and shipbuilders on 
the whole were much more optim istic than o il company 
forecasters. There was also hedging w ith $3 barrel, $6 barrel and 
$9 barrel (1972 dollars) oil price cases being examined in 
forecasting scenarios. Governments in particular did not wis.h to 
sponsor development of expensive energy resources on a significant 
scale i f  i t  would soon again be possible to im port cheap energy.
A very sim plified summary of the position is therefore;
1972 - rapidly diminishing cred ib ility  o f forecasts,
1973 - oil companies change forecasts,
1974 - supranational, government and other forecasts changed.
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to take into account the policy changes which resulted from  the 
energy price increases. Although individual countries responded in 
a variety of ways and at d iffe rent time intervals, the follow ing 
factors were common to most, i f  not a ll, energy policies.
a) Conservation. Simple conservation was introduced by higher 
energy prices (not including taxes) making i t  worthwhile fo r 
consumers to use energy more e ffic ien tly  by homekeeping 
changes and, in the long term , by investing in better plant.
b) Substitution. This involved development of indigenous energy 
resources to levels beyond those anticipated prior to 1973. 
These sources, together w ith energy from all sources saved by 
conservation would substitute for imported oil.
c) Security of Supply. There were also stated intentions of 
substituting other energy sources, mainly coal, fo r imported 
oil to be less dependent on imported oil.
d) L im it Growth of Energy Consumption. This was seen as 
necessary in the long run because of fin ite  resources and 
environmental problems and, fo r some countries, out of 
concern w ith balance of payment problems.
As the supranational level additional items of policy were 
postulated by the OECD.*
a) accelerated development of intra-OECD trade in fuel,
b) mechanisms to deal w ith  potential monetary instab ility  
arising from huge OPEC emphasis;
c) co-ordination of energyresearch and development
d) co-ordination of new e ffo rts  to overcome environmental 
problems.
*  Energy Prospects to 1985. OECD Paris 1974; 
published February 1975 
Main findings, P5.
- 160 -
prices; the energy planning program of the IEA and attempts to 
deal w ith the tanker surplus came later.
The most important policy decision, exp lic itly  stated by some 
governments but well understood by all governments and 
supranational bodies, was that the role of governments in energy 
administration would increase from the pre-1973 levels of 
involvement.
Following the watershed year of 1973, how did the forecasts 
change? The way in which they changed actually provides some 
evidence as to why the forecasting methodology itse lf changed.
F irs t consider the elements of the forecast which did not change. 
H ydroelectric power forecasts did not change and neither did 
forecasts of indigenous supplies of natural gas. Gas forecasts were 
subject to upwards revision in the 1973/75 period when i t  was 
known that additional supplies had been discovered and were like ly  
to be developed but these changes in the forecasts would have 
occurred w ithout any increase in energy prices. Forecasts of 
nuclear power were also revised upwards but the long term 
adjustments, i.e. 10 to 15 years ahead, re flected euphoria rather 
than rea lity , and subsequent revisions were made which tended to 
bring the over-optim istic forecasts back to nearer the pre-1973 
levels.
Solid fuel production forecasts were also revised upwards, but, in 
the period to 1985, the adjustments reflected an arresting of the 
decline in countries’ indigenous production. Preventing the decline 
of coal production however assumed gains in productiv ity and 
supplies of skilled labour being available that did not appear 
justified  on the results obtained in the 1973-76 period. New 
developments of coal resources outside Europe and levels of 
imports well above 1973 levels were not anticipated and w ritten  
into individual country’s forecasts.
Forecasts of indigenous o il production were not much influenced by 
the increase in energy prices and the policy changes. Indeed the 
uncertainty caused by the U.K. Government’s partic ipation and 
other moves in the North Sea possibly led to some delays in 
development.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The 1955 to 1975 period was one in which substantial economic growth occurred; 
from 1955 to 1973 West European GNP doubled in real terms. The expansion 
was fostered by considerable co-operation between nations and by re la tive ly 
cheap energy. European energy consumption increased form 542 to 1257 m illion 
tonnes in 1973 fa lling  back slightly to 1188 m illion tonnes oil equivalent in 1975.
Significant po litica l factors were US aid which greatly promoted the recovery 
from  World War II, liberalisation of trade, the formation of the EEC and the 
activ ities of the UN and the OECD in economic affa irs.
The 1956 and 1967 Suez crises caused concern over energy supplies which soon 
abated but the substantial rise in energy prices from  late 1973 onwards proved 
much more of a shock to the system. In spite of the Suez crises, oil's share of 
primary energy consumption rose from 21 per cent in 1955 to 60 per cent in 
1973. Oil was thus not only the balancing energy source but also the main 
energy source. In 1974 i t  was realised that Europe was too vulnerable to 
disruptions of oil imports and there was an important policy change to reduce 
oil imports as much as possible.
Throughout the period the European coal industry was in decline, coal's share of 
energy consumption fa lling from 71 per cent in 1955 to 22 per cent in 1973 and, 
in spite of contrary policy indications, to 21 per cent in 1975. Natural gas made 
substantial gains following the discovery of reserves in several countries, the 
Dutch fie ld  being particularly important. The share of the energy market taken 
by natural gas rose from 1 per cent in 1955 to 13 per cent in 1975.
Hydropower was an important source throughout the period w ith a market share 
of about 8 per cent. However, nucelar power, although receiving much 
publicity, was a fa ilure achieving on a 1 per cent market share by 1973 and a 2 
per cent share by 1975.
Energy forecasting has certainly developed in some ways since 1955. The main 
changes have been in the improvement of the quality of energy consumption and 
supply data, better analysis of the base position and, in particu lar, a great 
improvement in the coherency of forecasts. In 1975 energy consumption 
forecasts were better linked w ith energy supply forecasts and w ith  economic 
forecasts.
c .
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The economic forecasts became more exp lic it throughout the period and, w ith 
the development of economic models, made greater demands on the quality of 
economic data and analyses of the world's economies. However there was no 
really fundamental change in the forecasting methods used. Certainly there 
\^as a greater coherency but i t  did not arise from development of forecasting 
methodology but rather from the more detailed analysis and more e ffo rt put 
into forecasting. Mechanistic methods of forecasting, such as time series 
analysis and projection, proved a disappointment and although they were 
extensively tried  they were not used in practice.
th e  quality of a forecast may be judged on the amount of supporting analysis 
and also on the previous performance of the forecaster. Forecasts, defined as 
the most like ly outcomes as opposed to projections (w hat-if tria ls) or targets 
(ideals), may be examined against the ir actual outcomes and precision data 
derived. Precision data, which may be expressed in a variety of ways, indicate 
the quality of a forecast by providing a measure of the agreement between the 
forecast and the outcome or actual. Throughout much of the period energy 
forecasts, which were reviewed annually, were revised upwards each year. This 
was on account of energy and oil forecasts having to take into account higher 
than expected actuals thus increasing the base year consumption as well as 
increasing the growth rate. A prime source of the energy and oil under 
forecasting was the level of economic ac tiv ity  proving to be higher than 
forecast. The forecasts studies to calculate the precision data included those 
published by the international organisations such as the OECD and those 
published by the major oil companies. Only superficial consideration was given 
to the economic forecasts. Errors in economic forecasts inevitably lead to 
errors in energy forecasts. In economies where the ra tio  of primary energy 
growth rate to the GNP growth rate is about unity, an error of 1 per cent in the 
GNP forecast can obviously lead to an error of 1 per cent in the energy 
forecast. In the period 1955 to 1973 there were no serious lim its  placed on the 
level of economic a c tiv ity  by lim itations in energy supplies not withstanding the 
two Suez crises. However this w ill not necessarily be true in future and 
lim itations in energy supplies may lim it the level of economic ac tiv ity . On 
these grounds, grossly under-forecasting the level of economic a c tiv ity  may not 
be possible to a considerable extent in future i f  energy supplies become lim ited . 
Where this reasoning is applicable, the possibility of negative bias w ith  GNP 
forecasts (over-forecasting) may be less then positive bias (under-forecasting).
e
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unrealistically low forecasts of the level of economic ac tiv ity . Prominent 
exceptions were some forecasts from the UK. Here the levels of economic 
a c tiv ity  fe ll short of those anticipated and consequently the energy demand
forecasts were not under estimates. I f  one subscribes to the view that close
/
agreement between an economic forecast and its outcome is accidental, then 
close agreement between an energy forecast and its outcome w ill also be 
accidental.
Following the increase in energy prices in 1973, long term  economic prospects, 
as assessed by the OECD were not diminished and consequently a steady 
expansion in energy consumption was seen to 1985. The OECD view v/as 
reinforced by other publications and che published Shell view in the autumn of 
1973 saw expansion of energy consumption at 4.5 per cent p.a. through to the 
year 2000. The substantial reductions in the OECD forecasts from  1976 
onwards showed tha t much of the precision data established fo r forecasts made 
prior to 1973 needed to be used with caution. When energy demand forecasts 
are set at levels v/hich require supplies of solid fuels or nuclear power which are 
clearly speculative, then an appraisal of the likelihood of these supply sources 
being developed should be included in appraising the precision which should be 
associated w ith  the energy demand forecast.
In Western Europe, solid fuel consumption forecasts tended to be optim istic, 
partly fo r po litica l purposes but mainly because cheap oil caused the coal 
industry to run down at rates faster than anticipated. Here was an instance 
where energy supply forecasts, made without exp lic it price assumptions and 
certa in ly not anticipating the decline in energy prices in real terms, were fa r 
too optim istic on the whole. The fa ilure of the coal industry to match the oil 
industry on prices led d irectly to the errors in the forecasts. The solid fuel 
forecasts made from 1973 onwards generally anticipated a rise in solid fuels 
consumption in the period to 1985 w ith  values as high as 448 m illion tonnes coal 
equivalent in 1985 being published by the OECD in 1974. But an independent US 
view by the Brookings Institu te projected a level of only 250 in 1985. The 
spread of the numbers quoted in forecasts, together w ith the reasons fo r the 
spread i f  they are exp lic it, is a useful guide to interpreting them and arriv ing at 
the best precision estimates. There is no one way of combining h istoric 
precision data w ith precision data established from the range of values quoted 
fo r future years but both should be combined to provide the best guidance.
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iNatuim qua uuusurnption Torqcasts railed to anticipate the indigenous supplies 
of gas which were developed in the 1960s and 1970s. This problem is an 
evergreen one when forecasting more than about five years ahead. The OEEC 
forecast made in 1955 anticipated consumption of 14 m illion tonnes o.e. in 1975; 
the actual was 151 m illion tonnes o.e. To have forecast, in 1955, a level of 150 
m illion tonnes in 1975 would have been completely speculative. In the long 
term, natural gas forecasts should be considered in two parts; those that are 
associated w ith proved reserves where the production level may be forecast 
w ith  considerably confidence and those parts which are speculative depending 
on production from unproven areas.
Hydropower forecasts have on the whole been reliable and very precise. I t  is 
seldom that forecasts are published which include speculative elements. I f  
these can be identified they should be treated separately from those based on 
existing and planned fac ilities linked to specified resources.
Nuclear power forecasts were nearly alv/ays too high. Failures in nuclear 
technology were partly responsible fo r the forecasts proving too optim istic but 
the main problem was po litica l. Forecasts were aimed deliberately high by 
those in the nuclear power industry to obtain government funds and some 
forecasts, such as that fo r the Euratom target, looked to nuclear power to solve 
the world's energy problems. When appraising nuclear power forecasts and 
establishing the like ly degree of uncertainly which should qualify them, on past 
performances forecasts made fo r nuciear power by those in the nuclear power 
industry should be disregarded.
The precision of to ta l oil demand forecasts varied considerably from  one 
country to another. The following conclusions may be drawn from  the averages 
fo r the individual European countries. As would be expected, the precision 
deteriorated the further ahead forecasts were made although the precision data 
calculated fo r Austria and Finland are exceptions. A forecast made two years 
ahead should agree with the eventual outcome to w ithin about +4 per cent of the 
level forecast. A forecast made six years ahead should agree w ith  the eventual 
outcome to w ithin + 10 per cent of the" level forecast. These precision data, 
derived over the 1966 - 1973 period, do not take into account the large 
deviations which were encountered from 1974 onwards when changes in 
forecasts were larger than the lim its  quoted (95 per cent probability lim its  are 
used). In future, such precision data should be applied only to anticipate the 
magnitude of the error that w ill be encountered in 'normal' conditions.
c *
- 165 -
Exceptional events such as major energy price revisions or supply crises may 
change demand forecasts by more than the lim its  quoted. In sta tistica l terms, 
thf>se are not events which would be included in the 5 per cent probability 
outside the lim its  quoted but are events which make the application of the 
precision data not justifiable in the s tr ic t s ta tistica l sense. Forecasts of oil 
demand made in 1971 for the year 1977 were re la tive ly unchanged'when revised 
in 1972 and again in 1973. The 1975 revision saw the in itia l 1971 forecasts 
reduced by a fac to r of one th ird  for all European countries. The actual 
outcomes proved to be 2 per cent higher than the 1975 revised forecasts. An 
important point from this example is tha t the dispersion measured, in the 
changes from  one year to the next, when there has been l i t t le  perceived change 
in the overall environment o f the forecasts, does not provide a reliable 
indication of the agreement to be expected between a forecast and its  of the 
agreement between a forecast and its  eventual outcome.
The precision of oil product forecasts varied considerably between products but, 
fo r the same products, precision data varied l it t le  from country to country.
The precision of motor gasoline forecasts was generally good. For example, 
forecasts of motor gasoline consumption for 1972, which had been made in 1966, 
agreed to w ith in 7 per cent fo r to ta l Western Europe. The under forecast of 
about one per cent p.a. was probably largely a consequence of under forecasting 
levels of economic activ ity  and disposable incomes. However the forecasts 
were not accompanied by explic it forecasts of the economic variables so it  is 
not possible to quantify that part of the error due to lack of precision 
associated w ith the economic forecasts and that due to other factors.
Gas oil forecasts, in the period to 1973, did not suffer from  drastic revisions in 
spite of the rapid advance of natural gas. Forecasts made fo r six years ahead 
could be expected to agree w ith the outcome to w ithin + 20 per cent. However 
the forecasts made in years up to 1973 for 1977 proved to be high by 30 per cent 
or more in the three countries France, UK and Germany.
It is doubtful whether the precision data of fuel oil forecasts derived from 
forecasts made fo r any previous time period may be applied to current or future 
forecasts w ithout substantial qualification. There is so much possible 
competition between fuel oil and other energy sources and i t  may also be policy 
to use fuel oil as a balancing fuel, that probability lim its  on fuel oil forecasts 
should be arrived at only a fte r a consideration of factors such as possible 
substitution and other energy supply uncerta in ties.
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products, did not withstand the test of the shock to the system of the 1973 
energy price increases. For example, forecasts made fo r 1977 in 1973 and 
previous years proved to be about 30 per cent too high whereas the precision 
data would have indicated 95 per cent probability lim its  of +10 per cent or less 
fo r the UK and German forecasts (1973 forecasts for the year 1977).
The substantial revisions made to all energy and oil product forecasts following 
the 1973 price increases understandably led to a loss of confidence in the longer 
term forecasts (5 years ahead or more). The realisation that energy price 
changes could have severe impacts on that energy price forecasts could be 
extremely uncertain, led to re la tive ly more consideration being given to short 
term  forecasts i.e. forecasts by quarter for up to two or three years ahead.
Quarterly forecasts for oil products for OECD Europe, made one year ahead, 
showed the same ranking between products that was observed w ith  the long 
term  forecasts. From an analysis of six consecutive forecasts, the average 
error on motor sp irit forecasts was 3.3 per cent, on gas oils 6.5 per cent, on fuel 
oils 7.5 per cent and on to ta l oil consumption was 4.7 per cent.
The point is made that B ritish Petroleum’s in-house forecasts were those 
published through the period. This-point is a useful one to substantiate that the 
BP oil product forecasts which have been analysed were components of the 
published forecasts and to illustrate the transparency of oil and energy 
forecasts. The Mobil oil forecasts which were published in 1970, showed how 
conscious Mobil was of the under forecasting which had been endemic in the 
1960s. However the danger of projecting trends at high growth rates was v/ell 
illustrated by the substantial downwards revision made in the post-1973 period. 
Continued expectations of high growth rates, i f  proved unjustified, can be 
ruinous to business operations (e.g. Burmah Oil) and to governments' policies. 
The ruinous OECD oil tanker policy and the problems faced a fte r 1973 by 
shipowners, financiers and shipbuilders, were a direct result of shipbuilding 
running excessively ahead of oil consumption.
The relationships which exist between macroeconomic variables and energy 
usage form a basis fo r providing forecasts of energy demand. The relationship 
between the energy consumption and the GNP is one which has been reported 
extensively in the litera ture  and which has been much used fo r forecasting 
energy demand from forecasts of the GNP. A coherent set of energy data for 
Western Europe 1955 - 1975 was constructed (Appendix 2) and was used in the 
sta tistica l work.
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As expected very high correlation coefficients were observed between energy 
consumption and the GNP (0.990) for Western Europe, and also between energy 
consumption and the index of industrial production (0.996). It made l it t le  
difference to the relationships whether energy data was constructed on the low 
or high factors for hydro and nuclear power or whether oil was rated at 10000 
k.cal./kg. or 10500 k.cal./kg. It could be concluded that working w ith data over 
a twenty year period, the great care taken in establishing the energy data base 
was not necessary. To seme extent fo r the particular period considered, this 
was true. The contribution from nuclear energy was almost insignificant and 
the contribution from hydropower at the 8 per cent level throughout the period. 
In an area as large as Western Europe there is l it t le  scope fo r drastic swings 
between primary energy sources from one year to the next. Obtaining high 
values for the correlation coefficients w ill therefore depend less on the quality 
o f the data but much more on the ranges of the variables.
The relationships derived between the PE and GNP and IP provided good 
agreement between the calculated and observed values over the period. 
However there were good reasons why the relationships would be less suited for 
application beyond 1974 than w ith in the period 1955 to 1973. There were 
planned conservation measures, sector changes in consumption and substitution. 
On a statis tica l basis alone, the regression equations would not be considered 
applicable on account of these changes in the data set i.e. of changes in 
variables exonogenous to the regression equations but clearly influencing the 
relationship.
In the years 1974 and 1975, the PE/GNP and PE/IP relationships could be used 
to measure energy conservation. The difference between the level o f energy 
calculated to support the actual GNP and IP levels and the energy actually 
consumed could be termed the conservation e ffec t. As measured by the 
equation using the index of industrial production, conservation of energy was 4 
per cent in 1974. A calculation carried out fo r Western Europe as a whole, 
ignoring changes in economic sector mix and other factors, is necessarily a 
crude measure but nevertheless the method is a simple and readily applicable 
method of measuring energy conservation.
Relationships between the GNP and IP and key variables denoting a c tiv ity  in the 
petrochemicals sector i.e. ethylene and benzene, were derived. I t  was 
concluded that whilst equations derived relating ethylene consumption to the 
GNP and also to the IP quantified the relationship during the 1955 - 1975 period 
very adequately, they were not relationships which were suitable fo r projecting 
ethylene and benzene demand beyond 1975.
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historic relationships. In the 1955 - .1975 period ethylene consumption expanded 
both by creating new markets and by substituting for other materials. These 
tv,'3 factors could well have varying growth rates in the future which would not 
necessarily be indicated by the historic growth rate. As w ith  energy and oil 
products, forecasts of ethylene demand were revised substantially downwards 
follow ing the energy price rise to an extent which invalidated relationships for 
the 1955 - 1975 period.
The technique of principal components analysis was used to comment on the 
S tatistical relationships between variables being so dependent on the ranges of 
the variables rather than on the merits of underlying relationships. As the tim e 
period studied is reduced, the ranges of the variables are reduced and the 
correlation coefficients decrease. In component analysis terms systems which 
may appear to be unidimensional when the variables cover re la tive ly wide 
ranges, appear to include several real dimensions when the ranges are reduced. 
The same e ffec t was illustrated with data from three European countries and 
w ith  USA data.
So many of the macroeconomic variables are well correlated w ith  energy 
consumption and a c tiv ity  in the petrochemicals sector that s ta tis tica l 
relationships w ith  high correlation coefficients can be obtained in large numbers 
but whether the relationships have a causal basis is another m atter. One 
defin ite exception to this rule is shown w ith steel production in the UK. Whilst 
many other sectors were expanding, the steel sector stagnated hence 
correlation coefficients between steel and other variables were low.
The overall conclusion from the sta tis tica l work was tha t the purely 
mechanistic sta tis tica l methods should carry l it t le  weight in forecasting 
methodology. These methods are of value fo r analysis of h istoric data and may 
be used to quantify factors such as energy conservation although not completely 
unambiguously.
Energy prices in Western Europe were much influenced by governments through 
national energy companies and taxation and a l it t le  through policies other than 
the policy exercised through nationalised industries. But basically energy prices 
and oil product prices were a product of the world environment.
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from the Middle East to Europe could be $30 ton and when there were fa r too 
many tankers the cost would be $3 ton. In the case of oil tankers, shortages and 
excesses could be caused by under or overforecasting oil demand but incorrect 
policies or the lack of policies for the shipbuilding industry were major factors 
ijS tile  OECD world. In many ways forecasting and policies can influence energy 
prices.
World energy prices tend to be set by the supplies of coal and oil. This 
competition was provided not by Western Europe's coal but by the cheaper coal 
in the international trade produced in areas such as the USA and Poland.
Rotterdam and Genoa became established centres of the oil product trade in 
Western Europe and prices for oil products were quoted daily at these centres, 
the landed cost of crude at these centres (cost of crude at the loading port plus 
the cost of fre ight) set the to ta l cost of the oil products produced from the 
crude. Oil product prices were set in the marginal markets in part by fuel oil 
competing w ith the price of coal and the cost of producing motor sp irit from 
distillates. But the stocks of oil products in and overhanging these markets also 
had a substantial influence on product prices. With well established supply 
networks fo r the supply of the d iffe rent quality crude oils worldwide, the free 
market price of oil products was in equilibrium worldwide to approximately 
w ith in  the cost of moving oil products from one market to another. Whatever a 
country's oil policy and how tigh tly  i t  wished to control its energy and oil 
product prices, u ltim ate ly i t  was much dependent on the world environment.
Oil product prices, in all countries, net of consumer government taxes, were set 
mainly be the prices in the marginal markets w ith  local substantial influence. 
From the published price indices of Shell and Exxon Of the ir proceeds in 
European markets i t  proved possible to line these up quite closely w ith  the 
Rotterdam prices fo r motor spirits, gas oils and fuel oils. This close alignment 
was a good demonstration of how Rotterdam prices were related to prices to 
consumers in Europe.
In certain cases errors made in energy demand forecasting have made an impact 
on energy prices and policies whilst at other times errors have made l i t t le  
impact. The forecasts made around 1972, which showed a continued strong 
demand for energy and oil together with a theoretica lly like ly cross-over 
between the oil demand and supply forecasts in the late 1970s, made a major 
impact on prices and subsequently on policy.
0
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reducing the demand for a commodity is seen to be running ahead of potential 
supply, reducing the demand by increasing the price is one solution. In the case 
of oil demand, both increased prices and changes in energy policy served to 
lim it fu rther growth in oil consumption.
Control of 'own o il1 had been an important concept of energy policy fo r some 
European nations. Participation by the producing countries and the Arab oil 
embargo of 1973/4 were major factors augmenting the oil price increase to 
change European energy policy from one of cheap energy to lim iting  Europe's 
exposure to a high level of oil imports.
To sum up, the sequence of events was as follows. Participation was accepted 
in principle by the major oil companies in 1972 and in the same year there was 
rapidly diminishing cred ib ility  in long term  energy and oil demand forecasts. In 
1973 the major oil companies changed (revised downwards) the ir forecasts and 
in i974 supranational, government and other forecasts were changed. Energy 
conservation, substitution of oil by other fuels, security of supply and lim iting  
the demand fo r energy by any means came to the fron t of energy policy. A t the 
same time shipowners and shipbuilders were h it by the over supply of tankers 
and governments in most countries had problems w ith  shipbuilding financing and 
w ith their shipbuilding labour forces brought on as a result of the ir previous lack 
of decisive co-ordinated policy in this area.
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PRICE OF CRUDE OIL IMPORTS
- $/tonne
EUR-6 Doutschland • France llalin ,Nodorland BclgioBelgique
1955 21,09 21,62 21,12 19,27 21,67 21,04
1956 22,05 23,25 22,82 20,91 22.80 23,06
. 1957 28,38 < 27,13 28,85 24,35 29.81 28,05
1958 22,97 23.08 24,39 . 19,70 24,71 24,08
1S59 20,31 21,03 20,70 17,56 22,07 22,14
1960 19,32 • 19,67 19,50 16,18 20,53 20,90
1961 18,34 .18,62 19,56 15,22 o. 20,72 19,15
1962 17,72 17,75 19,41 14,65 20,32 13,59
1CG3 17,32 17,28 19,00 14,43 19,68 18,42
1964 16,91 16,99 18,62 14,24 19.3S 17,92
1965 16,15 15,55 18,52 13,83 17,50 17,22
1966 15,32 14,95 17,52 13,58 16,14 14,94
1967 16,54 16,17 10,06 15,36 . 17,01 16,77
1968 ' 17,07 16,66 17,97 16,34 17,54 17,55
1969 16,12 16,18 16,65 15,37- 16,15 16,36
1370 16,48 16,42 16,74 15,91 16,69 17,40
Source.f
Eurostat^  (SOEC Luxembourg)^  
Price of.Fuel Oil I960 - 1974 .
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Tuel-oil 
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N> 2
O.C.denso Stookolio 3 GOO"
fuel-oil 
extra lourd 
Bunker C
Fuel-oil 
extra lourd 
IJun'<jr C
Heavy fuel oil Sva:t luelolio Heavy fuel oil
1960 1
/
16,oi 25,95 26,71 15,79 18,60 26,00 23,13 24,90 .* * r . 18,57 25,68 23,60 14,74 17,80 24,00 23,13 22,87
7 21.43 25,38 22,40 14,21 1 7,40 23,00 22,62 22,87
10 20.00 25,30 23,68 14,74 21,20 25,00 22,62 22,87
1961 1 19,28 25,38 25,83 13,95 20,80 25,60 17.89 23,45
4 20,75 25,47 20,88 14.36 - 19,60 23,60 17,83 23,89
7 21,25 24,81 19,20 14,93 19,80 22,00 22,82 23,89
10 21,25 24,83 24,00 15,47 20,20 25,60 23,72 23,89
1962 1 21.75 24,91 24,90 16,30 21,20 27,40 23,72 23,89
4 21,75 23,73 24,00 16,30 20,00 24,00 23,72 23,89
7 21,75 23,76 22,40 16,30 19,20 21,60 23,13 23,89
10 21,75 23,11 22,59 16,60 19,80 24,00 23,13 24,61
1963 1 22,75 23,07 24,06 17,13 20,40 25,40 22.04 25,77
4 2.2,50 23,07 23,04 17,13 20,00 24,30 22,04 25,77
7 22,50 23,09 21,47 16,85 19.20 22.30 . 22,04 25,77
10 22,25 23,09 21,76 16,85 19,00 22,50 22,04 25,49
1964' 1 21,50 23,03 22,53 16,85 19,40 23,10 20,66 22,73
4 20,75 22,99 21,41 16,02 13,00 21,00 20,66 23.16
7 20,00 22,44 19,52 16,02 16,20 19,80 20,66 22,59
10 19,50 22,18 20,60 15,19 1 6.60 20,40 20,66 19,11
1965 1 19,00 21,92 20,72 15,19 17,20 21.50 19,29 19,11
4 19,00 21,51 20,64 15,19 17,00 20,70 19,29 19,11
7 19,00 21,25 18,00 14,64 17,20 19,30 19,29 18,82 •
10 19,25 21,27 20,76 14,92 17,20 20,50 19,29 18,82 •
1966 ‘1 19,00 20,46 22,68 16,02 18,60 24,90 20,03 18,82 29,06
4 19,00 20,46 21,92 17,13 18,20 24,90 20.08 18,82 29,03
7 20,00 -20,46 21,60 17,13 17,60 24,90 20,08 18,82 29,05
10 2.0,00 20,46 21.52 17,13 17,30 24,90 20,66 18,82 29,06
1967 1 20,25 18,23 22,24 17,40 17,40 21,90 21,06 18,82 29,06 .
4 20,25 18,23 21,44 17,40 17,10 21.90 21,06 18,82 29,05
7 22,50 18,63 24,32 18,23 20,20 21,90 26.46 26,49 34,41
. 10 22,25 18,63 24,32 19,06 20,80 24.10 26,46 26,49 34,41
1968 1 20,00 18,43 24,48 17,13 20,90 . 24,20 23,45 24,40 29,50
4 19,50 18,43 24,00 17,13 18,70 23,30 22,94 22,93 29,50
7 19,50 18.43 21,60 16,57 18,30 23,30 22,66 22,40 29,50
10 19,50 18,43 21,76 15,75 17,60 . 21,20 21,48 22,40 28,37
1969 1 19,25 17,01 22,08 16,02 16,70 20,90 23,45 22,40 28,37
4 18,75 16,20 22,0S 16,02 16.60 20,10 22,94 22,13 28,90
7 18,75 16,20 20,64 . 16.02 15,40 19,30 21,77 22,13 28,90
10 19,25 14,40 20,64 16,02 15,50 19,30 19,80 22,13 26,66
1970 1 22,13 15,48 21,60 16,85 17,70 21,40 19,61 22,13 26,66
• 4 22,68 15,84 22,08 19,34 19,40 23,80 19,61 22,00 26,65
7 24,32 21,97 22,64 22,65 24,80 28,80 20,09 23,33 2.6,66
10 27,32 24,31 24.32 27,34 29,40 33,40 22,66 26,00 28,90
1971 1 31,53 26,54 27,28 27,29 31,60 38.90 31,03 28,00 31,20
4 35,19 30,25 28,32 28,44 29,00 37,60 33,70 30,27 37,32
7 35,19 32,23 25,92 26,64 26,40 35,60 33,29 30,27 37,32
10 30,03 31,72 20,48 21,62 22,00 35,20 33,10 26,40 37,32
1972 1 29,21 30,96 22,86 20,35 20,94 33.99 35,04 28,37 39,93
• 4 29,71 25.55 28,23 21,70 21,99 39,45 34,92 28,37 40,59
7 29,87 26,14 24,44 22,07 21,91 29.48 32,29 28,37. 38,00
10 2.9,78 24,09 23,15 22,30 22,19 41,54 30,69 28,37 37.26
1973 1 29,87 24,14 29.05 22,78 24,48 42,84 29,78 30,52 37,18
4 33,66 30.99 30,43 27,15 27,89 48.32 29,88 33.79 39.19
7 40,44 35.10 28,19 30,22 30,59 55,26 31,25 37,94 40,64
10 36,80 34,17 30,04 29,98 37,44 53.57 31,37 38,05 40,31
1974 1 51,24 35,60 40,81 32,01 39,11 52,47 39,39 83,04 49,35
Source.^ SOEGj Luxembourg „
TABLE A 1 0 .1 3
SEASONALITY OF MOTOR SPIRIT PRICES 
Price of Premium Motor Spirit at Rotterdam
$ tonne Per Cent of Annual Average
Si Q2 03 04 Si 02 03 04
\
1967 29 31 45 39 20.1 21.5 31.3 27a
1966 27 31 30 28,5 23.2 26.6 25.9 24.5
19 69 26 25 24.5 24,5 26.0 25.0 24.5 24.5
1970 24.5 24 30.5 3l«5 22,2 21.7 27.6 28.5
1971 34 35 33 32,5 27.3 28a 26.5 26.1
1972 32.5 35 42.5 45 21.0 22.6 27.4 29.0
1973 56.5 94 90.5 146 14.6* 24.3* 23.4* 37.7*
1974 164 168 118 113 29.1 29.8 21.0 20 a
1975 120 135 127 134 23-3 26.2 24.6 26.0
Average 23.0 25.1 25 .8 26.0
A^verage without 1973 24a 25.2 26a 24.5
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TABLE AIO.IU 
SEASONALITY OP ROTTERDAM BRICES
Price of Gas Oil, Paige Quantities
$ tonne Per Cent of Annual Average
01 02 §5 04 si 02 S5 04
1967 21 19 50 29.5 21.1 19.1 30.2 29.6
1968 50.5 25.5 25.5 25.5 29.6 22.8 22.8 24.8
1969 25 20 19.5 19.5 28.0 24.4 25.8 25.8
1970 21 21 28.5 55*5 20.2 20.2 27.4 32.2
1971 55 50.5 26.5 25 29.9 26.1 22.6 21.4
1972 24.5 24 25.5 52.5 25.0 22.5 25*9 50.5
1975 40.5 55 74.5 164*5 12.1* 16.4* 22.5* 49 r 2*
1974 112 87.5 92.5 91.5 29.2 22.8 24.1 23.9
1975 84 96 108 112 21.2 24.2 27.5 28.3
Average 25*9 22.1 24*9 29.5
^Average exluding 1975 25*5 22.8 25*5 26.8
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. 7 ' TABLE A10.15
SSiiSOmLITY Off ROTTERDAM PRICES 
Price of Heavy Fuel Oil 5.5}>> Sulphur, Barge Quantities $ tonne
$ tonno Per Cent of Annual Average
si 02 03 04 01 02 03 04
1967 10.5 11 14 13.5 21.4 22.4 28.6 27.6
1968 13 12.5 11 10 30 26.9 ' 25.? 21.5
1969 10 10 1C 10 25 25 25 25
1970 13 15.5 22.5 21 18.0 21.5 31.3 29.2
1971 25 20 11.5 11.5 34.9 30.5 17.4 17.4
1972 13.5 14 14.5 14.5 23.9 24.8 25.7 28.7
1973 17.5 17.5 17 63 15.2* 15.2* 14.8* 54.8*
1974 82.5 65*5 62 68.5 29.6 23.5 22.5 24*6
1975 70 65 57 55 28.5 26.5 25.1 22.5
Average 25.1 24.0 23.5 27.5
^Average without 1973 26.5 25.1 24*6 24.1
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; TABLE A10.16
TUB :COTOIBUTJOIT OF MJEL OIL TO TUG GFW 
Per Cent
01 02 03 04
1967 27 28 25 25
1968 24 27 25 25
1969 25 27 27 27
1970 32 36 38 34
1971 35 33 -24 25
1972 28 29 28 24
1973 22 17 14 25
1974 33 31 32 35
1975 36 32 28 26
Average 
excluding 1973 50 30 28 27
Note In the above calculations, the weighting on fuel oil 
in the GFW was 41 percent. The nearest approach to this recovery 
factor was with the energy shortage in 50 1970 when 58 percent 
of the GFW was attributed to the fuel oil price.
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TABLE A10.17
THE GPW AS A PROPORTION OF THE! lAHDED COST OF CRUDE 
(Price Grade Oil f.o.b. plus spot freigiil LG-^ LV/B)
/j
j
01 02 £2 04
1967 1.14 1.10 0.86 1.05
1968 1.20 0.91 0.97 0.97
1969 1.01 1.08 0.88 0.79
1970 0.86 0.82 0.85 0.86
1971 0.97 1.29 1.15 0.99
1972 1.07 1.09 1.06 1.11
1973 1.14 1.18 1.97 2.51
1974 1.14 1.01 0.93 0.95
1975 0.98 1 .04 1.01 0.97
Average 
excluding 1973 1.05 1.04 0.96 0.96
In all years the GPW is calculated using the equation
GPW - 0.10 PMS + 0.03 HMS + 0.07 LDB + 0.03 Jet Eero + 0.30 GO + O.4I HFO.
The landed cost of crude is the market price of Arabian Light 
plus the'spot freight PG-PWE; (from Tables A10.4 to A10.12)
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TABLE A10#18
The Relationship between Rotterdam Spot Market Brices and European Harket 
Brices of Oil Products (net of excise taxes), Exxon Lata, by quarter.
i
!
Gasoline Gas Oil (Heating Oil) Fuel Oils
Late RotterdamPrices*
$ tonne 
A
Exxon
Sales
Price
$ tonne
B
b/a
%
Rotterdam
Price
$ tonne 
A
Exxon
Sales
Price
$ tonne
B
b/a
%
Rotterdam
Price**
$ tonne 
A
Exxon
Sales
Price
S tonne
B
b/a
0/TO
1073 57 57 100 41 41 100 17.5 17.5 100
2073 94 6 3 67 55 48 87 17.5 19-5 114
3073 91 69 76 75 61 81 17 20 118
4073 146 75 51 165 72 44 63 24.5 39
1074 163 107 66 112 91 81 82 43 52
2074 168 132 79 88 96 109 65 5L 78
3074 118 129 109 93 96 103 62 53 85
4Q74 113 128 113 92 94 102 68 57 84
1075 120 146 122 84 104 124 70 66 94
2075 135 1 4 6' 108 96 ' 102 106 65 64 98
3075 127 137 108 108 101 94 57 53 93
4075 134 137 102 112 108 96 55 53 96
*  m s
* *  3*5%  Sulphur Fuel Oil
Source of Lata Annual Report Exxon Corporation 1975 > Financial and 
Statistical Supplement and Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, 26th April, 1976•
/ Exxon published indices were converted to $ tonne taking the 10,73 
index for each product equivalent to Rotterdam price#
c
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TABLE A10«19
The Relationship between Rotterdam Spot Market Prices and 
European Market Prices of Oil Product3» Exxon Annual Data
Gasoline Gas Oil (Heating Oil) Fuel Oils
Late Rotterdam • Prices*
0 tonne 
A
Exxon
Sales
Price
$ tonne
B
b/a
°/o
Rotterdam
Price
$ tonne 
A
Exxon
Sales
Price
1 tonne
B
b/a
%
Rotterdam
Price** bales 
rirL Price
$ tonne $ tonne
A B
b/a
%
1965" 29 44 152 18 25.5 142 10.5 8 ,5 81
1966* 29 • 43 148 22 25.5 116 11.5 9.0 78
1967 56 43 119 25 27.5 110 12.5 9.5 76
1968 31.5 42 . 133 24 28.5 119 11.5 10 87
1969 25 40 160 20.5 ; 25.5 124- 10 10 100
1970 27.5 41 149 26 29.5 115 18 12.5 69
1971 33.5 48 145 29.5 35*5 120 16.5 16.5 100
1972 39 52 133 ■ 26.5 33.5 126 . 14 16.5 118
1975 97 67 69 • 85.5 53.5 64. 29 • 20.5 59
1974 140 125 , 89 96 90.5 94 69 48.5 70
1975 129 142 110 99 105 104 62 59.5 96
*  m s
** 3»^ Sulphur Fuel Oil
Source of Lata Annual Report Exxon Corporation 1975 > Financial and 
Statistical Supplement and Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, 26th April, 1976.
/ Exxon published indices were converted to $ tonne talcing the 1Q73 
index for each product equivalent to Rotterdam price.
1965 and 1966 Rotterdam prices were estimated from SOEC data taking 
into account crude oil and freight data. Source, "The Price of Fuel 
Oils 1960-1974" SOEC, Luxemburg, 1974*
O V
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; TABLE A10»20
The Relationship between Rotterdam Spot Market Brices and European Market 
Prices of Oil Products (Shell Lata)
Gasoline Gas Oil (Heating Oil)
b/a
%
Fuel Oils
Date RotterdamPricei
$ toime 
A
Shell
Sales
Price
$ tonne
B
b/a
c/6
Rotterdam
Price
$ tonne 
A
Shell
Sales
Price
$ tonne
B
Rotterdam
Price
$ tonne 
A
Shell
Sales
Price
$ tonne
B
b/a
%
1969 25 58 152 20.5 26 127 10 11.5 115
1970 27*5 - - 27 - - 18 - -
1971 55.5 - - 29.5 - - 16.5 - -
1972 59 46 118 26.5 52 121 14 15.5 111
1975 97 64 66 83.5 54 65 29 20.5 71
1074 165 99 61 112 92 82 82 59 53
2074 168 127 76 87.5 102 •117 65 51 78
5074 118 127 108 95 101 109 62 54 87
4074 113 127 115 92 105 114 68 59 86
1974 140 - — 96 - - 69 - —
1075 120 142 118 8 4 . 109 130 70 66 94
2075 155 140 104 96 106 110 65 64 98
5075 127 154 106 108 104 96 57 55 96
4075 154 154* 100 112 112* 100 55 55* 100
1975 129 - - 99 - 62 - —
1076 144 138 96 >
in0
. 115 110 67 59 88
*The Shell prices "B" v;ere calculated from their published indices 
taking 40.75 as being equal to the Rotterdam levels for each product. 
Source of Shell Data petroleum Intelligence Weekly, 9th August, 1976.
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